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I ask you to stop and think for a moment what it would mean to
have nuclear weapons in so many hands, in the hands of countries
large and small, stable and unstable, responsible and irresponsible,
scattered throughout the world.1
President John F. Kennedy
From the dawn of the nuclear era, the problem of nuclear weapons
proliferation has confronted the nations of the world. Since 1945,
despite continuing efforts to prevent further proliferation, there has
been a five-fold increase in the number of nations having nuclear
weapons of their own. At last, after long and arduous negotiations, the
United States and the Soviet Union have reached agreement on a
"Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons." 2 This Treaty
represents "the maximum area of agreement now obtainable."3 It has
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1. A Step Toward Peace: Report to the People on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,
Docu ENTF~rs ON DiSAR.NMiA.3!.N'r, 1963, at 250 (U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency Pub.
No. 24, 1964).
2. The complete Treaty did not emerge until June 10, 1968. U.N. General Assembly,
A/RES/2373(xxii), Annex, U.N. Doc. A/7Ol6IAdd.l, Annex, June 10, 1968.
3. Statement of United States Representative to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament
Committee (ENDC). Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference Proe.s Verbale 378
(prov.), at 23 [hereinafter cited as ENDC/PV].
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been widely discussed in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee
in Geneva,4 the NATO Council in Brussels,5 and the United Nations
Agreement was first reached between the United States and the Soviet Union on a draft
Treaty on August 24, 1967, at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee. The draft
was complete in all major respects except for Article III, dealing with safeguards on
peaceful nuclear activities. The Soviet Union insisted at that time, perhaps in a pcculiar
application of a principal of separate and equal, on tabling identical drafts rather than
one agreed draft. For the treaty draft of August 24, 1967, see DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT,
1967, at 338 (U.. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency Pub. No. 46, 1968) [hereinafter
cited as DOCUME'NTS ON DISARMAMENT, 1967]. Speeches by United States and Soviet Union
Representatives to the ENDC at the time of tabling are reprinted in id. 342, 347.
A second set of identical drafts was tabled by the United States and tie Soviet Union at
the ENDC on January 18, 1968. For text see ENDC/I92fRev.1. For the United States and
Soviet Union tabling speeches, see ENDC/PV.357. The January 18, 1968, draft included
Article III and also incorporated as amendments certain suggestions of other delegations
to the ENDC made during intervening discussion of the August 24, 1967. draft.
A third agreed draft was presented by the United States and the Soviet Union to the
ENDC on March 11, 1968, which incorporated certain minor changes in light of discussions
since the second draft had been tabled. ENDC/225, Annex A. For the United States and
Soviet Union tabling speeches, see ENDCIPV.376. Article IX, paragraph 2, in which the
names of Depositary Governments were to be specified, was still blank. Previously, on
March 7, 1968, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom had pre.
sented to the ENDC a draft resolution of the United Nations Security Council on security
assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states. ENDC/225, Annex B. For tabling speeches of
the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom, see ENDC/PV.375. The
March 11, 1968, draft Treaty and March 7, 1968, draft Security Council resolution were
submitted by the ENDC in its report to the United Nations General Assembly on March
14, 1968, and, thereafter, were discussed primarily in the First Committee (Political and
Security) of the resumed 22d Session of the General Assembly, which convened on April
26, 1968. In light of these discussions, on May 31, 1968, certain changes were agreed to by
the United States and the Soviet Union and incorporated into the June 10, 1968, Treaty
text.
Most of the public documents dealing with non-proliferation and the Treaty are col.
lected in DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT, a series compiled and issued annually by tle United
States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. An excellent historical account of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty, issued under the auspices of the U.S. Arms Control and Dis.
armament Agency is LAMBERT, ErFORTS TO PREVENT THE SPREAD OF NUCLEA, WEAroNS
(1968). The story of post-World War II arms control negotiations in general, up to 1961, is
authoritatively and readably told in B. BECHHOEFER, POSTWAR NEGOTIATIONS FOR ARMS
CONTROL (1961). See also KLEIN, L'ENTRPRISE DU DSARMEMENT DEPUIS 1945 (1961); OrFiats
OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, THE UNITED NATIONS AND DISARMAMENT 1945-1965 (United
Nations, no date).
4. The ENDC was established by agreement between the United States and the Soviet
Union and endorsed unanimously by the U.N. General Assembly on December 20, 1961. 16
U.N. GAOR 1129, A/RES/1722(xvi), Jan. 3, 1962; DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT, 1961, at
741 (U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency, Pub. No. 5, 1961). The Committee is
composed of five NATO members: Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the
United States; five Warsaw Pact members: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania,
and the Soviet Union; and eight non-aligned nations: Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India,
Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, and the United Arab Republic. France has never taken part In
the meetings. The United States and the Soviet Union serve as permanent co.chairmen.
The Committee first convened on March 14, 1962. The basis for discussion was a United
States-Soviet Union "Agreed Statement of Principles" for future multilateral negotiations
on disarmament. Paragraph 8 of the Joint Statement stated in part: "States partlcipatlng
in the negotiations should seek to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at
the earliest possible date." Under the rubric of this paragraph, a Committee of the Whole
was established (since discontinued) to discuss so-called "collateral measures." The Coin-
mittee of the Whole agreed on May 25, 1962, to begin "concurrent" discussions on two
proposals. The United States' item was reduction of the risk of war by accident, mIs.
calculation, or failure of communications; the Soviet Union's item was non-proliferation of
nuclear weapons, which at the time meant little more than an excuse for propaganda
attacks against West Germany. DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT, 1963, at 544 (U.S. Arms
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General Assembly in New York. Moreover, on June 12, 1968, the
Treaty was commended in a resolution of the United Nations General
Assembly-adopted by a vote of 95 in favor, 4 against and 21 abstaining0
-and on June 19, 1968, in conjunction with the Treaty, a resolution
on "security assurances" was adopted by the Security Council Now
each nation must decide whether or not to become a party.8
A goal of overriding importance in the nuclear era is the avoidance
of nuclear war.9 A flat prohibition on the further spread of nuclear
Control & Disarmament Agency Pub. No. 24, 1954). As of March 14, 1968, when it adjourned
for discussion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the General Assembly, the ENDC had
held 379 plenary meetings divided into 13 sessions. Much in addition to non.proliferation
has been discussed, but the Non-Proliferation Treaty is clearly the Committee's major
accomplishment to date.
5. An account of NATO consultations regarding the Non-Proliferation Treat) is
contained in Hearings on Arms Control and Disarmament Act Amendments. 1968, Before
the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 90th Cong., 2d Sem. 29-30 (1958).
6. For text see A/RES/2375(.-xii), U.N. Doc. A/7016/Add.l, at 5, June 10, 1963.
Four members were absent at the vote. Those against were Albania, Cuba, Tanzania and
Zambia. Among the abstentions were Argentina, Brazil, France, India and Spain. The first
three operative paragraphs of the resolution are:
"1. Commends the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the text of
which is annexed to the present resolution;
"2. Requests the Depositary Governments to open the Treaty for signature and rati-
fication at the earliest possible date;
"S. Expresses the hope for the widest possible adherence to the Treaty by both nuclear-
weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States .... "
In a previous resolution of November 19, 1965, the General Assembly had urged "the
early conclusion" of a non-proliferation treaty which should "be void of loop-holes" and
should "embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the
nuclear and non-nuclear Powers." A/RES/2028(.xX), Nov. 23, 1965; Docu:,tr O Dts.
AP-.iENT, 1965, at 532 (U.S. Arms Control & Disanament Agency Pub. No. 34. 19GG)
[hereinafter cited as Docubmusrs ON DIsR.MA.MEENr, 1965]. At the resumed 22d Session of
the General Assembly, the Treaty was criticized by many non-nuclear-weapon states
mainly because it violated, in their view, the principle of "balance" of obligation of
non-nuclear and nuclear states.
7. The vote was 10 in favor, 0 against and 5 abstentions. Among the abstentions were
France and Pakistan. SlRES/255, June 19, 1968. For text of operative paragraphs see
note 154 infra.
8. On May 17, 1966, the Senate approved without a dissenting vote a resolution
sponsored by Senator Pastore, Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, which
recognizes that "the spread of nuclear weapons constitutes a grave threat to the security
and peace of all nations," and commends "the President's serious and urgent efforts to
negotiate international agreements limiting the spread of nuclear weapons and supports
the principle of additional efforts.., for the solution of nuclear proliferation problems."
S. Res. 179, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). For hearings on this Resolution see Hearings on
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons Before the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
A conference of non-nuclear-weapon states, not limited to U.N. members, is scheduled
to be held in Geneva, August 29-September 28, 1968, pursuant to General Assembly
resolution. A/RES/2346(xxii), Jan. 5, 1968. Topics on the agenda will include: (1) methods
of assuring the security of non-nuclear-weapon states, (2) implications of the production
and acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear.weapon states, (3) prevention of pro-
liferation through cooperation among non-nuclear-weapon states, (4) programs for the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and (5) implementation of conference decisions.
9. For a dispassionate and revealing assessment of the effects of a variety of possible
uses of nuclear weapons, including a summary of the effects of the Hiroshima and
Nagasaki drops, see Report of the Secretary-General, infra note 14, at 6-28. The classic
work in the field is Tnz EFFEcrs OF NuC.AR WAPO NS (Glasstone ed. 196-, issued jointly
by the AEC and the Department of Defense.
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weapons to additional states seems justified as the preferred policy when
it is weighed against other alternatives in relation to this goal. More-
over, even though non-proliferation itself is not likely to reduce the
present risk of nuclear war, a general non-proliferation policy may be
justified as perhaps the only means of buying the time needed to take
further steps which might lead to a significant reduction in that risk.10
The principal aim of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is to prevent the
present five nuclear-weapon states1 from increasing to ten or fifteen
in the future.12 At the same time, the Treaty is intended to permit,
indeed to accelerate, the future development and spread of peaceful uses
of nuclear energy throughout the world.
10. It is often asserted that non-proliferation policy should be viewed as a means to
the end of disarmament: e.g., "A treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not
an end in itself but only a means to an end. That end is the achievement of General and
Complete Disarmament, and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament." Eight Nation
Joint Memorandum Submitted to the ENDC, Sept. 15, 1965, ENDCJ158; DocuaENTs ON
DISARMAMENT, 1965, at 424. While non-proliferation policy is related to disarmament
policy, both nuclear and conventional, all such policies should be evaluated in terms of
their effect on the likelihood of use of force, especially nuclear force. A disarmament
scheme which increased the likelihood of nuclear war would not be good policy, For a
statement of the reasons why the further spread of nuclear weapons "increases the danger
of nuclear war and diminishes the security of all nations," see testimony of Secretary of
State Rusk in Hearings on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons Before the Joint Gomt.
on Atomic Energy, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 4 (1966). For a statement contra which concludes
that: "a policy of vigorously pursuing a [non-proliferation] treaty over tie reservations
of a number of allies and friendly neutrals may represent a mistaken notion of the [U.S.]
national interest," see testimony of Dr. James McBride, Hearings on Arms Control and
Disarmament Act Amendments, 1968, Before the House Comm. on Foreign Aflairs, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 37, 40 (1968).
The other basic relationship against which non-proliferation policy should be evaluated,
however, is that between proliferation and economic development. The costs of various
kinds of nuclear weapons capabilities can be determined with a fair degree of accuracy,
See, e.g., Report of the Secretary-General, infra note 14, at 29-41. The interaction between
achievement of a nuclear weapons capability, or an attempt to achieve such a capability,
and the process of economic development in a particular state is, however, much more
difficult to judge.
11. Paragraph 3 of Article IX of the Treaty defines "nuclear-weapon State" as "one
which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device
prior to January 1, 1967." All other states would presumably fall into the category of"non-nuclear weapon States," an undefined term used throughout the Treaty. These
terms were introduced by the United States in amendments to its draft treaty proposals
on March 22, 1966, in order to "help stop the talk of a 'nuclear club.'" DocUmENTS ON
DISARMAMENT, 1966, at 164 (U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency Pub. No. 13, 1967)
[hereinafter cited as DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT, 1966]. Certain nations possessing sub.
stantial civil nuclear industries which had chosen not to acquire nuclear weapons, such
as India, had objected to being relegated to a status of "non-nuclear States" under the
prior United States draft Treaty proposals of August 17, 1965. DOcuNMENTS ON DisAtM-
AMENT, 1965, at 348.
12. The identity and number of non-nuclear-weapon states which could probably
develop a nuclear weapons capability vary widely depending on the time frame and also
the particular perspective of the compiler. Official governmental sources are understand
ably reluctant to publish their intelligence estimates covering this subject. Nevertheless,
there is a group of states which appear at the top of most lists. It has been recently esti.
mated that the following seven non-nuclear-weapon states could produce a nuclear
weapon in less than two years: Canada, India, Israel, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, and West
Germany. UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES or AMERICA, NATIONAL
POLICY PANEL, STOPPING THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (1967).
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The range of activities at which non-proliferation policy is aimed
has a large political and military, and a growing economic, content.
But at the core of nuclear activities is science and technology. Science
discovered the energy latent in the nucleus of the atom. With tech-
nology that energy has been unleashed. The technological opportunities
present in nuclear energy are now being exploited on an increasing
scale to achieve a growing variety of human goals throughout the world.
From a global perspective, the processes of research, development and
innovation focused on nuclear energy are taking place within and
among certain states in a nation-state system. Although one global
framework for voluntary cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy exists and several structures for regional coordination of peace-
ful and military nuclear activities are established, states remain the
primary actors. 13 The development and exploitation of nuclear energy
has occurred, and will probably continue to occur, in a predominantly
decentralized and competitive world context. Viewed from this per-
spective, non-proliferation policy seeks to stop diffusion of the science
and technology of nuclear weapons across international boundaries and
to prevent scientific and technological activities pertaining to nuclear
weapons from taking place within any state except the five existing
nuclear-weapon states.
The feasibility of such a policy may be questioned. Is an inter-
national policy feasible which seeks to prevent only a narrow band of
activity pertaining to nuclear weapons within a broad spectrum of
activity pertaining to nuclear energy generally? Is such a policy feasible
13. The global framework for peaceful nuclear cooperation is tie International Atomic
Energy Agency, headquartered in Vienna (IAEA). The objectives of the IAEA are to
"accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace ... troughout tie
world," and to "ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its r..quest
or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military
purpose." I.A.E.A. STAT. art II, opened for signature Oct. 26, 1956, [1957] 1 U.S.T. 1093,
T.I.A.S. No. 3873, 276 U.N.T.S. 3. For the history, see Bechhoefer, Negotiating the Statute
of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 13 IN-T'L ORG. 38 (1959); Stoessinger, Atoms for
Peace: The International Atomic Energy Agency, in CoMialssio. TO SruDY TilE Onro.'r.zA-
TION OF PEACE, ORGANIZING PFACE IN THE NucLEAR AGE 117 (1959).
The principal regional structure is the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom).
whose aim is "the creation of conditions necessary for the speed), establishment and growth
of nuclear industries" in its member states. Treaty Establishing the European Atomic
Energy Community (EURATOM), Mar. 25, 1957, art. I, 298 U.N.T.S. 167. For a recent
excellent appraisal of Euratom, see Scheinman, Euratom: Nuclear Integration in Europe,
INT'L CONCIL., May, 1967.
On the military side, efforts to achieve nuclear cooperation as a part of collective defense
arrangements, especially within NATO, have created intense arguments and have been a
prime source of conflict in the Non-Proliferation Treat), negotiations. These efforts, there-
fore, will be discussed in some detail below. But any treaty commitment to "act to meet
the common danger" in the event of an "armed attack" against any party to the treaty-
the common formula for multilateral and bilateral mutual defense treaties to which the
United States is a party-has a nuclear aspect.
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even though the technology which underlies nuclear weapons produc-
tion overlaps to a great extent that which applies to peaceful nuclear
activities? Moreover, can a policy to prevent nuclear weapons pro-
liferation be effective without structural change in an international
system in which nation-states are the dominant actors? For these funda-
mental issues the Non-Proliferation Treaty will provide the acid test.
The purposes of this article are to analyze the Treaty and assess its
potential. First, the technological prerequisites for a nuclear capability,
and, second, the global distribution of these prerequisites are out-
lined. Next, the existing international legal framework affecting non-
proliferation is described. Thereafter, the Treaty is analyzed in some
detail, primarily in terms of the various interpretations that may
govern its application to specific problems which will be encountered
by the parties as it is implemented. Lastly, the major implications of the
Treaty for the future are assessed.
I. Nuclear Capabilities: The Technological Base
A nuclear weapons capability consists of a stockpile of nuclear
weapons and an effective means of delivery. The Non-Proliferation
Treaty places restraints, however, only on the warhead aspect of
nuclear weapons capabilities. Therefore, we will limit our analysis to
this aspect.
An essential ingredient of any nuclear capability, whether for war-
like or peaceful purposes, is fissionable material.1 4 The two fissionable
materials of primary interest are uranium-235 and plutonium-239.
The former is the only fissionable material known to occur in nature.
Uranium-285 usable in nuclear weapons can be obtained from natural
uranium by an "enrichment" process in which the proportion of
uranium-235 atoms is increased from 0.7 per cent, as it occurs in nature,
to 90-95 per cent. The enrichment process most widely used, gaseous
diffusion, requires extremely large plants and complex technology. A
single plant of economic size has been estimated to cost upwards of $750
14. An important and recent source of expert estimates concerning nuclear weapons
technology is contained in Report of the Secretary-General on the Effects of the Possible
Use of Nuclear Weapons and on the Security and Economic Implications for States of the
Acquisition and Further Development of These Weapons, United Nations General
Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/6858, Oct. 10, 1967; DocuMsENTs ON D1SAMMAMIENT, 1967, at 476, The
report is particularly useful in presenting the elements that comprise a nuclear weapons
capability and the cost estimates, including both warheads and delivery systems, of a range
of possible nuclear weapons capabilities.
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million to build and $500-600 million per year to operate.'5 In addition
to cost and engineering difficulties, information relating to processes
for the separation of uranium isotopes is highly classified within various
national programs.16
It is considerably easier to produce plutonium usable in nuclear
weapons than enriched uranium. Uranium-238, the remaining 99.3
per cent of natural uranium, can be converted into plutonium-239 by
subjecting it to a neutron flux in a nuclear reactor fueled with either
natural uranium or uranium that is only 3-5 per cent enriched. 7 In
15. Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 14, Annex IV, at 1. The United States
has built three gaseous diffusion plants. The first cost $1 billion and the next two cost a
total of $1.3 billion to build.
16. As the need for additional uranium enrichment plant capacity approaches, pressure
will increase to loosen information controls, at least to the extent of permitting broader
access to classified information. See, e.g., AToMic INDUSTRIAL FORUM, REPORT OF TIE SnUDY
COai-rrrEE ON PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND OPERATION OF URANIUM, FNRICIMENT FAcurTEs
(1968).
It is possible that the cost barrier to enriched uranium will be lowered in the future if
the gas centrifuge process, an alternate method of separating isotopes of the same elements
which does not require such large-scale and costly facilities, is demonstrated to be eco-
nomically feasible. A plant capable of producing 50 kilograms of 90 per cent enriched
uranium-235 per year has been estimated to cost about $10 million to build and $13
million per year to operate. Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 14, Annex IV, at
2. Since large-scale facilities are not required for the centrifuge process, a nuclear weapons
production capability would be easier to conceal as well as being cheaper. Therefore, wide
dissemination of gas centrifuge technology could contribute to nuclear weapons prolifera-
tion.
On March 21, 1957, the AEC summarily announced that "national security interests
would best be served if privately sponsored work on the gas centrifuge proces for separa.
tion of isotopes were discontinued." U.S.A.E.C. Release No. K-70, Mar. 21, 1967, [1962.67
Transfer Binder] CCH ATo. EN. L. REP. 10,376, at 16,595. Gas centrifuge work is
the sole business of Electro-Nucleonics, Inc., and as a result of the AEC decision, the SEC
suspended over-the-counter trading in the company's stock. Wall Street Journal, Mar. 23,
1967, at 10, col. 2. Since that time, certain private firms affected by the AEC decision,
including Electro-Nucleonics, have signed contracts with the AEC under which their
research and development work in this field will be continued on a classified basis.
U.S.A.E.C. Press Release No. K-163, June 29, 1967, 2 CCH Mot. x L. REP. t 10,061,
at 16,109.
17. The slightly enriched uranium used as fuel for nuclear power reactors cannot be
used in a nuclear weapon without substantial further enrichment. In evaluating natural
uranium and slightly enriched uranium as potential fuels for a planned nuclear power
reactor, a series of complex technological, economic, political and security comparions
must be made. On economic grounds alone, enriched reactor technology has the edge
in most cases. Virtually all nuclear power reactors built and planned in the United States
and a large majority in the Soviet Union use enriched fuel. Of the total nuclear power
capacity outside both the United States and the communist bloc by 1980, about 30 per
cent is forecast to be in natural uranium reactors and about 70 per cent in enriched
uranium reactors. ARTHUR D. LITTLE, INc., THE GRowTrt OF Fomncn Nua.EARu Povmtn
(1966).
If a state uses nuclear power and lacks its own uranium reserves, it must rely on
foreign fuel supplies. If a state uses enriched reactor technology and lacks an isotope
separation plant, although it has its own uranium deposits, it must rely on foreign sources
of enrichment services. The United States, with a large stake in a future hare of the
world's nuclear power industry, has given repeated assurances of the availability of United
States enrichment services on a long-term, non-discriminatory basis at attractive and
stable prices. This "toil enrichment" policy is intended not only to assist in the export
of United States enriched reactor technology, but also to minimize incentives for construc-
tion of additional uranium isotope separation plants outside the United States. For a
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addition to a reactor, several other specialized facilities are required to
carry out all the operations necessary to obtain usable plutonium. Of
major importance are a facility to fabricate fuel elements for nuclear re-
actors and a plant to separate by chemical methods the plutonium
produced in irradiated fuel elements from depleted uranium and cer-
tain radioactive waste materials. Plutonium technology is unclassified,
well-understood, and already widely diffused.' Moreover, the aggre-
gate capital cost of the facilities required for production of militarily
substantial amounts of plutonium is well under $100 million, and
operating costs can be reduced below $10 million per year. 19 Once
fissionable material is in hand, manufacture of crude fission weapons
that work should no longer be considered a particularly demanding or
costly task, although weapons design information is cloaked in secrecy.20
more extensive discussion of the political factors in the choice between natural and
enriched uranium technology, see Wilirich, International Control of Civil Nuclear Power,
BULL AToNr. Set., Mar. 1967, at 31, 33.
18. The United States played a leading role in the diffusion process beginning with
President Eisenhower's famous "Atoms for Peace" address to the U.N. General Assembly,
which included a plan to "encourage worldwide investigation into the most effective
peacetime uses of fissionable material." 1 DOCUMENTS ON DISAPMAMENT, 19-15-1959, at 393,
400 (U.S. Dep't of State Pub. No. 7008, 1960).
The Atomic Energy Act of 1946, then in effect, prohibited "exchange of Information
with other nations with respect to the use of atomic energy for industrial purposes," Act
of Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 724, § 10(a)(2), 60 Stat. 755, 766. Following the "Atoms for 1'cace"
speech, Congress enacted the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which provided: "The dissemina.
tion of scientific and technical information relating to atomic energy should be permitted
and encouraged so as to provide that free interchange of ideas and criticism which Is
essential to scientific and industrial progress ... ." Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2161(b). The Act also established a scheme for declassification of restricted data front
time to time by the AEC. Id. § 2162. The First United Nations Conference on Peaceful
Uses of Atomic Energy, held in Geneva during 1955, resulted in the declassification and
subsequent diffusion of large amounts of information primarily concerning reactor
technology. Thereafter, on December 12, 1956, the United States, the United Kingdom,
and Canada took joint action to revise their information policies to declassify information
relating to "all phases of nuclear power from ore recovery and fabrication of fuel elements
to the design and operation of plants for the chemical recycling of spent fuel elements
from civilian reactors." Statement of Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy
Commission, on the Reciprocal Tripartite Declassification Guide, CCH ATom,. EN. L.
RP. 5056, at 11,088. Two further United Nations Conferences on the Peaceful Uses of
Atomic Energy have been held in Geneva in 1958 and 1964. The IAEA annually sponsors
between 10 and 15 scientific and technical conferences and symposia involving about 2000
participants from upwards of 50 countries. Annual Report of the Board of Governors to
the General Conference, 1 July 1966-30 June 1967, I.A.E.A. Doe. GC/(xi)/3 55, at 26.
19. Total costs and costs per unit will vary with the size. It is estimated that 8 kilograms
of 95 per cent plutonium-239 would be required to manufacture one nuclear wariead with
a yield of about 20 kilotons (equivalent to the bomb used on Nagasaki). The estimated
costs of an integrated production complex for 8 kilograms, or 1 bomb, per year are $22
million for construction and $4.8 million annually for operation; comparable costs for
160 kilograms, or 20 bombs, per year are $87 million for construction and $9.5 million
annually for operation. As the scale of operation increases there is a dramatic decrease in
the cost per kilogram: from $0.9 million per kilogram to $0.12 million per kilogram of
plutonium for the two previous examples. Report of the Secretary-General, supra note
14, Annex IV, at 3-7.
20. A weapons fabrication and assembly plant which can manufacture ten fission
warheads per year has been estimated to cost only $8 million to construct and $1 million
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The technology involved in the major peaceful uses of nuclear energy
is basically the same as that required to produce plutonium for nuclear
weapons. The facilities and materials required for a civil nuclear power
program consist of nuclear reactors, which use natural or enriched
uranium as fuel and produce large amounts of plutonium, fuel fabrica-
tion plants and chemical separation plants. Thus, the increasing use of
nuclear energy to generate electric power will greatly complicate the
task of preventing nuclear weapons proliferation.
A variety of possible peaceful applications for nuclear explosives have
also been suggested. These include nuclear excavation of canals, harbors
and rail cuts, and underground natural resource development projects,
such as nuclear stimulation of natural gas production and the recovery
of oil from shale. Such "Plowshare" applications require the develop-
ment of "dean" thermonuclear explosives.2 ' But "[a] device which
moves a million tons of earth to dig a canal or create an oil deposit can
just as easily pulverize a city of a million people."2' Therefore, the
development of "Plowshare" devices must be restrained in the Non-
Proliferation Treaty.
II. Distribution of Nuclear Capabilities
Outside the Communist states, roughly 80 per cent of the known re-
serves of uranium are located in three countries, the United States,
Canada and South Africa.3 Within Western Europe, France has de-
per year to operate. Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 14, Annex IV. at 8. The
successful development of a thermonuclear (fusion) device, however, still represents a
significant technological achievement. For one thing, enriched uranium is the preferred
material for a fission "trigger."
Thorium-232 is the only other important "fertile" material (ie., material which can
be transformed into fissionable material) that occurs in nature, in addition to uranium-238.
Upon neutron capture, thorium-232 will convert into uranium.233, another s)nthetic
fissionable material similar to plutonium in its nuclear properties. Therefore, the possibility
exists of a thorium-232/uranium-233 fuel cycle which would parallel the uranium.238/
plutonium-239 fuel cycle. In either case a fissionable material is needed to begin with.
Thorium technology is still in the development stage. Only very small quantities of
uranium-233 have been produced, and no nuclear weapons are known to have been con-
structed using this material.
21. For a simple and general explanation, see Gerber, Hamburger & Hull, Plowshare
(U.SA.E.C. Div. of Technical Information 1966). For a mine of information some of which
is now out of date, see Hearings on Peaceful Applications of Nuclear Explosives-Plow-
share-Before the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). A recent
critical assessment is found in Inglis & Sandler, Prospects and Problems: The Nonmilitary
Uses of Nuclear Explosives, BuLL. ATOM. SCL, Dec. 1967, at 46.
22. Statement of United Kingdom Representative to the ENDC, Feb. 23, 1957, ENDC/
PV.288, at 7.
23. ORcANIzATION FOR EcONOMIC DEVELOMENT/EUROPEAN Nczm ENrnc AcENCY,
WVoarLD UnANrum AND THORIUm REsoURCES (1965). Of course, reserves must be placed in
various price ranges based on costs of recovery. The figure quoted is an approximation at
the $5-10 per pound range.
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posits that are sufficient for its own weapons program, but probably
insufficient for its civil nuclear power needs as well. In addition, Sweden
Australia, Argentina, and a few African states have significant uranium
reserves.24 Of the Communist states, both the Soviet Union and China"5
are believed to have uranium reserves which are adequate for their own
military and civil power needs. Within Eastern Europe, the largest
uranium deposits are located in East Germany and smaller deposits in
Czechoslovakia.
Facilities for enriching uranium are presently located in each of the
five nuclear-weapon states. Such facilities are not known to have been
built in any non-nuclear-weapon state. With respect to plutonium tech-
nology, in addition to over 300 small research reactors located through-
out the world,26 large power reactors with an output above 100 mega-
watts (electric) are in operation or under construction in all
nuclear-weapon states except possibly China and a lengthening list of
non-nuclear-weapon states, including Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia,
West Germany, East Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Paki-
stan, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. The list of states planning to
begin construction of nuclear power reactors in the near future is con-
siderably longer.27 Thus, it is clear that the spread of nuclear power
and plutonium production capacity is not confined to particular geo-
graphic regions, or to specific political or ideological persuasions, or to
countries advanced in economic development.
Fuel fabrication plants to supply the input and chemical separation
24. Gabon has significant uranium deposits which are presently exported to France.
Thus far, Gabon has closely followed the French lead in the General Assembly concerning
non-proliferation.
25. Terminology is difficult concerning China. Unless otherwise indicated, "China"
hereafter in this article refers to the People's Republic of China. No political judgment
concerning China policy is intended by this terminology.
26. Plutonium production is nominal in most research reactors, but can be significant
in certain test facilities. Nevertheless, it should be recognized that such reactors are essen.
tial facilities for the education and training of the manpower required for a state to
translate nuclear ambitions into capabilities.
27. Power Reactors the World Around, NuCLEoNIcs, Aug. 1966, at 94. Less than 10
kilograms of plutonium is needed for a bomb which will destroy a medium.sized city.
One recent estimate of the aggregate plutonium production capacity represented by these
civil nuclear power programs is 8,000 kilograms per year by 1970 and 50,000,70,000
kilograms annually by 1980. WASHINGTON CENTER OF FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH, REPORT ON
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE UNITED STATES PROPOSAL FOR A
VERIFIED AGREEIENT TO HALT PRODUCTION OF FIssIONABLE MATERIALS FOP WEAPONS PURPOSES
90 (1966). The corresponding estimated amounts of plutonium accumulated in the world
as a result of this production are 28,000 kilograms by 1970 and 800,000.450,000 kilograms
by 1980. Another estimate shows that by 1974, plutonium will be produced in the world
at an annual rate of 36,700 kilograms, 9,500 kilograms of which will be produced in non.
nuclear-weapon states. The cumulative totals for the world, by this estimate, are 127,100
kilograms, of which 28,300 kilograms will be located in non-nuclear-weapon states. Taylor,
The Rapid Growth of Nuclear Technology-Implications for Nuclear Safeguards, INT'L
RESEARCH & TECHNOLOGY J., Jan. 1, 1968, at 8.
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plants to process the output of nuclear reactors have not yet been as
widely dispersed throughout the world as the reactors themselves. Since
nuclear fuels are readily available in international commerce, the lag
is due primarily to the absence of an economic justification for a com-
plete uranium-plutonium fuel cycle within one state unless that state's
civil nuclear power program exceeds a minimum size. All the nuclear-
weapon states, of course, already possess their own fuel fabrication and
chemical separation plants. Chemical separation plants capable of
processing industrial quantities of irradiated nuclear fuels are also lo-
cated in Belgium and India, and construction is planned for the near
future in West Germany, Japan and Sweden. Wherever a separation
plant is located militarily significant quantities of plutonium will be
found in a chemically pure form.8
The present distribution of raw materials and production capabilities
for obtaining fissionable materials demonstrates that the United States
and the Soviet Union are the only nuclear-weapon states with large and
self-sufficient military and civil nuclear programs. The United Kingdom
lacks its own uranium, and France lacks adequate indigenous uranium
to supply both its civil and military needs. China, which probably has
sufficient uranium to service both a military and a civil program has
thus far focused its limited scientific and technical resources on the ac-
quisition of a nuclear weapons capability.
Canada is the only non-nuclear-weapon state which possesses both
large uranium deposits and a strong base in nuclear technology. Vest
Germany and Japan are making bids for leadership in peaceful nuclear
technology, in each case backed by a broad industrial capability and a
28. To prevent the creation of complete nuclear fuel cycles within non-nuclear weapons
states, it has been suggested that an international agency be established which would own
all nuclear fuel from the start. It would lease fuel for reactors, but would own and operate
the processing facilities, and, in particular, the chemical separation plants used. All
plutonium produced in power reactors would, thus, be under international ownership
and control. Beaton, Nuclear Fuel-for-All, 45 FoREIGx AFnAas 662, 667 (197). The Euro-
pean Company for the Chemical Processing of Irradiated Fuels (EUROCHEMIC) is an
interesting example of international cooperation in this field. The Statute of EURO-
CHEMIC establishes a joint stock company. The stock is held by tvelve governments or
governmental authorities. The plant is located at Mol, Belgium. For the statute tee Multi-
lateral Agreements, 1 I.A.E.A. LEG.L SERIsS 220 (1959).
Nevertheless, the general tendency for states to place a high value on resource WEf-
sufficiency would seem irresistible, and the suggestion, therefore, impractical. Moreover,
the United States supply policy now encourages self-sufficiency. Prior to legislation re-
quiring private ownership of fissionable material, the AEC could inmert plutonium buy-
back provisions in its agreements for cooperation with other countries. Under the prUent
legislation, the AEC is not permitted to buy back plutonium that is produced in fuel
that has been "toll" enriched. AmtENDING TaE A'roucm ENcmy Act OF 1954 To Pnovmu-
FoR PRIVATE OwNERsHap OF SPEcuL NucLEAR MATERtALs, H.R. REP. No. 1702, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess. 2 (1964).
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firm political commitment; 29 India is embarked on a civil nuclear
power program of substantial size; and Israel, which has developed a
strong scientific and technical base, is now considering a variety of
power applications; but each of these non-nuclear-weapon states lacks
a uranium supply of its own. South Africa's large uranium reserves
make it a major power to be dealt with in the non-proliferation con-
text, but its nuclear power program is not far advanced. Thus, many
more nations, in addition to the present five nuclear-weapon states,
could easily acquire nuclear weapons in the future.30 Yet relatively few
could do so exclusively out of their own resources, at least not without
substantial cutbacks in their civil nuclear power plans.
III. Non-Proliferation: The Existing Legal Framework
The Non-Proliferation Treaty would be a major step toward nuclear
arms control, but it would not be the first. The Antarctic Treaty, con-
cluded in 1959, dedicated the South polar region to exclusively peaceful
purposes and prohibited "any measures of a military nature," including
"the testing of any type of weapons."31 In contrast to the strategic nu-
clear hub in the Artic, Antarctica became the first nuclear-free zone.
During the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962, the United States
29. A comprehensive description of Japan's program is contained in Gilinsky & Langer,
The Japanese Civilian Nuclear Program, RAND Memorandum RM-5366-PR (Aug. 1967).
A long-range program submitted by the Japanese Atomic Energy Commission to its govern-
ment in 1967 recommends that Japan import foreign reactor technology that is already
developed and concentrate its own resources in the development of breeder technology. If
successful, such a "leap-frog" strategy could put Japan in the front rank of nuclear tech.
nology after a period of heavy dependence on foreign technology. See id. 38.
30. See note 12 supra. Here it is important to distinguish the costs of nuclear weapons,
which are relatively cheap, and the total program costs for a nuclear deterrent force, in-
cluding the delivery systems, which are generally expensive. It has been estimated that
to acquire in 10 years time a modest nuclear capability of 30-50 jet bombers and 50
medium-range missiles in soft emplacements armed with 100 plutonium warheads of 20
kilotons each would cost approximately $15 million per year for warheads and $155
million per year for delivery systems, for a total 10-year program cost of $1.7 billion.
A small, high-quality nuclear force composed of 10-15 bombers, 100 intermediate range
missiles and 2 missile launching submarines, each equipped with thermonuclear war-
heads, would cost $560 million per year, for a total 10-year program cost of $5.6 billion.
Report of Secretary-General, supra note 14, at 36; id., Annex IV, at 6.
31. The Antarctic Treaty, art. I, para. 1, [1961] 1 U.S.T. 794, 795, T.I.A.S. No, 4780,
402 U.N.T.S. 71, 72. The parties are Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, Czechoslovakia,
Denmark, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the Republic of South Africa,
the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. This Treaty was the first
arms control arrangement to include both East and West. In 1954 West Germany under.
took "not to manufacture in its territory any atomic weapons" as a part of the arrange.
ments for its accession to NATO. Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States are
parties to the specific agreements which incorporate the West German renunclation.
There are complex arguments pro and con, concerning the continued legal efficacy of
the West German pledge. See Willrich, West Germany's Pledge Not to Manufacture
Nuclear Weapons, 7 VA. J. INTL L. 91-100 (1966).
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and the Soviet Union saw dearly that avoidance of nuclear war between
them was a rule of necessity on which their mutual survival depended.
The Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty followed in 1963. This Treaty,
now in force among over ninety parties, prohibits nuclear test explo-
sions in the atmosphere, outer space and underwater32 The ban is in-
complete since it does not prohibit explosions underground as long as
the radioactive debris is contained within the territory of tie state
where the test is conducted. Nevertheless, the Treaty halted the race
between the United States and the Soviet Union for ever increasing
explosive yields in the 100 megton range and above,33 and substan-
tially reduced radioactive contamination of the atmosphere. Moreover,
by confining permissible nuclear tests of any party to the costly and
time-consuming underground environment, the Limited Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty may retard the pace of nuclear weapons proliferation, at
least in the absence of a more effective legal barrier.3
Since the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, two additions have been
made to the legal structure of nuclear arms control. In 1967 the Treaty
for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America was com-
pleted, and it has since been signed by twenty-one states of that region.3
32. [1963] 2 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 (1963).
33. The maximum yield of a nuclear explosion that can be contained underground
will vary substantially with the depth of burial and surrounding geology. At the Foreign
Relations Committee hearings on the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treat), most experts
agreed that "with the passage of time tests of up to I megaton would be possible under-
ground." Testimony of Secretary of Defense McNamara, Hearings on the Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty Before the Senate Commn. on Foreign Relations, 88th Cong., 1st Ses. 126
(1963). "From tests at yields of up to 1 megaton some improvement in high-yield weapons
design could be achieved and ... new warheads-for example, a 35 megaton warhead
for our Titan H---could be developed and stockpiled with confidence that they would
work." Id. 101. Prior to the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty the United States had
already emphasized the acquisition of large numbers of invulnerable delivery systems
carrying a warhead in the one megaton range. The Soviet Union had tested a device of
60 megatons which could have been scaled up to 100 megatons for aircraft delivery. The
significance of very high yield nuclear weapons has been the subject of continuing debate
which the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty has by no means ended. Secretary of Defense Mc-
Namara has discounted in advance the significance of any "megatonnage gap" between
the Soviet Union and the United States. "Far more important is the surviving number
of separately targetable, serviceable, accurate, reliable warheads." In these terms, Secre-
tary McNamara has concluded: "our strategic forces are superior to those of the Soviet
Union. But I must caution that in terms of national security, such 'superiority' is of
little significance." Statement by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara before the
Senate Armed Services Committee on the Fiscal Year 1969-73 Defense Program and the
1969 Defense Budget 52 (1968).
34. President Kennedy clearly viewed the Treaty as "the opening wedge" in a cam-
paign to persuade other countries not to acquire nuclear weapons. Radio-Television
Address by President Kennedy, July 26, 1963, Docuimrs o,4 DtsAMMUMTI'T, 1963, at 250,
255 (U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency, Pub. No. 24, 1904).
35. This Treaty is referred to as the Treaty of Tlatelolco. An Englissh version of the
text is found in Docu. saNTs ON DxsAsszr1Nr, 1967, at 69. In addition to signing. Mexico
and El Salvador have ratified the Treaty, and also have waived the conditions for entry
into force contained in Article 28, paragraph 1, among them two conditions particularly
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When the Treaty enters into force the Latin American States will have
applied to themselves a substantially broader concept of non-prolifera-
tion than is embodied in the Non-Proliferation Treaty.30 Also in 1967
the Outer Space Treaty was completed and entered into force.37 Under
this Treaty the parties, and in particular the United States and the
Soviet Union as the major space powers, pledged not to place nuclear
weapons "in orbit around the Earth," to "install" them "on celestial
bodies," or to "station" them in outer space.38
"Safeguards" is the concept which has been developed to provide as-
surance that the materials and equipment used in peaceful nuclear
activities are not diverted to use in nuclear weapons programs. Safe-
guards consist of a system of international accountability applied to the
nuclear materials used, produced and processed in a peaceful nuclear
activity in a state. The system includes reports to an external authority
and physical inspection by that authority to verify the accuracy of the
impossible to fulfill, ratification by all Latin American states, including Cuba, and
ratification of Protocol II by all nuclear-weapon states, including China. Brazil has
signed and ratified the Treaty without waiving any conditions for entry into force.
On April 1, 1968, the United States signed Protocol II to the Treaty. Article 3 of
Protocol II contains an undertaking "not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons
against the Contracting Parties ...." In signing the Protocol the United States stated
that "each of the Contracting Parties retains exclusive power and legal competence,
unaffected by the terms of the Treaty, to grant or deny non-Contracting Parties transit
and transport privileges;" and that "an armed attack by a Contracting Party in which
it was assisted by a nuclear-weapon State, would be incompatible with the Contracting
Party's corresponding obligations under Article 1 of the Treaty." Thus, the United States
has preserved its right to transport nuclear weapons through the Panama Canal, and has
narrowed the scope of its commitment not to use nuclear weapons to circumstances where
no other nuclear-weapon state is involved. For a discussion of the Treaty by a man
instrumental in the negotiations, see G. ROBLES, THE DENUCLEARIZATION OF LATIN AMErICA
(1967).
36. In addition to prohibiting the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the parties,
Article l(l)(b) of the Treaty of Tlatelolco prohibits "The receipt, storage, installation,
deployment and any form of possession of any nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly,
by the Parties themselves, by anyone on their behalf or in any other way." Under the
Treaty, therefore, the parties could not permit nuclear-weapon states to deploy nuclear
weapons on their territories establishing a nuclear free zone in Latin America. Black Africa
has also moved in this direction. On July 21, 1964, at an Organization of African Unity
Summit Conference, the heads of government declared: "we are ready to undertake,
through an international agreement to be concluded under United Nations auspices, not
to manufacture or control atomic weapons." DOCUMENTS ON DisA"IaAMENT, 1964, at 294
(U.S. Arms Control k- Disarmament Agency Pub. No. 27, 1965).
37. For text see 55 DEP'T STAT BuLL. 953 (1966).
38. Id. The question has arisen whether deployment by the Soviet Union of a Frac.
tional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) would violate the Outer Space Treaty. The
question was quickly dismissed. For one thing, the FOBS would be launched in an opera.
tional mode only in time of war. Moreover, the vehicle launched in a FOBS mode is fired
into very low orbit about 100 miles above the earth and at a given point in time rockets
are fired to bring the vehicle out of orbit. The vehicle is not intended to orbit com-
pletely "around the earth." An ICBM normally does not go into orbit, but rather follows
a ballistic trajectory with a typical apogee of 500-800 miles. Although a FOBS has the
potential to place a nuclear weapon "in orbit around the earth," so does an ICBM, For
these reasons the deployment of a FOBS should not violate the Outer Space Treaty.
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reports. The external authority which administers safeguards can be an
international or regional organization or another state which has sup-
plied assistance to the activity. Various systems for international safe-
guards exist. The two principal international systems are administered
by the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), which covers
all civil nuclear activities on the territories of France, West Germany,
Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, and the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is organized on a world-
wide basis and presently has 98 members.19
In 1962 the United States adopted a policy of transfering to the IAEA
the responsibility for administration of safeguards with respect to its
bilateral agreements for cooperation with countries outside Euratom,
as these agreements were renewed. This policy and parallel efforts by
Britain and Canada have been largely responsible for the recent marked
expansion of the applicability of the IAEA's system. As of June 30,
1967, the Agency had signed 34 safeguards agreements with 27 member
states covering 61 reactors4 0
The safeguards responsibilities of Euratom have also increased sub-
stantially. For instance, over 70 per cent of the total amount of nuclear
materials the United States has supplied to foreign countries is subject
to Euratom safeguards. Although the Soviet Union has refused to accept
safeguards on any of its own peaceful nuclear activities, since 1963 it has
given strong support to the development and application of safeguards
by the IAEA.
The four treaties described above and the expanded role of inter-
national safeguards represent some progress in the construction of legal
barriers to prevent further nuclear weapons proliferation. Nevertheless,
the buildup of nuclear armaments in nuclear-weapon states continues
and takes on new dimensions which threaten the security of non-nu-
clear-weapon states. Moreover, the spread of civil nuclear power in a
39. For legal analyses, see Szasz, The Law of International Atomic Energy Agency
Safeguards, 3 REv. BErGE DE DRorr IrN-'L 196 (1967) (a useful bibliography is set forth in
Annex B); Wilirich, Safeguarding Atoms for Peace, 60 Amt. J. INTr'r L. 34 (1966); Gorove,
The First Multinational Atomic Inspection and Control System at Worh: Euratom's
Experience, 18 SwrA. L. REv. 160 (1965). For a political-technological analysis, fee Willrich,
International Control for Civil Nuclear Power, 23 BuLL. AToss. Sci. (March 1957). For a
discussion from the United States point of view, see Hall, Atoms for Peace or War, 43
FOREIGN AS-Anls 602 (1965).
40. Only four of the reactors are power reactors, located in the United States, the
United Kingdom, Spain and Japan. The majority are small research reactors. In addi-
tion, the United States has opened a chemical processing plant to IAEA inspection while
the plant is engaged in reprocessing fuel from the power reactor in the United States
which is subject to IAEA safeguards. Annual Report of the Board of Governors to the
General Conference, 1 July 1966--30 June 1967, I.A.E.A. Doc. GC/(x)/355.
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commercially competitive global environment continually threatens to
outrun the willingness of the states concerned to accept safeguards and
open their peaceful nuclear activities to international inspection.
Clearly, a comprehensive legal framework is needed to achieve the goal
of non-proliferation policy on a worldwide scale.
IV. The Non-Proliferation Treaty
To prevent nuclear weapons proliferation, the Treaty4 establishes
the following legal framework: nuclear-weapon states undertake not to
transfer nuclear weapons, or to assist non-nuclear-weapon states to ac-
quire such weapons (Article I); non-nuclear-weapon states undertake
not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons (Article II);
non-nuclear-weapon states agree to accept safeguards on their peaceful
nuclear activities (Article III); all parties are guaranteed the right to
exploit the peaceful uses of nuclear energy (Article IV); an obligation
and procedure for international sharing of any potential benefits from
peaceful applications of nuclear explosions is established (Article V).
The Treaty enters into force once the Soviet Union, the United King-
dom, the United States, and forty other signatory states have ratified it
(Article IX), and may be amended by a majority of the parties, includ-
ing all nuclear-weapon parties and parties which are members of the
IAEA Board of Governors (Article VIII). The Treaty has an initial
duration of twenty-five years, but any party may withdraw if it decides
that "extraordinary events" have jeopardized its "supreme interests"
(Article X). In addition, parties to the Treaty undertake to pursue
further nuclear arms control negotiations "in good faith" (Article VI),
and groups of states may establish regional nuclear-free zones apart
from the Treaty (Article VII).42
41. The Treaty consists of a preamble and eleven articles. The eleventh Article deals
with languages. Discussion of the Treaty's preamble will generally be relegated to appro.
priate places in the footnotes.
42. The draft Treaty of August 24, 1967, included what is now Article VII as the last
paragraph in the preamble. ENDC/192, ENDC/193; DOCUMENTS ON DIsAnNIAMENT, 1967,
at 388. In the discussion of the August 24, 1967, draft, Mexico proposed a transfer of this
provision from the preamble to the body of the Treaty, considering it an "authentic
legal provision." ENDC/PV. 331, at 8-9. This was subsequently done by the superpowers
in the revised draft Treaty of January 18, 1968. ENDCf192/Rev.1, ENDC IM.Rev.l.
During discussion of the latter draft, Brazil proposed that Article VII be amended so
that nothing in the Non-Proliferation Treaty would be interpreted "as affecting, In any
way, the rights or obligations of signatory States under regional Treaties on the proscrption of nuclear weapons . . . consistent with the objectives of this Treaty." END20 1
Rev.2. Had Brazil's amendment been accepted, difficult problems of priority between the
Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Treaty of Tlatelolco could have arisen, especially In
light of Brazil's apparent continued insistence on an interpretation of the latter as not
precluding its right to develop peaceful nuclear explosives.
1462
Vol. 77: 1447, 1968
Nuclear Weapons
A. Non-Transfer and Non-Acquisition
The obligation of nuclear-weapon states under Article 143 generally
complements the obligation of non-nuclear-weapon states under Article
II:44 the Treaty prohibits transfer by nudear-weapon states on die one
hand, and receipt by non-nuclear-weapon states on the other, of "nu-
dear weapons," "other nuclear explosive devices," and "control" over
such weapons or devices. Since none of these terms is explicitly defined,
the scope of the Treaty will largely depend on how each is interpreted.
A number of questions arise in defining "nuclear weapon."' 5 Ob-
viously, the nuclear warhead on the tip of an ICBM and the nuclear
bomb carried in a strategic bomber are nuclear weapons. But does
"nuclear weapon" include the delivery system as well as the warhead?
What about nuclear reactors used as power plants for Polaris sub-
43. "Each nudear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to
any recipient whatsover nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control
over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to
assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise
acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons
or explosive devices." Art. I.
44. "Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive
the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear ex-
plosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly;
not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear w-eapons
or other nuclear explosive devices." Art. I.
45. In 1966 the United States was "convinced of the need for such a definition" but
apparently changed its mind because no definition appeared in the agreed draft of
August 24, 1967. DocumENxTcs oN D , SLAR ENT, 1967, at 167. United States amendments
to Article IV of the earlier United States draft Treaty submitted on March 21, 1966,
included among other defined terms a reference to "nuclear weapons" followed by a
blank. Docu.rmmrs oN DixsmAmIENr, 1966, at 160. Article 5 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco
defines "nuclear weapon" as "any device which is capable of releasing nuclear energy
in an uncontrolled manner and which has a group of characteristics that are appropriate
for warlike purposes. An instrument that may be used for the transport or propulsion
of the device is not included in this definition if it is separable from the device and
not an individual part thereof." DocumENTs ox DISARMAMENT, 1967, at 72. 'Much of this
language seems to have been derived from the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
which defines "atomic weapon" as "any device utilizing atomic energy, excusive of the
means for transporting or propelling the device (where sud means is a separable and
divisible part of the device) the principal purpose of which is for use as, or development
of, a weapon, a weapon prototype, or a weapon test device." Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
as amended, § 11(d), 42 U.S.C. § 2014(d) (1964). Thus the definitions in both the Treaty
of Tlatelolco and the United States legislation expressly exclude nuclear delivery and
propulsion systems. One important difference in the definitions is that the United States
legislation includes a subjective element of purpose while the Latin American definition
is more objective and not dependent on the intended purpose for which the device will
be used, as long as it possesses a "group of characteristics" which make it "appropriate"
for use as a nuclear weapon. Hence Plowshare devices would seem to be excluded from
the definition of nuclear weapon under United States law, but included in the Treaty
of Tlatelolo.
We may speculate why a definition was omitted from the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
A definition similar to the Treaty of Tlatelolco would perhaps have highlighted the
Soviet Union's concession to the status quo regarding the United States' arrangements
within NATO. It might also have accentuated the exclusion of non-weapons military
cooperation from the prohibitions of the Treaty.
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marines or surface warships? The drafters clearly intended to exclude
nuclear delivery and military propulsion systems from the term "nuclear
weapon" and to limit this term to only one aspect of a nuclear weapons
capability, namely the warhead or bomb.40
Articles I and II also prohibit the transfer and receipt of "other
nuclear explosive devices." This phrase is primarily intended to cover
nuclear explosives of potential use in peaceful applications-so-called
"Plowshare" devices.47 These devices are indistinguishable on technical
grounds from nuclear weapons. Moreover, the production of such de-
vices requires a technology "even more sophisticated" than that re-
quired to produce serviceable nuclear weapons. Therefore, if the Non-
Proliferation Treaty is to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation, it must
prohibit transfer and acquisition of nuclear explosive devices for peace-
ful applications on the same terms as nuclear weapons.
Nevertheless, the superpower duopoly which the Non-Proliferation
Treaty would preserve with respect to acquisition of this aspect of
peaceful nuclear technology is bitter medicine for certain non-nuclear-
weapon states. Brazil is a leading critic of any such restriction which
could create, in its view, "an irreparable relationship of dependence"
and prevent the "technological leap that full utilization of nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes can provide" to a developing country.48
46. On March 14, 1968, the State Department issued a press release which stated:
"For purposes of the treaty a nuclear powered submarine is not, in itself 'a weapon.'
The treaty does not deal with such military applications of nuclear energy as nuclear
propulsion of warships. Therefore, nothing in the treaty would prohibit the provision
of nuclear fuel for this purpose .... " Statement by State Department Spokesman Robert
McCloskey, Mar. 14, 1968 (unpublished).
It is clear, however, that the Non-Proliferation Treaty makes no distinction between
offensive nuclear warheads and nuclear warheads associated with ballistic missile defense
systems. The prohibitions on transfer and acquisition under Articles I and 1I apply
equally to both. This is important because several of the Treaty's critics have suggested
that ballistic missile defense systems be transferred to United State allies, and one noted
authority has stated that "methods have been developed so that defensive nuclear ex.
plosives can be used for ballistic missile defense and for that purpose alone." Statement
by Dr. Edward Teller, Hearings on Arms Control and Disarmament Act Amendments,
1968, Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 245, 246-47 (1968).
For the Executive Branch reply, see id. at 184-85.
47. Statement by United States Representative to ENDO, June 8, 1967, ENDO/PV.303,
at 4-11; DocuMENs ON DISARMAMENT, 1967, at 252, 253.
48. Statement by Representative of Brazil to ENDO, May 18, 1967, ENDC/PV.297, at
14-17; DocumENau s ON DISARMAMENT, 1967, at 225, 226. Under the Treaty of Tlatelolco
Brazil has agreed (subject to conditions virtually impossible to fulfill) to commit Itself
not to acquire nuclear weapons. But it has thus far steadfastly refused to "waive the
right . . . to manufacture or receive nuclear explosives that will enable us to perform
great engineering works." Id. Brazil maintains that the Treaty of Tlatelolco "draws a
clear cut distinction between peaceful nuclear explosions and explosions for nuclear
weapons purposes." Statement by Representative of Brazil to ENDC, Mar. 14, 1967,
ENDC/PV.293, at 8-18; DocuMENTs ON DISARMAMENT, 1967, at 135, 140. The United States
and a majority of the Latin American states have taken repeated exception to such an
interpretation. Article 18 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco permits Parties to "carry out ex.
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The United States and Soviet Union have both taken a hard line in
reply. The United States has put it bluntly: "Should a State decide that
it does not wish to accept a treaty which prohibits the spread of nuclear
explosive devices we will have to conclude that it does not wish to ac-
cept a treaty which prevents the spread of nuclear weapons."40
Finally, Articles I and II prohibit transfer and receipt of "control"
over nuclear weapons and explosive devices. The meaning of "control"
and the related Soviet concept of "access" were the major language bar-
riers between the United States and the Soviet Union for the five years
of negotiations until agreement was reached in 1967 on Articles I and
II. At issue was the future role of non-nuclear members of military al-
liances, especially West Germany, with regard to their own nuclear de-
fense. Throughout the long years of disagreement, the Soviet Union
never tired of reiterating that regardless of United States plans for its
NATO allies, "the Soviet Union will never agree to West Germany
obtaining access to nuclear weapons."i" The United States was equally
adamant that it was "not going to invite the Soviet Union to sit at the
NATO table and determine NATO nuclear policy," and that there was
no conflict between non-proliferation policy and possible nuclear ar-
rangements proposed for the NATO alliance.al The compromise ulti-
plosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes-including explosions which involvc
devices similar to those used in nuclear weapons, provided that they do so in accordance
with ... articles 1 and 5"; however, in light of the definition of nuclear weapons in
Article 5, note 45 supra, the United States has stated: "We understand the definition
contained in Article 5 of the Treaty as necessarily encompassing all nuclear explosive
devices. It is our understanding that Articles 1 and 5 restrict accordingly the activities
of the Contracting Parties under paragraph 1 of Article 18." Statement Accompan)ing
Signature of the United States of America of Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition
of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, 58 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 555, 556 (1968). In simpler
terms, the United States has interpreted the Treaty of Tlatelolco "as prohibiting tle
contracting parties from acquiring or testing nuclear explosive devices for peaceful pur-
poses ... unless someone can someday invent a nuclear explosive whicl cannot be used
as a nuclear weapon." Statement by United States Representative to ENDC, NMar. 7, 1967,
ENDC/PV.291, at 14-16; Docu.ENrs ON DmtnmEr.NTr, 1967, at 126, 12-7-28. Moreover, in
a statement at the signing ceremony of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, Mexico interpreted the
Treaty in this respect similarly to the United States' interpretation. Statement by Repre-
sentative of Mexico to ENDC, Feb. 21, 1967, ENDC/PV.287, at 23-28; Docu1L%rs oc Dis-
AA RAENT, 1967, at 99, 101.
49. Statement by United States Representative to ENDC, June 8, 1967, ENDC/PV.03.
at 4-11; Docu.ENrs ON DsA umrcNT, 1967, at 252, 257. The Soviet Union has been just
as unflinching. See, eg., Statement by Soviet Union Representative to ENDC, July 13, 1967.
ENDC/PV.313, at 4-8; DocusmENrs ON DLsAnM.tAMENT, 1967, at 298-800. The steps taken
in the Treaty to mitigate, or perhaps reverse the discriminatory effects of the potential
Plowshare duopoly will be discussed below in connection with other aspects of coopera-
tion in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. See p. 1498 infra.
50. Statement by Soviet Union Representative to ENDC, Feb. 17, 1966, ENDC/PV.241.
at 24-33; DocumrENis ON Ds=tAMrmENT, 1967, at 24, 29. Earlier in the same speech the
Soviet Representative had stated that the "ambi-alent approach" of the United States
to the solution of the problem of non-proliferation was "as plain as a pikestalf" in the
United States draft treaty of August 17, 1965. Id. 27.
51. See, e.g., News Conference Remarks by Acting Secretary of State Ball, July 6, 1966,
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mately arrived at and embodied in Articles I and II basically reflects
the status quo.
5 2
In analyzing the existing circumstances in NATO, as well as possible
future arrangements, and the impact of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
on these circumstances and arrangements, we must distinguish the war-
head from the delivery vehicle. At present the United States has de-
ployed some seven thousand nuclear warheads in non-nuclear-weapon
states in Western Europe, principally West Germany. All of these
weapons are legally owned by the United States and remain in the
physical custody of United States armed forces stationed in Europeoa
55 DEP'T STATE BULL. 122-23 (1966); DOCUMIENTS ON DISARMAMENT, 1966, at 406. The re-
marks by Acting Secretary Ball followed by one day a remark at a news conference by
President Johnson: "We hope the Soviet Union will meet us and find an acceptable
compromise in language which we can both live with." News Conference Remarks by
President Johnson, July 5, 1966, 2 WEEKLY COMPILATION PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMlEN ts 905;
DOCUMENTS ON DISARmAMENT, 1966, at 405. President Johnson's statement signalled to his
own State Department, the NATO allies and the Soviet Union a willingness to take a
fresh look at the problem of reconciling NATO nuclear arrangements with a non-pro.
liferation treaty.
52. Article I, paragraph 1, of the Soviet draft Treaty proposal of September 24, 1965,
would have prohibited the transfer of control over the "emplacement and use" of nuclear
weapons to "units of the armed forces of military personnel of States not possessing
nuclear weapons even if such units or personnel are under the command of a military
alliance." Article I, paragraph 2, would have prohibited nuclear-weapon states from
transmitting to non-nuclear-weapon states "any kind of . . . information or documenta-
tion which can be employed for purposes of the manufacture or use of nuclear weapons."
(Emphasis added.) There were corresponding obligations for non-nuclear-weapol states
in Article II. U.N. Doc. A/5976, Sept. 24, 1965; DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMtNr, 1965, at
443-44. This language might have been interpreted as excluding non-nuclear-weapon
states from any knowledge concerning nuclear strategy or tactics and any voice in nuclear
deployment arrangements, even on their own territory. There is no counterpart for this
language in the Treaty text finally agreed upon.
53. Section 92 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, provides In part: "It
shall be unlawful, except as provided in section 2121 of this title [Atomic Energy Act §
91], for any person to transfer or receive in interstate or foreign commerce, manufacture,
produce, transfer, acquire, possess, import, or export any atomic weapon." 42 U.S.C. §
2122 (1964). The exceptions contained in Section 91 permit cooperation with another
nation and the transfer to that nation of nuclear materials for use in atomic weapons,
non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons, and reactors and reactor fuels for military applica-
tions. The President must determine that any such transfer "will promote and will not
constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security, while such other
nation is participating with the United States pursuant to an international arrangement
by substantial and material contributions to the mutual defense and security . .. " '12
U.S.C. § 2121(c) (1964). In the event of any transfer of nuclear materials for use in an
atomic weapons program or of non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons, there is an added
requirement that the recipient nation must have already made "substantial progress In
the development of atomic weapons," id. § 2121(c)(1), which has generally been construed
to mean that the recipient must have already acquired nuclear weapons. In no case,
however, can the United States transfer to another nation an entire nuclear weapon or
the nuclear parts of a nuclear weapon under existing legislation. With respect to the
interaction between Section 92 and the Non-Proliferation Treaty a United States spokes.
man has said that there is "nothing in this treaty that is an inhibition on the United
States that we haven't already adopted on a unilateral basis, basis of U.S. law, as far as
the substantive inhibitions are concerned. There is a difference between undertaking an
international obligation and having a U.S. statute which can be changed by the will of
the Congress." Testimony of Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Director, United States Arms Con.
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The United States has sold to certain NATO allies which are non-nu-
clear-weapon states large numbers of aircraft and surface-to-surface mis-
siles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. The bulk of these nudear
capable delivery systems has gone to West Germany. 4
If a major conflict broke out in Europe which required use of nuclear
weapons, under present arrangements the United States would respond
with its own nuclear equipped forces and would also release nuclear
warheads in its custody to its non-nuclear NATO allies for delivery on
target by their weapons delivery systems. Release of United States nu-
clear weapons to non-nuclear NATO allies would be effected through
"permissive action links," or the "PAL" system. Any sud release of nu-
clear weapons from United States custody would require a specific
Presidential decision at that time, followed by an affirmative physical
act: the turn of a key by a member of the United States armed forces.55
Would the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and in particular the prohibi-
tions on transfer and receipt of nuclear weapons in Articles I and II,
upset these large-scale but delicately balanced nuclear force arrange-
ments already established within NATO? It may be argued that sta-
tioning or deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of a non-
nuclear-weapon state does not, of itself, constitute a "transfer" of
weapons by the nuclear-weapon state concerned. Moreover, existing
trol and Disarmament Agency, Hearings on Arms Control and Disarmament Act Amend-
ments, 1968, Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (196S).
54. The range of the nuclear delivery systems the United States has provided to non-
nuclear-weapon NATO allies, however, limits their use to interdiction missions in Eastern
Europe and perhaps the western fringe of the Soviet Union.
55. One of the most comprehensive and authoritative unclassified descriptions of exist-
ing nuclear arrangements came on September 16, 1964, at the height of the Johnson-
Goldwater contest for the Presidency. In an address by President Johnson entitled "Di-
rection and Control of Nuclear Power," which was his response to Senator Goldwater's
assertion that authority to use tactical nuclear weapons should be delegated to NATO
field commanders, President Johnson stated unequivocally: "The release of nudear weapons
would come by Presidential deision alone." He then went on to explain: "Complex codes
and electronic devices prevent any unauthorized action. Every further step along the way
from decision to destruction is governed by the two-man rule. Two or more men must
act independently and must decide the order has been given. They must independently
take action. An elaborate system of checks and counterchecks, procedural and mechanical,
guard against any unauthorized nuclear bursts. In addition, since 1961 we have placed
permissive-action links on several of our weapons. These are electromechanical locks
which must be opened by secret combination before action at all is possible, and we are
extending this system. The American people and all the world can rest assured that ve
have taken every step man can devise to insure that neither a madman nor a malfunc-
tion could ever trigger nuclear war." 51 DEP*T STATE BULL. 458-60 (1961): DocusF %rs
ON DISARAMENT, 1964, at 429, 431 (U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency Pub. No.
27, 1965).
As might be expected, the Soviet Union took a dim view of this technological "fix"
adopted by the United States and its non-nuclear NATO allies. It called for an explana-
tion from the U.S. as to "why these locks cannot be opened by evil-doers." Statement by
Soviet Union Representative to ENDC, July 21, 1966, ENDC/PV.275. at 20.2-9; Doct-
MNrs ON DIvu.s sst, 1966, at 460, 462-63.
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United States custodial and release arrangements with non-nuclear
NATO allies would not constitute a transfer or receipt of "control" of
nuclear weapons as long as the affirmative act effecting release of the
weapons has not occured. 0 Thus, "control" would seem to mean actual,
not potential, control.
56. What would be the legal effect under the Non-Proliferation Treaty of a United
States release of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon NATO allies? A Presidential
decision to effect such a release would not be made except in what appeared at the time
to be an extreme emergency at the brink of nuclear war. It is doubtful, however, that
sufficient time exists between actual launch of a Soviet nuclear attack and its impact In
Western Europe (about 15 minutes) for receipt of warning, a Presidential decision In
Washington, nuclear arming of NATO delivery systems in Europe, and, in the case of
aircraft at least, stationing on airborne alert. Therefore, it would be possible, If not
probable, for the release of United States nuclear weapons to be effected in certain sit-
uations prior to actual launch of a Soviet nuclear attack. In these circumstances, two
basic scenarios can be envisioned: (1) a major crisis in Europe in which war was sub.
sequently avoided; and (2) a major crisis which resulted in armed conflict.
If war was subsequently avoided and United States nuclear weapons had been released,
both the United States and recipient NATO allies would be vulnerable to being charged
with a violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (assuming the fact of release became
known). Of course, the Soviet Union might have an interest in not pressing the charge.
If war subsequently occurred, the question of the impact of war on the Non-Prolifera.
tion Treaty would arise. During Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on the
Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty the question arose as to whether Article I of that
Treaty, which banned "any other nuclear explosion" in addition to a "nuclear weapon test
explosion" in the atmosphere might ban the use of nuclear weapons in war. Both the
United States and the Soviet Union had publicly taken the position that the Treaty did
not restrict the use of nuclear weapons in war, but only the peacetime conduct of certain
nuclear explosions. The implications of the Treaty itself and the intentions of the drafting
parties clearly expressed in the legislative history support this position. The Senate
Foreign Relations Committee report concluded: "As a practical matter, it would be
inconceivable that the treaty, or any of its provisions, could affect a decision to use
nuclear weapons should a situation develop in which the security of the United States
or any of its allies appeared to be in jeopardy." SENATE COMtM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
REPORT ON THE NucLEAR TESr BAN TREATY, S. EXEC. Doc. No. 3, 88th Cong., 1st Sess, 6
(1963). See also Hearings on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Before the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 et seq. (1963) (opinion of the Legal Adviser
on the meaning of the words "Or Any Other Nuclear Explosion," Aug. 14, 1963); Letter
to Senator Fulbright from General Counsel of the Department of Defense concerning use
of nuclear weapons in time of war. Id. 177-78.
However, the effect of a war involving nuclear weapons on the Non-Proliferation Treaty
is not as clear as in the case of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Although the
record is unclear, the United States and the Soviet Union may have agreed to Interpret
the Treaty as being suspended or ended by war. See Testimony of Adrian S, Fisher,
Hearings on Arms Control and Disarmament Act Amendments, 1968, Before the House
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1968). It may be argued that a major
purpose of the Treaty is to prevent from arising the circumstances under which United
States nuclear weapons must be released. If such circumstances do arise, then the purpose
of the Treaty will already have been defeated and the restraints of the Treaty would be
suspended. Moreover, a case might be made justifying United States action because of
prior violations by another Party, or hostile acts justifying a resort to individual or
collective self-defense which would override the Treaty's prohibitions.
An argument can also be made that the Non-Proliferation Treaty should not be sus.
pended in time of war. The first two paragraphs of the Preamble read:
"Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war
and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to
take measures to safeguard the security of peoples.
"Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the
danger of nuclear war .... 1"
It can be argued that these introductory paragraphs indicate an intention that the Treaty
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How much influence must a nation have over or within the decision-
making process concerning the use of nuclear weapons to be deemed to
have "control"? Nuclear-weapon states consult with non-nuclear-wea-
pon states within both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Indeed, consulta-
tion would seem to be an essential part of any concept of collective
defense. In the course of the consultation process, non-nuclear-weapon
states have an opportunity to influence to some extent decisions made
concerning use of nuclear weapons in the common defense.Y7 It would
be difficult to assert, however, that the non-nuclear-weapon states either
individually or collectively, would "control" the decision process simply
as a result of their participation in consultations.
Planning concerning the deployment and use of nuclear forces has
been a central activity of NATO. Participation in detailed planning
would accord non-nuclear-weapon states a substantially larger role in
the decision-making process than the mere exchange of views which
would normally constitute consultation.
In particular, as the United States and certain of its NATO allies
gradually backed away from proposals for a multilateral nuclear force
(MLF) during 1966 and 1967, the United States came forward with a
series of proposals for intensifying consultation and planning concern-
ing nuclear force posture, deployment, strategy and tactics. United
States efforts to construct a satisfactory framework for sharing respon-
sibility within NATO for planning and decision-making concerning
not be suspended during hostilities, and that it is essential to the achievement of the
purposes of the Treaty that it be maintained during future periods of tension and nuclear
crises, including an armed conflict.
Finally, it should be noted that there is no express authority in the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 for lifting in time of major crisis or war the prohibitions on transfer of
nuclear weapons contained in Section 92. The assumption on which both Congress and
the President have dearly operated has been that the President's inherent authority as
Commander-in-Chief to effect release of nuclear weapons in wartime remains unimpaired
by Section 92. For discussion, see Hearings on Amending the Atomic Encrgy Act of 1954
-Exchange of Military Information and Material with Allies-Before the Subcomm. on
Agreements for Cooperation of the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 85th Cong., 2d Sms.
470-74 (1958).
57. In the course of ENDC discussions, Poland attacked the United States draft treaty
because it would permit NATO nuclear arrangements which might "increase the influence
of a State among its allies." The United States replied: "influence among members of
either of the alliances has nothing to do with proliferation and cannot be governed by
a treaty." Statement by United States Representative to ENDC, Mar. 3, 1965, ENDC/
PV.245, at 25-32; DocUmFYrs ON DISARAMENT, 1966, at 78, 82-83. Subsequently the United
States affirmatively stated the need for consultation: "There must be, in fact, a measure
of consultation in any military alliance of sovereign States on the overall strategy or plan
of use of all the integrated forces available to the alliance, whether for air defense or
other purposes. This consultation must above all seek to achieve an understanding as
to the circumstances in which the most devastating of all weapons-that is, nuclear
weapons-could be used." Statement by United States Representative to ENDC, Mar. 31,
1966, ENDC/PV253, at 10-16; DocumENrs Oz DzmsLtAa.t-a"r, 1966, at 183, 187.
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nuclear defense culminated with the establishment in December 1966
of a Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee and a Nuclear Planning Group.
The Committee is open to any NATO nation willing to participate.
The Nuclear Planning Group is composed of seven Defense Ministers
drawn from the full Committee, with the United States, the United
Kingdom, West Germany, and Italy as permanent members, and three
other Committee members on a rotating basis. s Do the non-nuclear-
weapon NATO members which participate in this planning structure
have "control" of nuclear weapons?
It may be argued on legal grounds that even joint and detailed plan-
ning does not involve a shift in control over an actual decision to use
nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the United States has made clear
throughout the negotiations its view that a non-proliferation treaty to
which it would subscribe must not affect existing consultative and plan-
ning arrangements with its NATO allies. The Soviet Union has ap-
parently acquiesced in this view as evidenced by dropping objection-
able language in its earlier draft treaty proposals and a subsequent
press release.09
Thus, we are driven toward an interpretation of "control" which
focuses on the actual decision to use nuclear weapons. If a non-nuclear-
weapon state could make a unilateral and effective decision to use nu-
clear weapons, it would clearly have control-a "finger on the trigger"
--whether or not it had physical possession of the weapons. On the
other hand, if use of a nuclear weapon by a nuclear-weapon state re-
quired concurrence of a non-nuclear-weapon state, then the non-
nuclear-weapon state would have control in a negative sense. How-
58. A short summary of the various proposals beginning in 1960 to promote inte.
gration between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon NATO allies is contained In a
statement by Secretary Robert McNamara preceding the first meeting of the Nuclear
Planning Group which took place in Washington on April 6-7, 1967. 56 Drn"T STAI1t
BuLr.. 686-87 (1967). Concerning technical arrangements, in 1964 the United States entered
into an agreement for cooperation regarding the exchange of military nuclear information
with NATO and its members. Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic
Treaty for Cooperation Regarding Atomic Information, [1965] 1 U.S.T. 109, T.IA.S. No,
3768. The agreement, which supersedes an earlier 1955 agreement, provides for exchange
of "atomic information" necessary to development of defense plans, training of personnel
in the military applications of atomic energy, evaluation of atomic capabilities of potential
enemies "and other military applications," and "development of delivery systems coni
patible with the atomic weapons which they carry." Id. art, II. The agreement specifies
that there will be "no transfer [by the United States] of atomic weapons, non-nuclear
parts of atomic weapons, or non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons systems involving Re.
stricted Data." Id. art. IV.
59. For language dropped by the Soviet Union from its draft Treaty proposals, see
note 52 supra. West German newspapers reported on April 23, 1968, statements by a Soviet
Union official that "the so-called McNamara Committee does not deal with questions
relating to proliferation of nuclear weapons, and from this viewpoint discussions of qu es.
tions which do not concern non-proliferation are not a violation of commitments which
can be taken or have already been taken by parties to the treaty."
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ever, this kind of decisional control-a "finger on the safety catch"-
would seem not to be the kind of control which the Non-Proliferation
Treaty is intended to prevent non-nuclear states from acquiring.
Between a finger on the trigger and one on the safety catch, there are
a number of intermediate positions. To illustrate three major possibili-
ties, assume that the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, composed of two
nuclear-weapon states and five non-nuclear weapon states, is delegated
authority to make a binding decision to use nuclear weapons assigned
but not transferred to it by the nuclear-weapon states.
One way to make such a decision would be by a simple majority vote.
This clearly amounts to a transfer of control in a decisional sense from
the nuclear-weapon states to non-nuclear-weapon states and is barred by
the Treaty. The result is the same even if a two-thirds, or three-fourths
majority were required as long as the majority could be constituted ex-
clusively from non-nuclear-weapon states.
The second possibility is to require a majority vote, which must in-
dude the concurring vote of at least one nuclear-weapon state, for de-
cision by the Group to use any of the nuclear weapons assigned to it.
This is also prohibited since a nuclear-weapon state is barred by the
Treaty from transferring control "to any recipient whatsoever." This
language would bar an arrangement under which a majority of the
Group could decide to use nuclear weapons in the physical possession
of the United States upon the vote of a majority, including the United
States or the United Kingdom.
The third possibility is to require a majority which must include the
concurring votes of both the United Kingdom and the United States.
Does retention of a veto over use by every nuclear-weapon state partici-
pating take such an arrangement outside the reach of the Non-Prolifer-
ation Treaty's prohibitions? In one sense, as long as a nuclear-weapon
state retained a veto over the decision to use any nuclear weapons it had
assigned, control would not have passed to any other state or states. If a
multilateral decision framework as such is deemed a "recipient" of
control, then it would seem to be ruled out by the Treaty. However, if
such a framework is deemed to have no organic existence apart from its
members, then it may be argued that retention of a veto by each partici-
pating nuclear-weapon state is effective to preclude a "transfer" of
"control" to a "recipient." Control would not pass in these circum-
stances because there is, alternatively, either no transfer or no
recipient.60
60. Such an argument is supported by analogy to the authority of the United Nations
Security Council. Nuclear-weapon states are members of the Security Council. In theory,
1471
The Yale Law Journal
Each of the three possibilities discussed above reflects positions taken
by the United States during succeeding stages of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty negotiations. These efforts to preserve some possibility for joint
decision-making concerning the use of nuclear weapons were mounted
primarily to keep open an MLF option and other possible "hardware"
solutions to the problem of sharing nuclear defense within NATO.
These "hardware" solutions would have involved the "transfer" of
nuclear weapons to a group or association of NATO allies composed of
both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states. "Control" over
use of nuclear weapons would have been subject, at least at the outset,
to a United States veto.
61
the Charter could provide a legal basis for a decision by the Council ordering the nuclear.
weapon permanent members to use nuclear weapons in their custody as part of its au-
thority to use force. Although such a decision may seem beyond the realm of political
reality, it is precisely the possibility that such a decision may be made which provides
whatever "muscle" there is in the proposed Security Council resolution on security assur-
ances which would be adopted in conjunction with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. See
discussion at pp. 1512-13 & note 54 infra. Of course, it is arguable that a distinction
should be drawn between the Security Council and a group within a military alliance.
61. During the 1963-1965 period (before any draft non-proliferation treaty was tabled)
under the United States MLF proposal, "firing of the missiles in wartime would be by
decision of an agreed number of participants including the United States." However, "In
the longer term . . . evolution toward European control as Europe marches toward
unity is by no means excluded." Address by Gerald C. Smith, Special Adviser to the
Secretary of State, before the United States Naval Academy Foreign Affairs Conference,
Dep't of State Release No. 178, Apr. 22, 1964, at 5. This address is one of the fullest
official public descriptions of the United States proposal for an MLF. While under the
proposal the United States would retain a veto at the outset, it could have been relln-
quished. Moreover, the recipient of control of the nuclear force might have been an
entity composed entirely of non-nuclear-weapon NATO allies. The United States draft
non-proliferation treaty of August 17, 1965, retreated somewhat from this position. Article
I, paragraph 1, read as follows: "Each of the nuclear States Party to this Treaty under-
takes not to transfer any nuclear weapons into the national control of any non.nuclear
State, either directly, or indirectly through a military alliance, and each undertakes not
to take any other action which would cause an increase in the total number of States
and other organizations having independent power to use nuclear weapons." ENDC/162,
Aug. 17, 1965; DocuMENTs ON DISARiMfAMENT, 1965, at 347. As the United States conceded,
this formulation might have been interpreted "to permit the creation of a new nuclear
entity composed entirely of non-nuclear-weapon states, in the event that a pre.exlstlng
nuclear-weapon state had previously unilaterally disarmed itself of nuclear weapons.
Statement by United States Representative to ENDC, Mar. 22, 1966, ENDC/PV.250, at
4-12; DocummENTs ON DISARMAMETrr, 1966, at 160, 164. The United States draft treaty of
August 17, 1965, might also have been interpreted as permitting the creation of a multi-
lateral nuclear force to which a nuclear-weapon state had assigned its entire nuclear force
and in which a decision to use nuclear weapons could have been taken by a majority
vote. On March 22, 1966, the United States amended its proposed Article I to read: 'Each
of the nuclear-weapon States party to this treaty undertakes: 1. Not to transfer nuclear
weapons into the national control of any non-nuclear-weapon State, or into the control
of any association of non-nuclear-weapon States." The word "control" was defined in
Article IV to mean "right or ability to fire nuclear weapons without the concurrent
decision of an existing nuclear-weapon State." In addition, Article I, paragraph 3, obli.
gated the nuclear-weapon states "[n]ot to take any other action which would cause an
increase in the total number of States and associations of States having control of nuclear
weapons." ENDC/152/Add. 1, Mar. 21, 1966; DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT, 1966, at 159.
Under this formulation an MLF in which the United States retained its veto would have
been permitted. An MLF in which more than one nuclear-weapon state participated,
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The Soviet Union attacked all such schemes as involving prolifera-
tion because nuclear weapons would be transferred to the group of
states, and, thus, indirectly to the participants in the group. The United
States contended there would be no proliferation since there would be
no transfer of control over a decision to use nuclear weapons. Moreover,
because of the permissive action link system, participants in an MLF
would lack not only the right but the ability to fire nuclear weapons.
The Soviet Union replied with a series of questions:
We might, for example, ask what the situation would be if the
partners of the United States in NATO were to reject the legality
of the United States veto at a decisive or crucial moment? Mhat
would happen if the partners of the United States in NATO were
to find means of opening the lock on nuclear weapons in circum-
vention of the United States veto? Who would inherit the United
States right of veto if NATO ceased to exist?... Can it be seriously
suggested that a vital multilateral international agreement, to
which according to our calculations many States, probably even
more than a hundred, could become parties, should be based on the
unilateral right of veto of one of the parties to this agreement, the
United States?... [N]either the Soviet Union nor the many other
States... can base their security on the United States right of veto
on decisions within NATO relating to the use of nuclear
weapons.1
2
There the matter stood, with the United States focusing on "control"
and no transfer of control and the Soviet Union emphasizing a vague
concept of "access" and simply no transfer, until the United States, for
a variety of reasons, gave up all efforts to create a multilateral nuclear
force within NATO.6 Although the public record is not clear on this
point, it is reasonable to conclude that the Non-Proliferation Treaty
and which permitted nuclear weapons to be fired with the concurrence of either nuclear-
weapon state, but not both, would also have been possible. As a practical matter, how-
ever, the United States does not seem to have seriously contemplated any sudh possibility.
Shortly before the United States treaty amendments were tabled, on February 23, 1966,
Secretary of State Rusk had stated: "We would have to insist ... that the United States
be a party to a decision to use nuclear weapons. Because tie vast arsenals of the United
States are so heavily involved in that decision, we must be present for that decision
and must ourselves agree to the decision taken." Hearings on Nonproliferation of Nuclear
Weapons Before the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 89th Cong., 2d Se. 20 (1966).
Moreover, the United States could not relinquish its veto without an amendment to
existing United States law. Id.
62. Statement by Soviet Union Representative to ENDC, Apr. 5, 1966, ENDC/PV3.Z5,
at 16-25; Docu ENm-s ON DmisasaENr, 1966, at 199, 202-03.
63. For a dialogue which reveals some of the thinking behind the United States move,
see Testimony of Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Director, United States Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, Hearings on Arms Control and Disarmament Act Amendments,
1968, Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 90th Cong., 2d Ses. 200 (1963).
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does not necessarily rule out a multilateral decision process which may
authorize use of nuclear weapons if each participating nuclear-weapon
state retains its individual veto and no nuclear hardware is transferred
to the group. Indeed, the net effect of such an arrangement would be
more fingers on the nuclear safety catch, but no more on the trigger.
Articles I and II are concerned not only with prohibiting the transfer
and acquisition of nuclear weapons or of their control, but also with
prohibiting the receipt and transfer of nuclear weapons by certain
parties. Although this latter prohibition has been adverted to in discus-
sing the issue of "control," two further implications should be analyzed.
First, Article I prohibits the transfer of nuclear weapons "to any
recipient whatsoever," to nuclear-weapon as well as non-nuclear-weapon
states. For example, the United States could not, under the Treaty,
supply nuclear warheads to the United Kingdom for the Polaris missiles
which the United Kingdom will obtain from the United States."1 Simi-
larly, Article II prohibits the receipt of nuclear weapons by a non-nu-
clear-weapon state "from any transferor whatsoever." This language is
probably intended to make the undertaking coextensive with the non-
transfer obligation of the nuclear-weapon states; it also serves to rein-
force the conclusion that transfer and receipt through international
organizations or multilateral frameworks is not permitted under the
Treaty. 5
Second, whether these restrictions concerning transfer and receipt
would operate as an obstacle to Western European unity deserves dis-
cussion. For example, would either France or the United Kingdom, or
both, be able to weld their nuclear forces into a "United States of
Europe" under the Treaty? Although such a possibility is far below the
horizon of political reality today, preservation of the option through
some form of express "European clause" has been a continuing concern
of some of those favoring European integration. Earlier United States
proposals for a non-proliferation treaty contained specific language to
protect such a possible political evolution. 0 At that time the Soviet
64. Under the Nassau agreement the United States and the United Kingdom agreed
"that the United States will make available on a continuing basis Polaris missiles (less
warheads) for British submarines." Statement on Nuclear Defense Systems, attached to
Nassau Communique by President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan, Dec. 21, 1962,
49 DEP'T STATE BULL. 43-45 (1963); DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT, 1962, at 1274, 1276 (U.S.
Arms Control & Disarmament Agency Pub. No. 19, 1963).
65. Under Articles I and II, "transfer" and "receive" are also modified by "directly,
or indirectly." Although this expression is deeply rooted in the history of the negotiations
it now seems merely to add further cement to the interpretation suggested previously con-
cerning nuclear sharing arrangements.
66. See analysis, note 61 supra.
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Union took a firm stance against any evolution in Western Europe,
federated or otherwise, which would multiply the number of states or
former states having "access" to nuclear weapons.
07
Since no comparable language appears in the agreed Treaty text, may
such a provision still be implied? It would seem reasonable to make a
distinction between the notions of "transfer" and "succession." In the
process of political unification a United Western Europe would "in-
herit" the nuclear weapons of France and/or the United Kingdom with-
out transfer or acquisition. 8
In addition to the prohibitions against transfer and receipt of nu-
clear weapons, Articles I and II proscribe a further range of activity
which is broad, vague, and in large measure susceptible only of subjec-
tive appraisal. A nuclear-weapon state undertakes "not in any way to
assist, encourage, or induce" any non-nuclear-weapon state to "manu-
facture or otherwise acquire" nuclear weapons or "control" over such
weapons; a non-nuclear-weapon state undertakes "not to seek or receive
any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons."09
67. In reference to Article I, paragraph 3, of the United States draft treat), amendments
of March 22, 1966, the Soviet Union envisioned the possibility that "one or another nudear
Power will give up the rights to use nuclear weapons in favour of a group of States or in
favour of the whole military alliance . . ." and "will thus be transformed into a whole
series of nuclear States, and instead of one there may be five, ten, fourteen or fifteen
Powers having the right and ability to use nuclear weapons." Statement by Soviet Union
Representative to ENDC, June 23, 1966, ENDC/PV.267, 4-13; Docu.NTs ON DtISAMAMENT,
1966, at 359, 361.
68. Foreign Minister Brandt of West Germany has stated that a united Europe "wvould
not automatically become a member of such a treaty. A federal European state would
instead inherit what its members possess." Interview with Die Welt, Feb. 23, 1967.
DocurEirs ON DisAntAmF"Nr, 1967, at 92, 93. Italy also has made a distinction between an
alliance and a federation which would provide for defense under a unified government
and would receive only those nuclear weapons that its original members posse.sed. State-
ment by Representative of Italy to ENDC, ENDC/PV.267, at 16-17. The United States
based its support for keeping the "European option" open on the ground that "welding
of all a nuclear weapon State's nuclear forces into a collective unit could take place only
in the event of a very profound change in the political relationships existing between
States ... ," and even if such a change came about the "centres of nuclear power ...
would not be increased... :' Statement by United States Representative to ENDC. Mar.
31, 1966, ENDC/PV.253, at 10-16; Docusmms ON Dimmt tN.sr, 1966, at 183, 185-86.
69. The meaning of "manufacture" which is used in both Articles I and II is ex-
tremely important, yet difficult to ascertain. The United States draft treaty of August 17,
1965, had simply prohibited "manufacture" by non-nuclear-weapon states and "assistance
to any non-nuclear State in the manufacture of nuclear weapons" by nuclear-weapon states.
ENDC/162, Aug. 17, 1965; DOCUmENTS ON DIsA [itxmENT, 1965, at 347. On the other hand,
the Soviet Union draft treaty of September 24, 1965, had included "preparations for the
manufacture" of nuclear weapons among the forms of prohibited assistance by nuclear-
weapon states and activities prohibited to non-nuclear-weapon states. U.N. Doe. A/5976,
Sept. 24, 1965; DocusmL'wrs ON DIsRMAMENT, 1965, at 443, 444. Sweden addressed the
problem fully during the course of the ENDO discussion. Referring to manufacture as "a
long ladder with many rungs," the Representative of Sweden contended "the practical
question is: on which of these is it reasonable and feasible to introduce international
blocking?" Planning deisions to undertake research on nuclear weapons and to obtain
fissionable material for use in weapons could be described as preparations for manufacture,
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Almost any kind of international nuclear assistance is potentially
useful to a nuclear weapons program. Indeed, most nuclear activity is
objectively ambiguous. Therefore, if only Articles I and II applied,
any nuclear assistance received by a non-nuclear-weapon state could be
subjectively appraised as falling within the range of prohibited activity.
Fortunately, the application of safeguards to all peaceful nuclear assis-
tance to non-nuclear-weapon states, as required by Article III, provides
a way to establish and clarify the peaceful purpose of most international
nuclear assistance.70
The prohibitions against encouragement and inducement by nuclear-
weapon states are even broader and more nebulous than those against
assistance, and no other parts of the Treaty would operate to narrow or
sharpen the meaning of the terms used 71 Could China's blandishments
to the Afro-Asian nations to follow their example be deemed the kind of
encouragement proscribed by the Treaty? Or is something more than
as, of course, could operational decisions to build plants and conduct tests, "To prohibit
just the final act of 'manufacture' would seem to come late in these long chains of
decisions. On the other hand, already to probe the preliminary thinking of politicians and
the laboratory research of scientists obviously is as difficult, as it would be considered un-
desirable intervention. Could a middle link be found on which the prohibitory regulation
should most definitely be focused?" Statement by Representative of Sweden to ENDC,
Feb. 24, 1966, ENDC/PV.243, at 4-16; DocuMErNTs oN DISARMAMENT, 1966, at 49, 56.
In the March 22, 1966, amendments to its draft Treaty, the United States adopted to
some extent the Soviet Union's position concerning preparations for manufacture. Under
Article I, as amended, nuclear-weapon states would have undertaken not to provide
assistance "in preparations for such manufacture." Under Article II, as amended, non-
nuclear-weapon states would have undertaken not to seek or receive assistance "in
preparation for such manufacture." However, as distinguished from the Soviet Union's
position, there would have been no express prohibition on preparations for the manu.
facture of nuclear weapons by a non-nuclear-weapon state as long as such activity was
carried on without any outside assistance. Articles I and 11 of the Non.Proliferation
Treaty as finally agreed upon do not contain any reference at all to preparations for
manufacture, either in relation to prohibited nuclear-weapon state assistance or to pro.
hibited non-nuclear-weapon state activities. In view of this omission together with
the historical background, it would appear that at least under Article II of the Treaty
non-nuclear-weapon states would remain free to engage in many of those activities on
the "long ladder" which stop short of actual manufacture, including perhaps a major
portion of nuclear weapons research and development work.
70. Safeguards would not, however, be applicable under Article III to a nuclear
weapons research program which did not constitute "manufacture." Moreover, If past
IAEA practice is followed in implementing Article III, the specific agreements governing
the application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear activities in a non-nuclear-weapon
state will provide in general for termination on six months' notice at the option of the
state concerned. See Szasz, The Law of International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards,
Ray. BELGE DE DRorr INT'L 196, 219-20 (1967); Willrich, Safeguarding Atoms for Peace, 60
An. J. INT'L LAW 34, 50-51 (1966).
71. The concept of a prohibition on encouragement or inducement to manufacture
nuclear weapons has its origin in Article I of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which,
in addition to prohibiting nuclear weapon test explosions in the atmosphere, outer space
and underwater in paragraph 1, also prohibits any Party from "causing, encouraging, or In
any way participating in" a nuclear weapon test explosion conducted by any state in a
prohibited environment. Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, art. I, para. 2, [1963] 2 U.ST.
1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.NT.S. 43 (1963).
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words necessary? The range of possible activities by nuclear-weapon
states which constitute assistance, encouragement or inducement under
the Non-Proliferation Treaty might develop into a fertile field for
future legal controversy, if the parties choose to pour the foreign policy
process into this form.
There are also some important limitations on the scope of prohibited
activity. Although the transfer of nuclear weapons is prohibited "to any
recipient whatsoever," including a transfer from one nuclear-weapon
state to another, nuclear-weapon states are prohibited from assisting
only non-nuclear-weapon states in the manufacture of nuclear weapons.
This leaves open the possibility that nuclear-weapon states could "assist"
each other in their respective nuclear weapons programs in a variety of
ways, short of transfer, without violating the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
In particular, the so-called "special relationship" between the United
States and the United Kingdom with respect to nuclear weapons cooper-
ation is apparently unimpaired by Article 1.72
The undertaking by nuclear-weapon states not to assist non-nuclear-
weapon states under Article I is universal and applies with equal force
to all such states, whether or not they are parties to the Treaty. Indeed,
any other result would constitute an inducement to non-nuclear-weapon
states not to become parties to the Treaty. Article II, on the other hand,
does not on its face prohibit a non-nuclear-weapon state from assisting
any state in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Article I does not pro-
hibit a nuclear-weapon state from receiving such assistance. Therefore,
the Treaty does not limit a nuclear-weapon state's ability to purchase
uranium for its weapons program from any foreign supplier. On the
other hand, assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons may not
be given by a non-nudear-weapon state to another non-nudear-weapon
state if the latter is a party to the Treaty without the recipient being in
violation of its obligations under Article II not to seek or receive such
assistance. But Article II does not expressly prohibit a non-nuclear-
weapon party from giving assistance in the manufacture of nuclear
weapons to another non-nuclear-weapon state which is not a party.
It might appear that this loophole in Article II is closed by Article
III, since under paragraph 2 all parties undertake not to supply nuclear
materials and equipment to non-nuclear-weapon states, whether or not
72. The basic United States-United Kingdom agreement for cooperation on the uses
of atomic energy for mutual defense purposes entered into force Aug. 4, 1958. [1958]
U.S.T. 1028, T.IA.S. No. 4078, 326 U.N.T.S. 3. It was amended May 7, 1959, (1959) 2
U.S.T. 1274, T.IA.S. No. 4267, 351 U.N.T.S. 458. For recent criticism of the "speaal rela-
tionship," see G. BALL, THE DISCIPLINE OF POIVM 90-117 (1968).
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parties, except under safeguards. But this argument fails because safe-
guards under Article III are applicable only to nuclear materials and
equipment provided "for peaceful purposes." Therefore, under the
Treaty as it stands, there would seem to be no legal obstacle to a non-
nuclear-weapon party furnishing material assistance to another non.
nuclear-weapon state not a party to the Treaty for a nuclear weapons
program. In spite of the plain meaning of the Treaty's language in this
regard, both the United States and the Soviet Union have tried to close
this loophole by questionable interpretations. 73 Of course, the Treaty
could have been amended to cover this problem clearly.74 But such an
amendment might well have resulted in pressure from other nations to
have the Treaty bar assistance by non-nuclear-weapon states not only to
other non-nuclear-weapon states, but also to the nuclear-weapon states
themselves.
The prohibitions contained in Articles I and II of the Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty thus far discussed have been directed at actions between
states, including transfer and receipt of nuclear weapons and assistance
75. The United States has stated: "It seems clear that a non-nuclear-weapon state
which accepts the treaty's restrictions on itself would have no reason to assist another
country not accepting the same restrictions to gain advantage from that fact in the field
of nuclear-weapon development. If a non-nuclear-weapon party did nevertheless attempt
to provide such assistance in the territory of a non-party, the presumption would In-
mediately arise that these acts had the purpose of developing nuclear weapons itself, in
violation of the treaty." Statement by United States Representative to ENDC, ENDC/
PV.370 (prov.), at 52-60. The Soviet Union has stated on the same point: "If a non-nuclear
State were to give assistance to another non-nuclear State in producing or acquiring
nuclear weapons, in that case, under the provisions of Article II and the preamble to
the treaty, it would be viewed as a violation of the treaty." Statement by the Soviet Union
Representative to ENDC, ENDC/PV.370 (prov.), at 41-44.
74. On two occasions the United Arab Republic suggested that Article II should be
amended to ban assistance by one nuclear-weapon state to another (and also to amend
Article I to ban expressly transfer by private organizations and individuals). Statements
by Representative of United Arab Republic to ENDC, ENDC]PV.333, at 4if; ENDC/PV.367
(prov.), at 12-16. Brazil and India supported the U.A.R. with regard to Article 1. ENDC/
PV.363 (prov.), at 32-35; ENDC]PV.368 (prov.), at 23-25. The United States draft treaty
of August 17, 1965, covered the point nicely. Article II, paragraph 2, provided: "Each of
the non-nuclear States Party to this Treaty undertakes not to seek or to receive assistance
in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, or itself to grant such assistance." ENDC/162,
Aug. 17, 1965; DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT, 1965, at 347, 348 (emphasis added), The
United States draft Article II as amended on March 22, 1966, also covered the point.
ENDC/152/Add. 1, Mar. 22, 1966; DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT, 1966, at 159. Tie Soviet
Union draft treaty of September 24, 1965, was less dear, but Article II, paragraph 1, did
prohibit non-nuclear-weapon states from manufacturing nuclear weapons "either inde-
pendently or together with other States, in their own territory or in the territory of other
States." U.N. Doc. A/5976, Sept. 24, 1965; DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT, 1965, at 443, 444,
The reluctance of the superpowers to amend their draft in this respect seems difficult to
justify, especially if there was support for such an amendment from the non'nuclear,
weapon states, and if there was no latent conflict between the superpowers as to interpreta
tion. With reference to the statements by the United States and Soviet Union, at note 731
supra, the United Arab Republic Representative has stated that the fact that these
statements were made by the co-Chairmen and co-authors of the Treaty "confers tin'
portant weight upon them." Statement by Representative of United Arab Republic to
ENDC, Feb. 27, 1968, ENDC/PV.370, at 31.
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in the manufacture of such weapons. Of course the gut provision of the
Treaty, directed at non-nuclear-weapon states individually, is the under-
taking "not to manufacture or otherwise acquire" nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices, even with indigenous resources and
without any outside help. In effect, all the measures of nuclear disarma-
ment which the nuclear-weapon states have been unable to agree upon
in 23 years of almost uninterrupted negotiation would be applied pro-
spectively to the non-nuclear-weapon states, including a comprehensive
ban on all nuclear weapon tests and a halt in production of fissionable
materials for use in weapons.7 Non-nuclear-weapon parties must hence-
forth be satisfied with pursuing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy."
B. Peaceful Nuclear Activities
Since peaceful and warlike uses of nuclear energy spring from the
same technology, the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty con-
cerned with peaceful nuclear activities (Articles III, IV, and V) are at
least as important in the overall non-proliferation scheme as those
focused directly on nuclear weapons. Article III provides for safeguards
on peaceful nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon states to ensure
that nuclear materials used in such activities are not diverted to use in
weapons. Articles IV and V contain important undertakings regarding
future cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Many of the
undertakings concerning cooperation laid on the nuclear-weapon states,
some hortatory and some real, have been inserted to reduce the discrim-
ination inherent in asking non-nuclear-weapon states to pledge not to
manufacture nuclear weapons, even out of their own resources. Further-
more, the opportunity of receiving expanded nuclear assistance for
peaceful purposes provides a carrot for the non-nuclear-weapon states
to accept safeguards, while the threat of a refusal of further cooperation
unless such safeguards are accepted could be a rather effective stick.
1. Treaty Safeguards
The character of existing international safeguards systems has been
previously outlined. A major part of the problem with implementing
75. In 1955 both the Soviet Union and the United States conceded that, as a technical
matter, in view of the amounts of fissionable material that has already been produced, it
would be impossible to provide assurance that all stockpiles of nuclear weapons had been
eliminated under any practicable verification system. After 1955, therefore, talk of
complete nudear disarmament by the nuclear-weapon states became at most propaganda.
For the text of the Soviet statement, see I Docur.mNnrs oN Di mA. EN, 19,15-1959, at 456.
464-67 (U.S. Dep't of State No. 7008, 1960); and for the United States statement, see id.
510-13.
76. But the breadth of the pledge not to manufacture depends on the interpretation
of "manufacture." See note 69 supra.
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the Non-Proliferation Treaty will be to fit the Treaty safeguards re-
quirements into the framework which already exists.
At the outset, it is important to stake out certain ground which is
beyond the reach of any international inspection requirement under
the Treaty. There is no verification of the undertakings by the parties
under Articles I and II not to transfer or receive nuclear weapons.71
Moreover, safeguards are not intended to ensure that a non-nuclear-
weapon state does not establish a secret nuclear weapons program en-
tirely outside and independent of its peaceful nuclear industry. A
system for effective verification of these fundamental obligations would
require access not only to declared peaceful nuclear activities within
states, but also to all areas and activities suspected of being related to a
nuclear weapons program. Such verification would probably be so in-
trusive and extensive as to render the Non-Proliferation Treaty unac-
ceptable to some nuclear-weapon as well as many non-nuclear-weapon
states.78
Finally, safeguards are not required on peaceful nuclear activities
within nuclear-weapon states. A logical reason for this exemption is that
in a nuclear-weapon state verification that the nuclear materials used
in the peaceful program are not diverted to weapons loses its non-pro-
liferation purpose.7 9 The political reason for the exemption is that an
international inspection of civil nuclear activities in nuclear-weapon
77. Rumania and India questioned the absence of any method of assuring that the
nuclear-weapon states and their non-nuclear-weapon allies were respecting their obliga.
tions under Articles I and II. Statement by Representative of Rumania to ENDC, ENDO/
362 (prov.), at 12; Statement by Representative of India to ENDC, ENDC/PV.370 (prov.),
at 17.
78. Article 16 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, however, provides for "special inspection"
when so requested "by any party which suspects that some activity prohibited by this
Treaty has been carried out or is being carried out . . . ," or when requested "by any
party which has been suspected or charged with having violated the Treaty." The
inspection is to be carried out in such a situation not by the IAEA which has general
safeguards responsibilities with respect to declared peaceful nuclear activities In the
territories of the parties, but by the Council of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons in Latin America. The Council is composed of five of the parties, each elected
for a four-year term. Therefore, although the Latin American nuclear free zone concept
includes peremptory inspection for clandestine nuclear weapons facilities, the Inspection
agency is regional rather than global in make-up.
79. The logic, however, can be questioned. In the past, much of the plutonium pro.
duced in civil nuclear power reactors in the United Kingdom, and probably in the Soviet
Union, has been used in nuclear weapons programs. In the United States one dual
purpose power and plutonium production reactor was specially built at Hanford, Wash-
ington. The bulk of the plutonium produced in France's nuclear power reactors is being
used in the French weapons program. For this reason, the French, on doubtful legal
grounds, are believed not to have permitted Euratom inspection of most of their nuclear
power reactors. These circumstances suggest that safeguards on reactors In nuclear-
weapon states could force a dear separation between civil power and military production
facilities and, in some cases, make the production of plutonium for weapons more
expensive for nuclear-weapon states.
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states is not acceptable to the Soviet Union. The absence of any require-
ment that the nuclear-weapon states accept safeguards on their peaceful
nuclear activities creates another major political discrimination in the
Treaty between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon statesEO Con-
cern has also been expressed that nuclear industries in non-nuclear-
weapon states would risk disclosure of industrial secrets in the inter-
national inspection process, while their commercial competitors in
nuclear-weapon states would not.8' To meet this concern with possible
80. On May 30, 1967, before any superpower-agreed draft had been tabled, Swreden
outlined five possible safeguards systems for a non-proliferation treaty in descending order
of acceptability: (1) Universal and obligatory submission to safeguards of all nuclear
industry of all states and of all transfers of nuclear materials between states. This would
amount to a verified cut-off of further production of fissionable materials for weapons as
well as assurance that civil nuclear industries were not diverted. It would stop vertical
and horizontal proliferation. (2) Compulsory submission to safeguards of all peaceful
nuclear activities of all states, and all transfers between all states. This would provide a
complete stop to horizontal proliferation, including additions from abroad to the weapons
programs of nudear-weapon states. It would also provide non-discrimination and com-
mercial equity in the peaceful nuclear sector. (3) Compulsory submission to safeguards
of all peaceful nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon states and on all transfers between
all states. This would stop horizontal proliferation, but would introduce the possibility of
discrimination in regard to the commercial markets within the nuclear-weapon states
between domestic and foreign suppliers. (4) Application of safeguards to all transfers
between all states. This would be non-discriminatory in a sense, but would favor those
states which were self-sufficient and would be ineffective from the standpoint of insuring
against horizontal proliferation. (5) Application of safeguards to all peaceful nuclear
activities in non-nuclear-weapon states and all transfers to non-nuclear-weapon states.
This would stop horizontal proliferation to non-nuclear-weapon states, but would not
prevent foreign contributions to nuclear weapons programs in nuclear-weapon states. It
would also be commercially discriminatory. Sweden called the fifth alternative "very
unsatisfactory" and "unbalanced in all respects." Statement by Representative of Sweden
to ENDC, May 30, 1967, ENDC/PV300, at 4-15; Docuitmrs oN Dmm.ewa.n'rr, 1957, at 239.
243-45. Nevertheless, the fifth alternative is essentially the alternative adopted in Article
IMI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
81. The IAEA system itself gives broad protection to commercial and industrial se-
crets. Members of the Agency staff are prohibited from disclosing, except to authorized
Agency officials, commercial secrets "or any other confidential information" coming to
their knowledge by reason of safeguards administration. Specific information relating to
the implementation of safeguards may be given to the Board of Governors and to staff
members "only to the extent necessary for the Agency to fulfill its safeguards respon.
sibilities." Summarized lists of items being safeguarded may be published upon Board
decision, but publication of additional information requires the further consent of all
states "directly concerned." IA.E.A. INFCIRC/66, at para. 14 (1965).
The fear that implementation of safeguards could result in unwanted disclosure of
valuable industrial secrets is probably derived in large measure from the international
character of the inspectorate. Western and capitalist countries may be concerned that
Agency inspectors who are nationals of Communist states would have little respect for
property rights in information. Moreover, countries engaged in stiff technical competi-
tion in developing advanced reactor concepts might well be concerned about inspection
by the national of a competitor, regardless of the economic ideology of his government.
The IAEA system also contains requirements that safeguards be implemented "in a
manner designed to avoid hampering a State's economic or technological development,"
and "in a manner designed to be consistent with prudent management practices required
for the economic and safe conduct of nuclear activities." I.A.E.A. INFCIRC/60, at paras.
9-10 (1965). A more specific provision dealing with a related question states that the
Agency shall not request the state concerned "to stop construction or operation" of any
nuclear facility "except by explicit decision of the Board." Id. para. 11. These "safeguards
against safeguards" provided in the IAEA system are echoed in Article III, paragraph S.
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economic discrimination the United States has declared its intention,
when safeguards are applied under the Treaty in non-nuclear-weapon
states, to "permit the International Atomic Energy Agency to apply its
safeguards to all nuclear activities in the United States-excluding only
those with direct national security significance."8' 2 The United King-
dom has made a parallel policy declaration83 Thus, argument by the
non-nuclear-weapon states that Article III of the Treaty discriminates
against them in this way should be primarily directed to the Soviet
Union.
In spite of these several limitations on the application of safeguards,
Article III would have a broad impact on peaceful nuclear activities
within non-nuclear-weapon states, and on international nuclear com-
merce. Under paragraph 1 of Article 111,84 each non-nuclear-weapon
of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which provides: "The safeguards required by this Article
shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty,
and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the partic5 or
international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including tile inter
national exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or produc.
tion of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this
Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the preamble."
82. Address by President Johnson, Dec. 2, 1967, 57 DEP'T STATE BULL. 862, 863 (1967);
DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAIENT, 1967, at 613-15. Previously, the United States attitude had
been that "the application of a system of safeguards to all the peaceful activities of exist
ing nuclear-weapon Powers would involve a tremendous strain on the safeguard system.
A strict inspection of the peaceful nuclear activities of existing nuclear-weapon Powers
when there is no restriction on their increasing their large nuclear stockpiles might well
be described as straining at gnats while swallowing camels." Statement by United States
Representative to ENDC, July 28, 1966, ENDC/PV.277, at 407; DocuMENTS ON DISAnMA-
MENT, 1966, at 482. 483-84.
83. For statement by United Kingdom Disarmament Minister Mulley to the House
of Commons, Dec. 4, 1967, see ENDC2O7, Dec. 5, 1967; DOCUMENTS ON DISAItrIAMENT,
1967, at 616.
84. "Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safe-
guards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International
Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy
Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of
the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing
diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear ex-
plosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed
with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, pro.
cessed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safe-
guards required by this article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable mate-
rial in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its juris-
diction, or carried out under its control anywhere." Art. III, para. 1.
The question may be asked whether Article III incorporates by reference the IAEA
safeguards system as it would exist when the Treaty enters into force. If such were the
case, it might be argued that a Treaty amendment would be required to change the
IAEA safeguards system applicable by virtue of Article Ill. The United States has stated
that the Non-Proliferation Treaty should not be interpreted in this way. Statement by
United States Representative to ENDC, Jan. 18, 1968, ENDC/PV.357, at 14, 16. The
IAEA system itself contains provision for "periodic review in the light of the further
experience gained by the Agency as well as of technological developments." 1,A,E,A.
INFCIRC/66, at para. 8 (1965). The Preamble to the Non-Proliferation Treaty also con-
tains a paragraph: "Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts
to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy
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state undertakes to accept safeguards which would be applied "on all
source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities"
within its territory or under its jurisdiction or control. Hence, safe-
guards would be applicable to the entire peaceful nuclear industries of
all non-nuclear-weapon states which become parties to the Treaty.
Widespread adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty would, there-
fore, constitute a major step toward international security regulation of
the nuclear phase of the energy economy in many countries of the
world, and in Eastern as well as Western Europe.sa
But the undertaking of the non-nuclear-weapon states under para-
graph I to accept safeguards is imperfect. Since the "exclusive purpose"
of safeguards under Article III is "verification of the fulfillment of
[each non-nuclear-weapon state's] obligations assumed under this
Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from
peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,"
the Treaty safeguards do not necessarily prohibit diversion to any mili-
tary purpose aside from nuclear weapons. Under paragraph 2 of Article
III, which covers international nuclear transactions, safeguards are not
required on imports for a military reactor program in a non-nuclear-
weapon state. 6 Unless the safeguards concept is applied more broadly
under paragraph 1 than under paragraph 2, therefore, safeguards would
not follow nuclear materials transferred by a non-nuclear-weapon state
Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source
and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain
strategic points." Under the IAEA safeguards system, however, the specific safeguards
agreements would be negotiated with reference to the system as it exsts at that time.
Further modification in the IAEA system would not affect safeguards agreements already
in effect unless so provided in the agreement or consented to by the state concerned.
I.AE.A.. INFCIRCI66, at para. 6 (1965). See also Statement by United States Representa-
tive to ENDC, ENDC/PV.368 (prov.), at 23-26.
85. Although in the past the Communist states have been adamant against arms con-
trol inspection, Eastern European states have declared their willingness to accept IAEA
safeguards while West European states have been reluctant. At the Tenth General Con-
ference of the IAEA (Sept. 21-28, 1966) East Germany, not an IAEA member, declared its
willingness to "accede" to IAEA safeguards on condition that West German) an IAEA
member, would do likewise. I.A.E.A. Doc. GC(x)/INF/91, Sept. 27, 1966; Docusmarrs o.
DsA sR'rT, 1967, at 640. Poland and Czechoslovakia made similar offers to place their
nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards if West Germany would reciprocate. Id. 642.43.
West Germany responded that it had expressly renounced production of nuclear weapons
in 1954, had already accepted Euratom safeguards on all its nuclear facilities, and would
be willing to require IAEA safeguards on all its nuclear exports outside the Euratom
area, "provided other supplying countries are willing to impose the same condition."
I.A.E.A. Doc. GC(x)/OR.104, at 14; Docu. Nrs o, Dm .mAmwr, 1967, at 644.
Participation of East Germany in the Non-Proliferation Treaty will raise some inter-
esting problems. If East Germany joins the Treaty and accepts IAEA safeguards, its
claim for membership in the IAEA would be strengthened. If East Germany is admitted
to the IAEA it will be the first time that both halves of Germany have been members
of the same international organization and the first time East Germany will be a member
of a U.N.-related agency.
86. See pp. 1489-90 infra.
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from a civil power reactor to a military propulsion reactor program, for
example.
8 7
These are intricate but limited problems concerning the purpose of
the safeguards. Under the word "verification" is buried the major part
of a much larger and more politically charged problem. How should
the global IAEA system of safeguards be related to the regional Eura-
tom system within the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty?88
Should "verification" require basically the same arrangements between
87. In connection with this problem, the United States has stated: "The present IAEA
Statute and safeguards system do not provide for safeguards on military facilities ... 
Statement by State Department Spokesman Robert McCloskey, Mar. 14, 1968 (unpub.
lished). This statement can support a conclusion that safeguards under Article III do
not apply to military non-weapon nuclear programs. However, the statement does not
resolve the problem of whether a non-nuclear-weapon state would be free to transfer
nuclear materials subject to safeguards into a military nuclear program. The IAEA is
authorized to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that safeguarded
nuclear materials and equipment "are not used in such a way as to further any military
purpose." I.A.E.A. STAT. art. III, A, 5. If non-nuclear-weapon states were free at will to
terminate a safeguards agreement as to particular nuclear material or a piece of equip.
ment it wished to use for a military purpose, the purpose of IAEA safeguards would
seem to be distorted. This potential conflict between the IAEA Statute and Article III
of the Non-Proliferation Treaty may be eased somewhat by the limitation in IA,..A,
STAT. art. II, that the IAEA shall ensure only "so far as it is able" against diversion to
"any military purpose." Nevertheless, having accepted safeguards on their peaceful nuclear
activities, the non-nuclear-weapon states might find that safeguards obstruct, to tomce
extent, their ability to engage in military non-weapon nuclear programs or nuclear-
weapon research programs which are not deemed to be manufacture. Of course, from the
standpoint of non-proliferation policy, this seems a desirable effect.
88. Any-relationship between Euratom and IAEA will raise a number of legal and
political issues. From the Euratom perspective, do the Community and its member
states have power under the Euratom Treaty to consent to the application of IAEA safe-
guards on peaceful nuclear activities with the Community, or would amendment to the
Treaty be required? Assuming amendment would not be required, who would have to
consent or be a party to an arrangement between Euratom and IAEA or the application
of IAEA safeguards within a particular Euratom member state-the state concerned,
other member states, the Commission, the Council? In general, there are a variety of
legal roadblocks which could be thrown in the way of any arrangement which accorded
IAEA a right for its inspectors to enter Euratom territory, even though the particular
Euratom member state concerned agreed. Not the least of these is the fact that under
Article 86 of the Treaty all fissionable material subject to Euratom safeguards is ipso
facto owned by the Community. On the other hand, there appears to be enough flexibility
in the constitutional arrangements to permit a variety of relationships such as according
IAEA a right to enter Euratom territory as long as no single member state voices strong
objection. Whether one Euratom member state could veto arrangements proposed to be
concluded with the IAEA which would be applicable only to other consenting member
states is problematic.
From the perspective of IAEA, the kind of arrangement with Euratom and/or some of its
member states that the Agency could become a party to is limited by its statute. Unlike
Euratom, however, the basis for IAEA safeguards jurisdiction is primarily consensual
and ad hoc. The Board of Governors of the IAEA will have considerable flexibility in
the kind of arrangements which it can properly approve under Article III. The present
safeguards system provides that the IAEA will not assume safeguards responsibility for
nuclear materials "unless the principles of the safeguards and the procedures to be used
are essentially consistent with those set forth in this document." IA.E.A. INFCIRC/66,
at para. 5 (1965). However, the present system also includes provision for transfer of
safeguarded nuclear material into a state if it will be subject in the recipient state "to
safeguards other than those of the Agency but generally consistent with such safeguards
and accepted by the Agency." Id. para 28(d). See also p. 1485-86 & note 90 infra.
1484
Vol. 77: 1447, 1968
Nuclear Weapons
the IAEA and all non-nuclear-weapon parties to the Treaty?s0 If so, the
result could be the application of IAEA safeguards in parallel with, if
not in lieu of, Euratom safeguards in the territory of non-nuclear-
weapon Euratom members which adhered to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty. Or, in the case of the five non-nuclear-weapon states whose
peaceful nuclear activities are already subject to Euratom's system of
safeguards, should "verification" be accomplished by an IAEA decision
to accept Euratom safeguards in lieu of those of the Agency? 0 Between
these extremes of parallel application of IAEA safeguards in Euratom
territory on the one hand, and complete delegation of IAEA respon-
sibilities to Euratom on the other, a range of intermediate possibilities
exists.
89. Sweden has called for "the application of one system of safeguards to the activities
of all countries." Statement by Representative of Sweden to ENDC, ENDC/PV..00, at 6-7.
The United Arab Republic has similarly stated that a non-proliferation treaty should
require "compulsory and uniform application" of IAEA safeguards to all non-nuclear-
weapon states. Statement by Representative of United Arab Republic to ENDC, E.NDC/
PV.294, at 7. Section 11(E) of the United States Euratom Agreement for Cooperation pro-
vides: "In recognition of the importance of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the
United States of America and the European Atomic Energy Community .ill consult with
each other from time to time to determine whether there are any areas of responsibility
with regards to safeguards and controls and matters relating to health and safety in
which the Agency [IAEA] might be asked to assist' In an exchange of correspondence
with reference to Section 11(E), the understanding was reached that "in the event of the
establishment of an international safeguards and control s)stem by the International
Atomic Energy Agency, the United States and Euratom wll consult regarding assumption
by that agency of the safeguard and control over the fissonable material utilized or
produced in implementation of the program contemplated by the Memorandum of
Understanding." European Atomic Energy Community, Agreement for Cooperation be-
tween the European Atomic Energy Community and the Government of the United States
of America and Related Documents, Nov. 8, 1958, at 4548. The United States has been
able to make no tangible progress in implementation of Section ll(E) and the under-
standing.
Until recently, in addition to the United States-Euratom Agreement for Cooperation.
bilateral agreements for cooperation were in effect between the United States and the
Euratom member states individually. Although various Euratom members would have
preferred that these bilateral agreements continue, the United States adopted a "fold-in"
policy of non-renewal upon expiration of their fixed terms, continuing the same nuclear
cooperation, however, under the aegis of the overall United States-Euratom agreement.
This move was designed to strengthen Euratom at a time when nuclear industries within
the member states were tending to become increasingly nationalistic, The trend to,'ard
nuclear nationalism has not been substantially affected by the fold-in policy, but by
adopting it the United States has given up a series of bilateral agreements. The respon-
sibility for safeguards under these agreements might have been transferred from the
AEC to the IAEA in accord with general United States safeguards policy, and by this
time the problem of relating IAEA safeguards to peaceful nuclear activities in non-
nuclear-weapon Euratom member states might have been largely resolved, at least in
principle. The United States, however, did not get its priorities as between promoting
European nuclear integration and global non-proliferation readjusted in time.
90. The present IAEA safeguards system would allow for this, upon a decision of the
Board of Governors, as to transfers into the Community. The principle might be extended
to safeguarding peaceful nuclear activities in a state. See Willrich, Safeguarding Atoms
for Peace, 60 Am. J. INr'L L. 34, 49-50. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely the Board would
ever make such a decision generally to abdicate its responsibilities in relation to Article
I of the Non-ProLiferation Treaty.
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These possibilities will be analyzed in terms of the two basic require-
ments which both IAEA and Euratom safeguards systems include:
first, that reports which reflect the running inventory of nuclear ma-
terials in various declared locations be submitted to an external au-
thority; second, that the external authority have physical access to the
declared locations to check by independent means the accuracy of the
reports. There are many intermediate positions around which a
Euratom-IAEA relationship could be built. With respect to reporting,
declared locations could submit reports directly to the IAEA; they
could submit reports to Euratom for forwarding to the IAEA; or they
could submit reports only to Euratom, and Euratom could compile its
own set of reports for submission to IAEA. All reporting requirements
could be more or less based on the Euratom or on the IAEA system.
With respect to physical access, declared locations could be open to
IAEA inspection as prescribed under the IAEA safeguards system;
they could be open to IAEA inspection on a less frequent basis than
generally prescribed under the IAEA system; they could be open to
IAEA inspection only if reports to the IAEA revealed a discrepancy;
they could be closed to IAEA inspection as such, but IAEA inspectors
could accompany Euratom inspectors on a limited basis; they could be
closed to IAEA inspection, with IAEA inspectors being limited to con-
sultation with Euratom inspectors and review of Euratom inspection
procedures used. With respect to all IAEA access to declared locations,
Euratom might or might not be given advance notice and a right to
accompany IAEA inspectors.91
The governments concerned have disclosed little beyond general
91. In general, the IAEA system provides for the right of access at all times without
advance notice to reactors capable of producing more than 60 kilograms of plutoniunm
per year (which indudes virtually all power reactors). Chemical processing plants with
an annual throughput exceeding 5 kilograms of plutonium are subject to be "inspected
at all times," and in such plants with a throughput exceeding 60 kilograms "the right
of access at all times would normally be implemented by means of continuous inspection."
See I.A.E.A. INFCIRG/66, at para. 57 (1965); I.A.E.A. Doc. GC(x)/INF/86, Annex, para. 
& n.2 (1966). Thus, large nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards are open to inspection
at any time, and resident inspection is a distinct possibility.
IAEA inspectors for a particular state are designated by the Director General from
a panel previously nominated by him and approved by the Board of Governors. In each
case the state concerned must approve the identity of the inspectors designated. I.A.E.A,
Doc. GC(v)/INF/39, Annex, paras. 1-3 (1961); see Szasz, The Law of International Atomic
Energy Agency Safeguards, 3 REv. BELGE DE DROrr IwrL 196, 224-25 (1967). See also
Statement by Department of State, DocumEwrs ON DISA=,AMENr, 1967, at 96, 97. In prac-
tice, therefore, a Western state could refuse to admit an IAEA inspector from a Cont.
munist state and vice versa. A Western state may also be reluctant to admit an inspector
from another Western state with which it is in commercial competition. If these attitudes
persist under the Non-Proliferation Treaty it would place a very large burden of Ill.
spection on neutral and developing states, some of which do not have available personnel
or can ill afford to supply people well qualified to be inspectors.
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positions as to the nature of the IAEA-Euratom arrangement that might
emerge under Article III, leaving plenty of room for future conflict. On
the one hand, the Soviet Union has characterized Euratom as a "closed
organization of West Germany's allies in the military NATO bloc,"
and Euratom's safeguards as nothing more than self-inspection. 2 Ac-
ceptable safeguards, in their view, are those of the IAEA, an organization
in which all social and political systems are represented and in which
all states can have confidence. On the other hand, Euratom member
states have agreed among themselves that any arrangement between tie
IAEA and Euratom resulting from the Non-Proliferation Treaty
"should concern the verification of Euratom control methods and not
direct IAEA control." 93 Caught in the middle, the United States has
stated that:
In order to avoid unnecessary duplication, the IAEA should
make appropriate use of existing records and safeguards, provided
that under such mutually-agreed arrangements IA2A can satisfy
itself that nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices. 4 (Emphasis added.)
92. Statement by Representative of Soviet Union to First Committee of the U.N.
General Assembly, Oct. 20, 1966, U.N. Doc. A/C.I/PV.1431. at 6-21 (1966); DocuE,rs
oN Dx S A.m=r, 1966, at 657, 661. The element of self-inspection, while not a major
concern in the present political context in Western Europe, would become increasingly
important if progress toward the political integration of Western Europe were achieved.
Secretary of State Rusk has also recognized the precedent the relationship of LAEA to
Euratom would set for "other parts of the world who might wish to put together a little
family group which would inspect itself and deny outside inspection on the grounds
that it is up to each regional group to provide its own inspection." Television Intervier,
with Secretary of State Rusk, Feb. 10, 1967, 56 DEP'r STATE BuLL. 360 (1967). It is note-
worthy in this regard that although the Treaty of Tlatelolco would establish an "Agency
for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America" with certain inspction func.
tions, Article 13 of the Treaty also provides: "Each Contracting Part) shall negotiate
multilateral or bilateral agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency for
the application of its safeguards to its nuclear activities." Thus, the element of self-
inspection will be avoided as to declared facilities in the Latin American nuclear free
zone. For the treatment accorded inspection for possible clandestine facilities, see note
78 supra.
93. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Apr. 1968, at 17. West German Foreign Minister Brandt
has stated that the IAEA could be related to Euratom by means of a "verification treaty."
He has also said that under a non-proliferation treaty, "[t]he IAEA should be able to
convince itself of the effectiveness of the other control systems." Statement by Foreign
Minister Brandt to the Bundestag, Apr. 27, 1967, at 1-8; DocutErxs oN DLs.~sMA.stLr,
1967, at 206, 213. France has remained aloof during the course of discussions in Euratom
and will probably not become a party to the Treaty. Even if it did, as a nuclear-weapon
state, France would not be required to accept safeguards under Article Ill. While the
objective of Euratom is intended to create one integrated legal and economic community
as regards the peaceful uses of nuclear energy among its member states, the results of
the Non-Proliferation Treaty will be to apply to peaceful nuclear activities in the five
non-nuclear-weapon Euratom members certain measures not applied to similar activities
in France.
94. Statement by the United States Representative to ENDC, Jan. 18, 1965, ENDC/
PV.357, at 14, 17. Statement of this principal was the quid by which the United States
was able to obtain the quo of Soviet agreement to a text for Article I which had been
previously approved by the NATO Council. For a fascinating account of the history by
1487
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 77: 1447, 1968
With these diverse viewpoints and interests involved, putting together
a combination of reporting and access provisions from the possibilities
outlined, and elaborating these into an overall relationship among
IAEA, Euratom and the non-nuclear-weapon Euratom members will
be a complicated process. However, it will revolve around one central
question. Should the IAEA have access to declared locations within
Euratom territory as a matter of right? Diplomats and their lawyers
will perhaps invent solutions to obscure or gloss over this issue. But it
can be avoided only if the participants in future negotiations agree to
do so.
While paragraph 1 of Article III deals with acceptance of safeguards
on peaceful nuclear activities within non-nuclear-weapon parties, para.
graph 2 pertains to international transactions in nuclear materials and
a participant, see Testimony of Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Director, United States Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, Hearings on Arms Control and Disarmament Act
Amendments, 1968, Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
61-62 (1968). In addition to the principle quoted above, the United States set forth two
other principles as follows:
"There should be safeguards for all non-nuclear-weapon parties of such a nature that
all parties can have confidence in their effectiveness. Therefore safeguards established
by an agreement negotiated and concluded with the IAEA in accordance with the Statute
of the IAEA and the Agency's safeguards system must enable the IAEA to carry out Its
responsibility of providing assurance that no diversion is taking place.
"In discharging their obligations under article III, non-nuclear-weapon parties may
negotiate safeguards agreements with the IAEA individually or together with other
parties; and, specifically, an agreement covering such obligations may be entered into
between the IAEA and another international organization the work of Which Is related
to the IAEA and the membership of which includes the parties concerned."
The United States is well aware of the difference between being convinced of the
effectiveness of another safeguards system, as advocated by Euratom and West Germany
in particular, and being satisfied that nuclear materials subject to another safeguards
system are not being diverted to nuclear weapons, as advocated by the United States,
from its own experience under the United States-Euratom Agreement for Cooperation.
[1958] U.S.T. 1116, T.I.A.S. No. 4091, 335 U.N.T.S. 161 (1958); as amended, [1962] 2
U.S.T. 1403, T.I.A.S. No. 5103, 453 U.N.T.S. 390 (1962). Under Section ll(B) Euratom
is given "the responsibility for establishing and implementing a safeguards and control
system" which is "reasonably compatible" with the IAEA system. Section 11(D) provides,
"There will be frequent consultations and exchanges of visits between the parties to
give assurance to both parties that the Euratom safeguards and control system effectively
meets the responsibility and principles stated in B above and that the standards of the
materials accountability systems of the United States and Euratom are kept reasonably
comparable." In an exchange of correspondence on June 18, 1958, the following under.
standing was reached with reference to Section 11(D): "T]he consultations and exchanges
of visits agreed upon in the referenced section and the assurance provided for therein
include within those terms permission by each party for the other party to verify, by
mutually approved scientific methods, the effectiveness of the safeguards and control
systems applied to nuclear materials received from the other party or to fissionable
materials derived from these nuclear materials." European Atomic Energy Community,
Agreement for Cooperation between the European Atomic Energy Community and the
Government of the United States of America and Related Documents, Nov. 8, 1958, at
45, 47. In implementing the understanding, the United States AEC has not been accorded
a right of physical access to Euratom facilities, although it has been asserted that such




equipment. Under paragraph 2 of Article IIu each party to the Treaty,
including a nuclear-weapon state, undertakes not to export or provide
nuclear material or equipment for peaceful purposes to any non-
nuclear-weapon state, whether or not a party, unless the materials or
equipment are subject to safeguards. If the importing state is a nuclear-
weapon state, however, safeguards are not required.""
Safeguards apply only to a transaction "for peaceful purposes." Inter-
national nuclear transactions entered into expressly for non-weapons
military purposes are neither reached by any safeguards requirement
under paragraph 2 of Article III, nor prohibited by any other pro-
vision of the Treaty, Thus, nuclear materials and equipment could be
furnished free and clear of safeguards to a non-nuclear-weapon state
95. "Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special
fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the
processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to an) non-nuclear-weapon
State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be sub-
ject to the safeguards required by this article." Art. In, para. 2.
96. This exclusion is similar to the exclusion of nuclear-weapon states from the pro-
hibition on receiving and giving assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons under
Articles I and I. The United States position has not always been that which is embodied
in paragraph 2 of Article MI. Rather, the United States position on July 28, 1966, was
that "in the transfer of such materials and equipment between States for peaceful pur-
poses, all States would be treated alike" as regards safeguards. Statement by United States
Representative to ENDC, July 28, 1966, ENDC/PV_77, at 4-7; Docutsxv on DismntA-
itmNT, 1966, at 482, 485.
On June 3, 1965, the Government of Canada announced that, in the future, export
permits covering sales of uranium will be issued only if the unranium is to be used for
peaceful purposes, and that an agreement with the government of the importing state
to this effect will be required together with "appropriate verification and control." State-
ment by Foreign Minister Martin in the Parliament of Canada, June 3, 1965. This policy
was resisted by some firms within Canada which were seeking to negotiate long-term
supply arrangements with France, which refused to accept any safeguards requirement.
Under paragraph 2 of Article II, the Canadian Government may in the future be some-
what more hard pressed to refuse to approve a substantial uranium export contract to
a nuclear-weapon state for lack of safeguards, especially if another seller such as South
Africa is in competition for the business.
Although Article I, paragraph 2, itself permits unsafeguarded exports to nuclear-
weapon states, the present IAEA system, in conjunction with Article Ill, may not permit
such unsafeguarded exports to occur. Article MI, paragraph 1, of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty requires safeguards on "all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful
nuclear activities" of a non-nuclear-weapon state. Once IAEA safeguards are applied to
particular nuclear material it cannot, in general, be transferred to another state unless
safeguards follow the material or an equivalent amount of material has been substituted
for that upon which safeguards are to terminate. The IAEA system does not differentiate
between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states in this regard as does the Non-
Proliferation Treaty.
The possibility of terminating safeguards on material to be transferred to a nuclear-
weapon state by substitution by the non-nuclear-weapon state of an equivalent amount
of unsafeguarded material would not exist because safeguards would apply to all mate-
rial in its jurisdiction under paragraph 1 of Article Il. The possibility of the nuclear-
weapon state providing material to the non-nuclear-weapon state desiring to export to
it for purposes of substitution by the non-nuclear-weapon state does not exist bccau-e
paragraph 2 of Article IJI requires safeguards on exports to non-nuclear-weapon states.
See Szasz, The Law of International Atomic Energy Agency Saleguards, 3 REv. BELGE DE
DRorr INT'L 196, 218 (1967); AVillrich, Safeguarding Atoms for Peace, 60 Amt. J. IN'LV L.
34, 48 (1966).
1489
The Yale Law Journal
for use by that state in a naval propulsion reactor program or a reactor
for irradiating military equipment.
97
Excluding exports for military purposes from the safeguards require-
ments may appear to be a large loophole in Article III. The size of this
loophole, however, is reduced by Articles I and II. The exporters,
and the importers if parties to the Treaty, would violate their under-
takings under Articles I and II if the materials and equipment provided
pursuant to a military nuclear agreement were used for nuclear
weapons. Moreover, the amounts of nuclear materials used in military
programs in non-nuclear-weapon states will probably be very small
compared with the amounts involved in their civil power programs.
In any case, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to develop
and administer a system of international safeguards to verify that
nuclear materials used in a classified military program in a non-nuclear-
weapon state were not being diverted to a nuclear weapons program.
It is doubtful whether the IAEA has the authority under its present
statute to involve itself in such an activity. Therefore, it seems reason-
able to leave it to the exporter to police transactions of this kind, at
least until some experience has been gained with the Treaty in opera-
tion.
Finally, Article III applies to transactions in three kinds of subject
matter: "source material," "special fissionable material," and "equip-
ment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use
or production of special fissionable material." It is the "source of
special fissionable material" which is actually subject to safeguards.
Consistent with the present IAEA and Euratom systems, the Non-
Proliferation Treaty safeguards are based on accounting for the nuclear
materials as they are used, produced or processed in principal nuclear
facilities, and while they may be stored outside such facilities.0 8
The operation of paragraph 2 of Article III can be illustrated by two
examples. First, if either natural uranium ("source material") or en-
riched uranium ("special fissionable material") is provided by a party
97. Statement by State Department Spokesman, Mar. 14, 1968 (unpublished); see note
46 supra.
98. There are certain exemptions provided in the IAEA safeguards system for militarily
insignificant quantities of nuclear materials. Above the exemption limit is a sliding scale
of frequency of required reports and inspection up to a certain amount where access at
all times must be permitted. There are no such exemptions in the Euratom system. See
Willrich, Safeguarding Atoms for Peace, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 34, 42 n.28 (1966). Rumania
proposed that Article III be amended to provide that safeguards would apply only
"to such peaceful nuclear activities of non-nuclear-weapon states as, by their nature
and the quantities of source and special fissionable materials which they produce, process
or use, may lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons." ENDC/223-/Rev.1, Mar. 8,
1968. The amendment was not accepted.
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to the Treaty to any non-nuclear-weapon state, safeguards would be
applied to the material. Safeguards, and associated reporting require-
ments and inspection rights, would be applied while the material was
stockpiled after its arrival in the importing non-nuclear-weapon state,
and would follow the material as it progressed through the nuclear
fuel cycle in that state. While safeguarded nuclear material was being
fabricated into reactor fuel elements, the fabrication plant would be
open to inspection. Thereafter, while the fuel elements containing
safeguarded nuclear material were being irradiated in a nuclear reactor,
international inspectors would have access to that reactor. Moreover,
safeguards would automatically attach to every gram of plutonium
produced in safeguarded nuclear fuel irradiated in a reactor. When
the irradiated fuel elements were removed from the reactor and sent to
a processing plant to be chemically dissolved and separated into con-
stituent elements, the plant would be open to inspection. After the
depleted nuclear material and produced plutonium emerged from the
chemical processing plant, safeguards would continue to apply to all
that material wherever it went, at least until it was transferred to a
nudear-weapon state. 9
Second, suppose that a party to the Treaty provides a civil nuclear
power reactor ("equipment.. . especially designed ... for the ... use
or production of special fissionable material") to a non-nuclear-weapon
state.' 00 The importing state intends to supply its own nuclear fuel and
process the fuel in its own fuel fabrication and chemical separation
plants. Safeguards would be applied to fissionable material as it was
99. The difficulties which may be encountered if such a transfer is attempted under
the existing IAEA system are outlined in note 96 supra.
100. Determination of what items of equipment and material are "especially designed
or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material" will be
a difficult task. Obviously, the drafters did not intend to require safeguards on all equip-
ment and material flowing into a non-nuclear-weapon state. They dearly intended, how-
ever, to require safeguards on something less than an entire reactor or other principal
nuclear facility. In many cases, a nuclear project in a particular state will utilize a variety
of domestic and foreign manufacturers and suppliers in putting together a nuclear
project. A detailed list of equipment and non-nuclear materials which will trigger safe-
guards has not been incorporated into the IAEA system because the Board of Governors
has been unable to agree on the items which should be included. The present test under
the IAEA system is whether the nuclear facility involved would be "substantially assisted."
This imprecise criterion is applied by the IAEA Board of Governors on a case-by.case
basis. See Willrich, Safeguarding Atoms for Peace, 60 Am. J. iNT'L L. 34, 42-43 (19G6).
The Non-Proliferation Treaty represents an attempt to be somewhat more specific.
However, the criteria there established---"especially designed or prepared for"-arc per-
haps unfortunate in that they seem to depend to some extent on the intent of the ex-
porting or perhaps the importing state. Hopefully, in practice this provision will not
cause difficulty, because nuclear projects are generally relatively large scale and each
has some rather unique features. Therefore, it would seem that most international nuclear
transactions will take place with specific nuclear projects in mind.
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produced in all fuel loadings over the lifetime of the reactor and would
follow that produced material throughout the fuel cycle as it was pro-
cessed and recycled into other reactors. Furthermore, safeguards would
be applied to all subsequent generations of fissionable material pro-
duced in fuel elements containing previous generations of fissionable
material subject to safeguards.
From these two examples it becomes clear that if a non-nuclear-
weapon state, even though not a party to the Treaty, were to import
nuclear materials or equipment from any party, the potential reach
of international safeguards into its civil nuclear industry could be very
broad. Even if the state's nuclear imports were small, safeguards could
in time creep throughout its civil nuclear industry. If it wishes to avoid
the safeguards required by Article III, the non-party, non-nuclear-
weapon state would be limited to importing from other non-parties to
the Treaty. On the other hand, if such a non-nuclear weapon state
decides to accept safeguards in order to import from a party to the
Treaty, the importing state would have gone a long way toward accept-
ing one of the most serious restraints in the Non-Proliferation Treaty,101
101. This may be a useful argument with India. However, nothing in the Treaty
prevents a non-nuclear-weapon state which is not a party from importing nuclear mate.
rials subject to safeguards for use in its civil nuclear power program, thereby freeing
its limited indigenous resources for concentration in a nuclear weapons program. In fact,
if India does not become a party to the Treaty, this may be the strategy it will pursue
with respect to utilization of its limited uranium resources.
The Indian view of safeguards has been colorfully put:
"Institution of international controls on peaceful reactors and power stations is like
an attempt to maintain law and order in a society by placing all its law-abiding citizens
in custody while leaving its law-breaking elements free to roamn the streets .... Reactors
engaged in peaceful pursuit, and atomic power stations of the developing countries, do
not in themselves pose any threat to the security of the international society. It is the
chemical separation plants and the gaseous diffusion plants which produce the fissile
material used in bombs; and it is these facilities which need to be controlled in any
system of controlled disarmament.
"Here ...I am referring to international treaties and conventions as distinct from
national decision. We in India, for example have with our friends who have assisted us
in the past perfectly satisfactory arrangements for safeguards, and we are determined
to observe and implement them. But that is entirely different from entering Into an
international instrument for International Atomic Energy Agency or other international
safeguards over the reactors and power stations of the developing countries."
Statement by Representative of India to ENDO, Aug. 12, 1965, ENDCGPV.223, at 5-21;
DoCuMvENTs ON DISARMAMENT, 1965, at 326, 339. There is superficial logic in the Indian
position since plutonium when it is encased in fuel elements lodged in a reactor cannot be
used for nuclear weapons. It must first be separated from the depleted uranium and fission
products. It is at the chemical separation and fuel fabrication plants that the major
opportunities for diversion exist. However, there are good grounds for having safeguards
apply to all facilities in the nuclear fuel cycle since this decreases the overall technical
uncertainty in the system and forecloses the opportunity of diverting fuel elements from
a reactor to a clandestine chemical separation plant. India has already agreed to accept
IAEA safeguards, consistent with other treaty terms, on its major power reactor projects
assisted by the United States and Canada. E.g., United States-India Agreement for Coop,
eration, art. VIII, [1963] 2 U.S.T. 1484, T.I.A.S. No. 5446, 488 U.N.T.S, 21.
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Few, if any, non-nuclear-weapon states will have a completely self-
sufficient civil nuclear industry, at least in the near future. The safe-
guards requirements on all peaceful nuclear exports of parties could,
therefore, become a powerful inducement to broad adherence to the
Non-Proliferation Treaty once the substantial exporters of nuclear
materials and equipment become parties. On the other hand, one or a
few nudear exporters which remained outside the Treaty and avoided
the requirement of safeguards on their exports would be in a powerful
position to spoil the operation of the Treaty in this respect.
2
2. Sharing Peaceful Uses
Paragraph I of Article IVo3 sets forth the "inalienable right" of all
parties to continue to engage in peaceful nuclear activities under the
Treaty, qualified only by the requirement that such activities be con-
ducted in a manner "in conformity with" Articles I and II (pertaining
to non-transfer and non-acquisition of nuclear explosives). While
preservation of such a right is of cardinal importance to industrially
advanced states, the undertakings in the Treaty to share the benefits of
peaceful nuclear energy are of particular interest to the developing
states.1 04
(a) Nuclear materials, equipment and information. Under para-
102. It would seem difficult to maintain the Non-Proliferation Treaty in effect for
very long if a comparatively few large exporters and some important importers remained
outside. If all major exporters joined the Treaty, then all non-nuclear.weapon importers
would have to accept safeguards on their imports whether or not they were parties. If
some exporters, e.g., France or South Africa, stayed outside the Treat), and exported
reactors or uranium to non-nuclear-weapon importers which were not parties to the
Treaty, the unsafeguarded nuclear industries in these importing states could in time
be perceived as a threat by neighboring non-nuclear-weapon states which had joined the
Treaty and accepted safeguards.
In this connection, France's statement that, although it will not sign the Treaty, it
"will behave in the future in this field exactly as the States adhering to the treaty"
takes on both importance and ambiguity. Statement by Representative of France to U.N.
General Assembly, June 12, 1968, U.N. Doc. A/PV.1672 (prov.), at 3, 6. Does this mean
France will behave in accordance with Article III, as well as Articles I and II?
103. "Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of
all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nudear energy for
peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and n of this
Treaty." Art. IV, para. 1.
104. West Germany has gone so far as to state that "the future of the Federal Republic
of Germany as a modem industrial state depends on this principle." Statement by Foreign
Minister Brandt to the Bundestag, Apr. 27, 1967, DocuszENrs ON DzsAMwts 1r, 1967, at
211. India has made the same point more colorfully: "T]he civil nuclear powers can
tolerate a nuclear weapons apartheid, but not an atomic apartheid in their economic and
peaceful development." Statement by Representative of India to ENDC, May 23, 1967,
ENDC/PV298, at 4-17; DocuMmNrs ON DIsA mAM&ENr, 1967, at 229,234. At the beginning of
the nuclear era, when there was but one nuclear-weapon state, President Truman stated:
"No nation could long maintain or morally defend a monopoly of the peaceful benefits of
atomic energy." 13 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 514 (1945).
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graph 2 of Article IV 05 all parties have the right and undertake "to
participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and
scientific and technological information." An important limitation on
the undertaking and the right is that the subject matter of the exchange
be "for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy."'10 Moreover, use of the
word "exchange" means that the nuclear haves are not obligated to
make a gift to the have-nots.
In addition to providing for exchange of peaceful nuclear materials,
equipment and information, paragraph 2 of Article IV contains an
important general undertaking to "cooperate in contributing" to
peaceful nuclear development, "especially in the territories of non-
nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for
105. "All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to
participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and
technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty
in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other
States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon
States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of
the world." Art. IV, para. 2.
The draft Treaty of March 11, 1968, provided only that all parties "have the right to
participate in the fullest possible exchange." ENDC/225, Annex A, Mar. 14, 1968. The
undertaking "to facilitate" such exchanges was originally proposed by Nigeria in the
First Committee debate and finally incorporated by the United States and the Soviet
Union as an amendment on May 31, 1968. "Thus, the right to such sharing is recognized
explicitly not only as a right of non-nuclear Powers but also as a commitment to actionby nuclear Powers and all others in a position to contribute thereto." Statement by United
States Representative to First Committee of U.N. General Assembly, May 31. 1968, U.N.
Doc. A/G.I/PV.1577 (prov.), at 77. Furthermore, in the draft Treaty of March 11, 1968, the
exchange was limited to "scientific and technological information." In line with Its long
standing position, see note 110 infra, Italy took the lead in the First Committee debate
in urging that the exchange provision be broadened by specifically including "cuipment"
and "materials" in addition to information. "This important clarification of article IV of
the treaty considerably expands the scope of co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy which, without any doubt, would correspond to the interests of non-nuclear States,"
Statement by Soviet Union Representative to First Committee of U.N. General Asembly,
May 31, 1968, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1577 (prov.), at 67.
106. In connection with assurances of their right to participate in the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy, various non-nuclear-weapon states raised the question of "spin-off"-
benefits that civil nuclear activities in nuclear-weapon states could derive from nuclear
weapons programs. West Germany initially expressed particular concern in this regard.
Statement by Foreign Minister Brandt to the Bundestag, Feb. 1, 1967, DocoNrENTs oN Dis
ARMAAMENT, 1967, at 48, 49. In reply Secretary of State Rusk stated: "... . [T]he fact is that
the non-proliferation treaty has nothing to do whatever with the use of nuclear materials
for peaceful purposes, and that includes a wide range of industrial application. The
actual industrial spin-off from so-called weaponry, that is, those items which are limited
to the gadgetry of weapons, is very small, indeed, infinitesimal. And I think exchanges on
the technical level will clarify that point." 58 DEP'T STATE BULL. 320-21 (1968). Neverthe-
less, to allay concern in this regard, the Preamble of the Non-Proliferation Treaty affirms
the principle "that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including
any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from tile
development of nu (ear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all
Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nucear-weapon States." The United
States has also interpreted the exchange of information provisions in paragraph 2 of
Article IV as covering information concerning peaceful applications of nuclear explosions.
Statement by United States Representative to ENDC, ENDC/PV.378 (prov.), at 5-11.
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the needs of the developing areas of the world."10 7 This particular
undertaking exists for "Parties... in a position to do so ... ." Thus
paragraph 2 introduces a new category of states, broader than nuclear-
weapon states and narrower than non-nuclear-weapon states, which
we will call "contributing states."
The contributing states are not specified, nor is any criterion estab-
lished in the Treaty for identifying them. 108 Will each state make a
unilateral determination whether and to what extent it is itself in
a position to contribute to development of peaceful nuclear activities
in non-nuclear-weapon states? An affirmative answer would seem to
pull the teeth from the obligation to cooperate and would also run
counter to the express undertaking "to facilitate... the fullest possible
exchange." On the other hand, should a non-nuclear-weapon state be
able to direct a claim for cooperation at a contributing state of its own
choice, a claim which the contributing state would have to honor?
Would this mean, for example, that the United States or West Germany,
in adhering to the Treaty, would become obligated to subsidize the
export of its nuclear power reactor technology to any non-nuclear-
weapon states which request it? An obligation of such breadth would
not seem to be intended. The undertaking under the Treaty is "to
cooperate in contributing." Such an undertaking is less firm than one
simply "to contribute," or "to make available." 10a
107. The phrase "with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of tie
world" was added to paragraph 2 of Article IV on May 31, 1968, based on a suggestion by
Chile. Statement by United States Representative to First Committee of U.N. General
Assembly, May 31, 1968, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1577 (prov.), at 77. Any general assumption
that nuclear power will be a boon for the developing countries is, of course, erroneous,
especially in view of the large plant size required to achieve the economies of scale.
108. Some guidance might be found in the composition of tie IAEA Board of Gov-
ernors. Under Article VI of the IAEA statute, the outgoing Board of Governors, by major-
ity vote, makes the following designations of membership for the succeeding Board: "The
five members most advanced in the technology of atomic energy"; the member most ad-
vanced in the technology of atomic energy, including the production of source materials,
not represented by the original five in each of the following eight geographic regions: (1)
North America, (2) Latin America, (3) Western Europe, (4) Eastern Europe, (5) Africa and
the Middle East, (6) South Asia, (7) Southeast Asia and the Pacific, (8) Far East; two
members from among Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Portugal as producers of
source material; and one additional member as a supplier of technical assistance. The
General Conference elects the remaining 12 out of a total of 25 members on the basis of
"equitable representation." See also Willrich, Safeguarding Atoms for Peace, (0 Am. J.
INr'L L. 34, 39 n.18 (1966).
109. Mexico proposed that the second sentence of Article IV, paragraph 2, be amended
to read: "Those parties that are in a position to do so, have the duty to contribute, ac-
cording to their ability, alone or in cooperation with other states or international organi-
zations, to the further development of the production, industries, and other applications
of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes specially in the territories of non.nuclear-weapon
states." (Emphasis added.) Mexico justified and interpreted its proposal as follows: "We
believe that this duty can and should be enunciated as a true legal obligation, although
the obligation is imperfect and general and its practical significance will continue to de-
pend ultimately on the will of the nuclear powers. .. .The phrase "according to their
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"Contributing" also raises a problem concerning the basis for co.
operation. If contributing means "cost-free" to the recipients, expense
to the contributing state could constitute a deterrent to cooperation
rather than an incentive. On balance, the most that could probably be
inferred from the Treaty is some generosity and perhaps a degree of
departure from the normal pursuit of commercial profit in world
nuclear trade on the part of the contributing states, especially in relation
to developing countries.11 0
Although some doubt surrounds the basis of peaceful nuclear co-
operation under paragraph 2 of Article IV, the Treaty clearly permits
the parties to any cooperative arrangement to determine whether the
channel for cooperation should be "alone or together with other States
or international organizations." Such flexibility would seem to have
advantages for both the supplier and recipient of peaceful nuclear
assistance. There is already a trend, reinforced by Article III, toward
organizing the administration of safeguards on a worldwide and
centralized basis. There is no parallel trend, however, in the organiza-
tion of actual international cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear
energy. Certain recipients of nuclear assistance may prefer to deal
directly with the supplier, while others might prefer to have the supply
channel run through an international organization such as the YAEA.
The IAEA's role as a channel for the supply of nuclear materials and
equipment, however, has thus far been limited to small research
facilities."1 The larger, more complex and costly transactions involving
ability" refers not only to the parties' financial and technical ability but also to their
legal ability, since much of this knowledge is covered by patents owned by private
persons." Statement by Representative of Mexico to ENDC, Sept. 17, 1967, ENDC/PV.
331, at 4-11; DocuMENTs ON DISARMAMENT, 1967, at 395, 397-98.
Canada, a non-nuclear-weapon state which clearly falls into the category of contributing
states, expressed concern that the Mexican suggestion might be construed as an inre.
stricted obligation to comply with all requests from non-nuclear-weapon states. ENDC/
PV.336, at 6. The United States stated that while it "shares the objectives sought" by
Mexico, "the precise terms of the Mexican formulation may in some respects create too
sweeping and too general an obligation." Statement by United States Representative to
ENDC, Oct. 12, 1967, ENDC/PVS38, at 7-10; DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT, 1967, at 513,
514.
110. Italy proposed, as a measure that could be independent of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty: "An agreement under which the nuclear powers would transmit periodically to
the non-nuclear-states signatory to the treaty an agreed quantity of the fissile materials
they produce .... [T]he non-nuclear countries . . . should pay a reduced price com-
pared to the market value. Whereas part of this price would go to the nuclear producing
powers, the other part could be paid into the United Nations funds for the progress of
the developing countries." Statement by Italian Foreign Minister Fanfani to the ENDO,
Aug. 1, 1967, ENDC/PV.318, at 6-9; DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT, 1967, at 812, 313.
111. As of June 30, 1967, 13 project agreements were in effect between the IAEA and
various countries covering primarily the supply of research reactors. Annual Report of
the Board of Governors to the General Conference, 1 July 1966-30 June 1967, [A.E.A.
Doc. GC(xi)/355, at 32.
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civil nuclear power reactors will probably occur in the future, as in the
past, largely outside the IAEA framework.
112
It seems, therefore, that paragraph 2 of Article IV is unlikely to have
a major effect on either the volume or pattern of world trade related to
the growth and spread of civil nuclear power. This conclusion is con-
trary to the official wisdom which maintains that the Treaty will pro-
vide a favorable basis for the spread of peaceful nuclear technology and
implies that without the Treaty the spread might not occur. With or
without the Treaty, the Soviet Union will, subject to a few exceptions,
probably continue not to cooperate in peaceful nuclear power develop-
ment outside Eastern Europe, and do so only half-heartedly within the
Warsaw Treaty area. On the other hand, it seems inconceivable in view
of the economic stakes that the United States would refrain from at-
tempting to maintain a leading role in the future world market for
peaceful nuclear technology, whether or not the Treaty enters into
force.113 Moreover, the number of suppliers competing in each sector
of the nuclear fuel cycle is increasing rapidly and the ability in such
circumstances of the United States-or any other nuclear supplier
alone-to influence the nature and rate of nuclear technological in-
novation by a policy of abstention is swiftly diminishing.114
Therefore, whether or not the Treaty enters into force, international
nuclear commerce will probably increase dramatically in the coming
years, and states "in a position to do so" will facilitate and contribute
to peaceful nuclear power development throughout the world primarily
because it will be in their economic or political interests to do so. Al-
112. For example, the United States has entered into 13 bilateral agreements for co-
operation involving power applications (not all of which have involved actual transfer of
power reactors as yet). No power reactors have yet been supplied through the IAEA.
U.S.A.E.C., Major Activities in the Atomic Energy Programs, January.December 1967,
at 345 (1968).
113. At power costs of 4.5 mills per kilowatt hour (a conservative figure) the value
worldwide of the annual production of electricity from nuclear power sources in 1970 is
estimated to reach about $1 billion, and in 1975 about $5 billion. Capital costs of the
nuclear plants to produce this power will be about $3 billion and $5 billion, respectively.
The value of the plutonium produced annually in power reactors has been estimated to
reach $0.5 billion by 1975. Taylor, The Rapid Growth of Nuclear Tedmolog)-mpica.
tions for Nuclear Safeguards. INr'L Rr.sr~nciH & TEcHIotoGY J., Jan. 1, 198, at 9.
114. While at the outset nuclear power plants and their initial fuel loadings were sold
as a unit under "turnkey" contracts, now there is an increasing trend to shop around for
"bits and pieces." The implications are that no single nuclear supplier will be able to
control the supply policy of other suppliers, and dependence on imports in sectors of the
nuclear fuel cycle where multiple sources of supply exist should not be too riny. The
limited sources of enrichment services-primarily the United States-may constitute Poll-
tical incentive in favor of natural uranium reactors, especially in developing states where
a civil nuclear power program frequently serves political as well as economic objectives.
See also Willrich, International Control of Civil Nuclear Power, BUL.r Aro:r. Sci.,
March 1967, at 31, 35.
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though the Treaty may not substantially affect the rate of diffusion of
peaceful nuclear technology, it will improve the possibilities for keeping
the potential security costs within acceptable limits as the economic
benefits of nuclear power come to be widely shared.
(b) Plowshare projects. Under the Treaty, the right to develop or
otherwise acquire Plowshare explosive devices is excluded from the
general "inalienable right" of all non-nuclear-weapon states to develop
and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under Article IV. To this
extent the Treaty would again discriminate against non-nuclear-weapon
states with respect to peaceful nuclear activities. In return for renuncia-
tion of their rights to develop this aspect of nuclear technology for
themselves, however, the non-nuclear-weapon states would receive under
Article V n5 important undertakings by the nuclear-weapon states con-
cerning access to any potential Plowshare benefits.
Under Article V, "benefits" from "explosions" would be made avail-
able to non-nuclear-weapon states, but not nuclear explosive devices
themselves. Articles I and II of the Treaty deal with Plowshare explosive
devices as with nuclear weapons and require that the supplier of Plow-
share devices retain "control" of them throughout any project until
detonation.
The United States and the Soviet Union are likely to be the only two
states which will develop and be able to supply Plowshare explosives in
the near future. The "appropriate measures" which the two super-
115. "Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure
that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and
through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful ap-
plications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States
Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for
the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research
and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain
such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an
appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon
States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty
enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring mnty also
obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreement." Art. V.
In the agreed draft treaty of August 24, 1967, the Plowshare provision appeared In a
much less specific form as a declaration of intention in the Preamble, ENDC/192, ENDC
/193; DOCUMENTS ON DISARIMAMENT, 1967, at 338-39. The agreed draft treaty of Januarly
18, 1968, contained an Article V in which the parties undertook "to cooperate to Insure'
that potential Plowshare benefits will be made available. ENDC/192/Rev. 1; ENDC/193/
Rev.1. Although this version of Article V was attacked repeatedly at the ENDC by the
non-nuclear-weapon states-principally Brazil and India-for a variety of reasons, It was
retained intact in the draft treaty of March 11, 1968. After further criticism in the First
Committee and concrete suggestions from Mexico, however, the United States and the
Soviet Union finally rewrote it and in the process substantially strengthened their supply
obligations and clarified the channels through which non-nuclear-weapon states could
claim Plowshare benefits. Nevertheless, the changes were apparently insufficient to induce
either Brazil or India to change their positions on the Treaty.
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powers will be obligated to undertake to make Plowshare benefits avail-
able remain to be spelled out in a "special international agreement or
agreements." The potential suppliers of Plowshare explosions will have
a large influence over the details of any such agreement. But the
principle that non-nuclear-weapon parties to the Treaty "shall be able
to obtain such benefits . . . on a non-discriminatory basis" is clearly
established.:" Moreover, the cost to non-nuclear-weapon states of
nuclear explosive devices is fixed with some certainty. The charge must
be "as low as possible" and must exclude "research and development"
costs. Inclusion of an allocable share of the acquisition cost of tie
thermonuclear weapons technology which underlies Plowshare would,
of course, render the whole scheme uneconomic. On the other hand,
the charges for nuclear explosives, even though based on production
costs alone, will in many cases constitute a relatively small fraction of
the total costs of a Plowshare project. Production costs of the nuclear
explosives used will be far outveighed by the costs of engineering and
safety surveys, drilling emplacement holes, possibly moving local in-
habitants, and clean-up operations.117 Nevertheless, the price established
for Plowshare explosions under Article V is in fact favorable to the
recipient.
Another aspect of Article V concerns the channels through which
Plowshare explosions could be made available. The non-nuclear-weapon
states have the option to obtain Plowshare benefits either "through an
appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-
nuclear weapon States," or on a bilateral basis.118 The Treaty, however,
116. The United States has stated that Article V "binds the parties dearly and em.
phatically." Statement by United States Representative to First Committee, May 31, 1963,
U.N. Doc. A/C.l/PV.1577 (prov.), at 78. Early in the ENDO discussions of this subject
Mexico stated: "[AlIthough the details ... must be regulated in a separate agreement,
the actual right to enjoy the benefits of peaceful explosions must be recognized and
enunciated in the non-proliferation treaty itself." Statement by Representative of Mexico
to ENDC, Sept. 19, 1957, ENDC/PV.331, at 4-11; Docusms',s oN D mAtAitLr, 1967, at
895, 398.
117. The United States has stated it will charge the same price for nuclear explosives
to foreign and domestic users. Statement by United States Representative to ENDC/PV.
569 (prov.), at 32-35. The AEC currently projects that charges for nuclear explosives will
range from $350,000 for a 10-kiloton yield to $600,000 for a two-megaton yield. The larger
the yield the cheaper the cost per unit of energy released. Gerber, Hamburger & Hull,
Plowshare 50 (U.S.A.E.C. Div. of Technical Information 1966). Cost estimates for nuclear
excavation of a sea-level canal across the Isthmus of Panama show that charges for ex-
plosive and firing services will amount to roughly 15 per cent of the total project costs. See
Hearings on Peaceful Applications of Nuclear Explosiztes-Plowshar -1iefore the Joint
Comm. on Atomic Energy, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 376 (1965).
118. With bilateral channels of supply open as well as a channel through the inter-
national body, the issue has arisen whether the same international supervision should
apply to both cases. Sweden argued that an international authority should license each
Plowshare project; bilateral arrangements should receive the same treatment as arrange-
ments through the international body; and there should be international supervision of
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contains no guidance for determining the composition of the interna-
tional body and no indication whether "adequate representation" for
the non-nuclear-weapon states would amount to control of the decision-
making process in such a body. Moreover, it is not clear which of the
two potential Plowshare suppliers would be obligated by an affirmative
decision of the international body in a particular case.119
Finally under Article V, Plowshare benefits must be made available
"under appropriate international observation and through appropriate
international procedures." The United States has stated that "pro-
cedures for international cooperation . , . should be developed in full
consultation with the non-nuclear-weapon States.'
12 0
peaceful nuclear explosions in nudear-.weapon states to prevent suspicion that such ex-
plosions were nuclear weapon tests. Statements by Representative of Sweden to ENDC,
ENDG/PV.364 (prov.), at 16-20, ENDC/PV.373 (prov.), at 11-20. As a matter of interpret-
ing Article V, it seems dear that the "appropriate international observation" and "appro-
priate international procedures" mentioned in the first sentence are intended to apply to
whatever benefits from peaceful nuclear explosions are made available, regardless of the
channel. Use of the word "appropriate," however, may allow in each case some differenti.
ation in the treatment accorded depending on the channel.
119. The United States has assured the non-nuclear-weapon states that there would be
no scarcity of devices once peaceful explosions became practical. Statement by United
States Representative to ENDC, ENDC/PV.369 (prov.), at 28ff. Both superpowers night be
eager to supply explosions for a particular project in which case the "international body"
would have to choose between the two. Or, neither superpower might wish to supply the
project, in which case the "international body" would have to choose one that was un.
willing, and an element of compulsion would enter into performance of the arrangement,
These are the kinds of decisions, however, that international organizations are reluctant
to make. Sweden has suggested that Plowshare devices "might be committed to a formal
pool for allocation, by this body, to interested customers." Statement by Representative of
Sweden to ENDO, June 6, 1967, ENDC/PV.302, at 4-8; DocuiENTs ON DISARMAMENT, 1967,
at 248-49. While prior allocation of Plowshare explosives might ease the decision-making
problem, it would not dispose of it. Of course, if there were a willing supplier and a
willing receiver, a bilateral arrangement might well suffice.
120. Statement by United States Representative to ENDC, June 8, 1967, ENDC/PV,03,
at 4-11; DOCUMENTS ON DISARMIAMENT, 1967, at 252, 255. The United States has stated: "The
international body might consider such matters as the feasibility of requested projects,
priority among such requests, and necessary safety precautions." Statement by United
States Representative to ENDC, Mar. 21, 1967, ENDC/PV.295, at 23-26; DOCUMENTS ON DIS.
AwMrAMENT, 1967, at 172-73. In an effort to minimize the fact that the Non-Proliferation
Treaty would exclude non.nuclear-weapon states from a proprietary role in relatioh to
peaceful nuclear explosives, the United States has emphasized the relatively large role the
recipient of Plowshare explosions would have with respect to all phases of particular
projects other than control over the device, its emplacement and detonation. For example:
'The type of international procedures we have in mind would permit countries to perform
their own engineering work, utilizing nuclear explosives detonated under te control of
a nuclear-weapon state .... [N]uclear-weapon states would merely provide nuclear cx.
plosive services, and the country in which the project was conducted would be respon.
sible for the remainder of the project, if that was its choice. In essence, this would not be
different from a situation in which conventional explosives or other equipment are pur-
chased abroad." Statement by United States Representative to ENDC, June 8, 1967, ENDC/
PV.303, at 4-11; DocutiENTs ON DISARMAMENT, 1967, at 252, 256. The analogy between nu.
clear explosive services and purchase of conventional explosives abroad should not be ac.
cepted uncritically. Given the complexity of the tasks involved, the intimate relationship of
the device to other parts of a Plowshare project, the risks of major harm If something
goes wrong, and the technical uncertainties involved, both the supplier and the recipient
will have a major political stake in. any Plowshare application. Success would tecm to
1500
Nuclear Weapons
Health and safety aspects of Plowshare projects are one area of inter-
national concern which might be subject to appropriate procedures
under Article V.121 For instance, it would be necessary to make careful
and objective assessments of fall-out levels anticipated from surface
excavation projects. Likewise, underground natural resource develop-
ment projects dose to national borders would need to be monitored
since they could contaminate water flowing under the surface into an
adjacent state.122 Should the international procedures include a require-
ment for review and approval of Plowshare projects on safety grounds?
Without such authority, the effectiveness of international safety pro-
cedures would be greatly reduced. But the possibility of disapproval
of Plowshare projects at the international level on safety grounds might
increase the risk that political considerations would enter into the
review process. Should provisions for on-site safety inspection of the
Plowshare project be included? Safety review only "on the record"
would be likely to be little more than a formality, while international
on-site inspection might be a sensitive issue with some states.
The economic feasibility of Plowshare projects proposed by non-
nuclear-weapon states, might also be subject to review as a part of the
procedures under Article V. An unfavorable international assessment
of the economic merits of a project would give Plowshare suppliers a
basis for resisting pressures to assist projects of doubtful value. But an
international approval of the economic aspects of a particular project
would strengthen the claim of a non-nuclear-weapon state to Plow-
share benefits.m
depend on close international cooperation and a sharing of responsibilities throughout
all phases of a project.
121. Some form of international review could have several advantages. First, concern
with the health and safety implications of Plowshare will be a major focus of public re-
sistance, both within the recipient state and elsewhere. External review and approval
would be perhaps the best way of establishing public confidence in Plo.share. Second,
certain non-nuclear-weapon states might view an attempt by Plowshare supplier states to
require their own health and safety standards as an obnoxious interference, vhereas non-
nuclear-weapon states would be more willing to conform to an "impartial" set of standards
developed by an international body. Third, from the perspective of the Plowshare sup-
plier states, it would be preferable if each knew that the other was bound by the mme
technical standards. Finally, in light of the uniqueness of each project it would be prefer-
able to have a central repository of information concerning health and safety experience.
122. Safety issues are likely to be more substantial and certainly more dramatically
raised in relation to surface excavation projects than in underground enginering. The
presence of unique elements in each Plowshare application coupled wit the fact that
large scale applications are not likely to be frequent, at least during the initial pha.s of
technological innovation and public acceptance, will make general criteria for determining
whether a particular project is "safe" not only difficult to develop, but also of limited
utility in concrete cases. Plowshare applications will also raise serious difficulties in allocat-
ing the risk of loss and in providing adequate indemnity for loss.
123. If and when we move closer to Plowshare applications, the United States Govern-
ment may have to make some difficult choices between protecting its own natural re-
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"International observation" and review procedures might be used
to ensure that a Plowshare project in a non-nuclear-weapon state did
not conceal or serve a military purpose of the supplier, the recipient,
or both in collusion.124 And if the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is
broadened in the future into a comprehensive ban on all nuclear
weapon tests, it would become especially important to establish pro-
cedures to provide assurance that the supplier nuclear-weapon state
does not derive any information from Plowshare projects that would
be useful for nuclear weapons development.
125
Who would be the administering authority for the "international
procedures" under Article V? The "international body" that serves as
a possible supply channel for Plowshare benefits might also administer
the international procedures. Such a body might exist apart from or
within the IAEA.126 The monitoring activities concerning Plowshare
projects, however, would be quite different from the IAEA's present
responsibilities to foster peaceful nuclear research and power projects
and to administer safeguards with respect to these activities. New
procedures based on different technical concepts would be required.
Although such procedures could be administered within the IAEA
framework, a new organizational set-up would probably be needed.1 "
source extraction industries operating in both domestic and foreign markets and its re-
sponsibilities to assist non-nuclear-weapon states in their own national development using
Plowshare explosions. In this respect, surface excavation projects for harbors, canals, and
rail cuts would seem likely to pose fewer conflicts with private United States interests thai
underground resource development and extraction projects.
124. The Soviet Union has stated that the purpose of international supervision is "to
exclude the possibility of using peaceful nuclear explosions as a means for nonnuciclear.
weapon States to obtain special information necessary for the prodttction of nuclear
weapons." Statement by Representative of Soviet Union to First Committee, May $1, 1968,
U.N. Doc. AfC.1/PV.1577 (prov.), at 68-70.
125. This is not a current issue since the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty permits
underground nuclear weapon tests. If a comprehensive nuclear test ban is ever achieved,
however, Plowshare would become the only form of legitimate nuclear explosions. The
incentives to use Plowshare for a double purpose in these circumstances would seem to
increase. Moreover, the development and applications of surface excavation technology
will generate cratering information, some of which might be of use to a military program.
The United States has stated that Article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is compatible
with a comprehensive test ban. "If under a comprehensive test ban treaty, international
approval were needed for the conduct of a nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes, such
approval would constitute an 'appropriate international procedure' applicable to services
conducted bilaterally or through an appropriate international body." Statement by United
States Representative to ENDO, ENDC/PV.369 (prov.), at 28.
126. The United States and others have supported using the IAEA for this purpose,
Statement by United States Representative to ENDC, Mar. 21, 1967, ENDC/PV.295, at
23-26; DocuMENTs ON DISARMAMENT, 1967, at 172, 174.
127. A further issue is the extent to which Plowshare projects in nuclear-weapon
states would be subject to the "international procedures" of Article V. Sweden in partic,
ular has urged that there be no differentiation between projects in nuclear-weapon and
non-nuclear-weapon states in this regard. See Statement by Representative of Sweden to
ENDC, June 6, 1967, ENDC/PV.302, at 4-8; DoCUsEMrs ON DISARMAMENT, 1967, at 248, 251,
As to health and safety, and verifying the exclusively peaceful purpose of the project In
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The undertaking to share Plowshare benefits enshrined in Article V
amounts to a "carrot" for the non-nuclear-weapon states to chew on.
Such states could not develop their own Plowshare devices without
incurring the enormous costs of acquiring a capability in nuclear
explosive technology on a par with the United States and the Soviet
Union. Thus, under the Non-Proliferation Treaty the non-nuclear-
weapon states simply concede a Plowshare duopoly which they are
incapable of breaking.128 In return, the United States and the Soviet
Union make a major political concession to the concerns of the non-
nuclear-weapon states by undertaking a firm legal obligation to share
that area of peaceful nuclear technology where the economic uncer-
tainties are largest.1
29
the event of a comprehensive test ban, it would seem that there would be good reason to
subject Plowshare projects in the United States and the Soviet Union to the same inter-
national procedures applied to projects in non-nuclear-weapon states. There would be
little point however, in having an international revicw of the economic feasibility of
projects within the territory of the Plowshare supplier state. In any event, it is doubtful
that the Soviet Union will agree to any Plowshare supervision in its territory.
128. The position of the non-nuclear-weapon states in bargaining for an equitable dis-
tribution of Plowshare benefits is further strengthened by present restraints impoed on
future Plowshare applications by the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty with respect to
surface excavation. It is clear that if nuclear surface excavation techniques prove feasible
and economical, the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty will have to be amended at least
in order for the United States to use nuclear excavation for a nea.level trans.Isthmian
canal. Article II of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty provides for amendments "by
a majority .. .of all the parties . . including the votes of all of the original parties
[the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom]." Thus, to the extent that
Plowshare programs conflict with the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty as it stands, the
United States and the Soviet Union each have a veto over the other's program. Moreover,
a simple majority of the total number of signatories, which could be constituted entirely
of developing and "mini-" states, have a veto over both United States and Soviet programs.
129. "It is a fact that the United States has not yet demonstrated that the technology
for any--I repeat, any-specific peaceful application of nuclear explosions is technically
and economically feasible. Some private companies in the United States and elsewhere
and some foreign governments have evaluated certain applications of nuclear explosions
for peaceful purposes and have made assessments that the technology, if successfully
developed, would have economic potential in certain applications. Whether those evalua-
tions will be confirmed requires further development, such as additional experiments
with nuclear explosives." Statement by United States Representative to ENDC, June 8,
1967, ENDC/PV303, at 4-11; DocumEms oN DisAs.wA.tE-r, 1967, at 252, 257.
The Plowshare development which is probably the closest to realization is tie use of
nuclear explosives to stimulate natural gas production. The United States Bureau of Mines
estimates that if nuclear explosions prove successful in stimulating gas production,
United States recoverable gas reserves would more than double from under 800 trillion
cubic feet to about 600 trillion cubic feet. Hearings on AEC Authorizing Legislation
Fiscal Year 1968 Before the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3,
at 1797 (1967). On December 10, 1967, a nuclear explosion of approximately 26 kilotons
yield was detonated by the AEC at a depth of 4240 feet in a natural gas field in New-
Mexico (Project Gasbuggy sponsored jointly by the AEC and El Paso Natural Gas
Company). The purpose of the experiment mas to determine to what extent a lov,
permeability natural gas formation can be stimulated by an underground nuclear
detonation. See generally Hearings on AEC Authorizing Legislation Fiscal Year 1969 Before
the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 1915-2022 (1953). Results
of the explosion are not yet available.
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C. Durability
Issues related to the durability3 0 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
magnify the difficulty of predicting the outcome of many of the major
problems previously discussed. Yet these issues are among the most
important to be considered in determining the scope and effect of the
Treaty.
It is by no means certain that the Treaty will ever enter into force,
and putting it into effect will probably, in itself, be a time consuming
process involving significant political costs. Article IX provides that the
Treaty will enter into force upon ratification by the "Depositaries"-
the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States-and
forty non-nudear-weapon states. 131 Thus all five nuclear-weapon states
need not become parties for the Treaty to become effective-a necessary
provision since France and China have dearly stated they will not ad-
here to the Treaty. 3 2 The number forty has no particular magic to it
130. I am grateful to the National Policy Panel convened by the United Nations
Association of the United States of America for the term "durability" in this connection,
although I have grouped procedural issues under it as well as the major substantive prob.
lems discussed by the Panel. See REPORT OF A NATIONAL POLICY PANEL ESTABLISHED BY TIIE
UNITE NATIONS AssOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STOPPING TIE SPREAD OF
NucLEAR WEAPONS 26 et seq. (1967).
131. Article IX, paragraph 1, of the Treaty provides in part: "This Treaty shall be
open to all States for signature." The Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, art. III, para. 1,
contains the same provision. There are a number of practical legal proble-ni en.
countered in giving any treaty potentially global coverage these days. For globally oriented
international organizations the usual method is to open the treaty to "all States Members
of the United Nations or of any of the specialized agencies." I.A.E.A. STAT. art. XXI,
para. A. Under such formulas the Western-oriented halves of divided countries such as
Germany, China, Korea and Vietnam have generally been admitted to membership in the
U.N. specialized agencies while the Communist halves have been excluded. Neither half
of any divided country except Nationalist China is a member of the United Nations
itself. For arms control treaties, it is important that status as parties not be denied to
entities not recognized as states by all the major powers, and that the challenged status of
certain regimes not prevent those regimes from acting as governments of states for pur-
poses of becoming parties. The way around the difficulty, first adopted in the Limited
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and now followed in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Is to make
the Treaty open to all states and provide three depositary governments, the United States,
the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. A particular entity unrecognized by one or
more of the depositaries can become a party to the Treaty by depositing instruments
with that depositary which is friendly to it. Since each depositary keeps its own list, no
single agreed list of parties exists. Problems may well arise under the Non-Proliferation
Treaty in connection with whether particular entities are entitled to participate in
review conferences and whether amendments have received the requisite majority. On the
question whether recognition is accorded to an unrecognized regime that subscribes to
the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, see Opinion of the Legal Adviser, Aug. 12, 1963, Hearings
on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1963).
132. "France, for its part, which will not sign the non-proliferation treaty, will behave
in the future in this field exactly as the States adhering to the treaty." Statement by
Representative of France to U.N. General Assembly, June 12, 1968, U.N. Doc. A/PV,1672
(prov.) at 6.
China's attitude toward the Treaty is illustrated by their reaction to the draft treaty of
August 24, 1967: "Obviously, Washington and Moscow are hoping to use the draft
treaty as a means of pushing their criminal activity against communism, against the
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as far as the non-nuclear-weapon states are concerned. It seems to have
been selected simply as a substantial number, but one which will per-
mit the Treaty to enter into force without undue delay. Ratification by
any forty non-nuclear-weapon states, regardless of their nuclear capa-
bilities, will be sufficient to bring the Treaty into force.
The United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, after
signing the Treaty, can each block entry into force until it is satisfied
with the identity as well as numbers of non-nuclear-weapon parties.
The Soviet Union may be among the first to sign the Treaty, but might
delay ratification until West Germany becomes a party. Moreover, cer-
tain non-nuclear-weapon states might make their own signature or ratifi-
cation contingent on ratification by one or more other states. For ex-
ample, Israel and the United Arab Republic might await each other's
pleasure. Pakistan might wish to follow India.13 3 Nothing in the Treaty
precludes such procedures.
The Treaty's requirements that non-nuclear-weapon states negotiate
with the IAEA and conclude agreements accepting safeguards could
also delay its early entry into force. Under paragraph 4 of Article III,131
negotiations must begin within six months after the Treaty is in force.
States which become parties more than six months after the Treaty's
effective date, however, must commence negotiation simultaneously
with their ratification. Safeguards agreements with the IAEA must be-
come effective within eighteen months after the date of initiation of
negotiations, giving original parties as long as two years to negotiate and
people, against revolution and against China, in an attempt to stem the revolutionary
tide in the world ... . But atom bombs, puided missiles and hydrogen bombs were
possessed by the Chinese people before their treaty was drawn up. This magnificent
achievement of the Chinese people dealt a death-blow to the US.-Soviet policy of nuclear
monopoly and nuclear blackmail and has encouraged the revolutionary people of the
world tremendously. Thus, Washington and Moscow had to come up with the treaty in
the hope of using it as a means of agitation against China and to contain socialist China's
influence abroad .... Obviously, the U.S. imperialists and Soviet revisionists concocted
the treaty to put all non-nuclear countries in a subordinate position, that of being
'protectorates,' so that they may maintain their special status as big nuclear powers and
remain 'nuclear overlords."' Chinese Communist Comment, Sept. 3, 1967, PnuNG Rn'.,
Sept. 8, 1967, at 84; DocUMErs ON DisAR.AMENT, 1967, at 380, 881.
183. India has stated that its present intention is not to become a party to the
Treaty. Statement by Representative of India to First Committee, U.N. Doc AIC.I/
PV.1567, at 82.
134. "Non-nudear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with
the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either
individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180
days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their
instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such
agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements
shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of
negotiations." Art. III, para. 4. This paragraph of the Non.Proliferation Treaty is based
on Article 13 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
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conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Such agreements can
be concluded "either individually or together with other States," so
the five Euratom members that are non-nuclear-weapon states can
negotiate as a bloc with the IAEA.135
What would happen if a non-nuclear-weapon state which had be-
come a party did not conclude an agreement with the IAEA within the
prescribed time limits? No provision in the Treaty deals with this ques-
tion. The recalcitrant state would possibly have breached an important
obligation under the Treaty, but it would not automatically cease to
be a party. Nor would IAEA safeguards be automatically applied to
that state's peaceful nuclear activities. 8 "
Even though the deadline for IAEA negotiations may be unenforce-
able, some non-nuclear-weapon states might prefer to negotiate their
safeguards agreements before ratifying the Treaty rather than after: the
subject matter involved is complex and technical, and the commitments
required are substantial and controversial. If the non-nuclear-weapon
states with major civil nuclear industries become reluctant to sign the
Treaty until the nature of their agreements with the IAEA becomes
more precisely defined, the Treaty's entry into force will be substan-
tially delayed at least as to this most important category of states.
After the Treaty enters into force, paragraph 2 of Article X111 pro-
vides that the initial term will be twenty-five years, subject at that time
to two options which are exercisable by a simple majority of the
parties: 138 first, the Treaty may be renewed for a fixed period or periods;
135. Article III(D) and Article XIV(A) of the IAEA Statute provide ample authorit)
for the IAEA to conclude an agreement with Euratom.
136. Earlier proposals for Article III, which were never officially published, included
a clause which required the IAEA system automatically to enter into force at the end of
three years if no agreement had been reachd with IAEA in the interim. Euratom member
states objected strongly to this "guillotine clause," and it was deleted from the version
of Article III which was tabled on January 18, 1968. EUROPEAN COiMMUNIrY, April 1968,
at 17.
137. "Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a Conference shall
be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be
extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a
majority of the Parties to the Treaty." Art. X, para. 2.
Article VII of the draft treaty of August 24, 1967, provided for "unlimited duration."
ENDC/192; ENDC/193; DocuMENTs ON DISARMAMENT, 1967, at 338, 341. Italy characterized
the provision for unlimited duration in the August 24, 1967, draft as an "iron corset.'
Statement by Representative of Italy to ENDC, ENDC/PV.341, at 5-6. The government
of Switzerland suggested a treaty for a definite period with a review conference at the
end, stating: "The non-nuclear-weapon states certainly cannot take the responsibility of
tying their hands indefinitely if the nuclear-weapon states fail to arrive at positive results
"in the direction of nuclear disarmament measures." ENDC/204. There has been little
objection to the twenty-five year period specified in the draft treaty of January 18, 1968,
and subsequent versions. Article IV of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty specifies
"unlimited duration." Article 30 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco specifies that the Treaty shall
remain in force "indefinitely."
138. It might be argued that the decision to extend the duration of the Treaty
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second, the Treaty may be continued indefinitely. Once the Treaty
enters into force, therefore, a few more than a majority of the non-
nuclear-weapon parties can control how long the Treaty will remain in
effect after the initial twenty-five year period.
Since some rather severe stresses on the Treaty can be anticipated
during its first twenty-five years of operation, it is well that it contains
rather liberal provisions for review in the interim. 30 Paragraph 3 of
Article VIII140 contains requirements that five years after entry into
force, and at five-year intervals thereafter at the request of a majority of
the parties, a conference of the parties "shall be held" in Geneva "to
review the operation" of the Treaty "with a view to assuring that the
purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being
realized." The Treaty offers no guidance concerning the form of the
assurance or what would be the effect of the decision by a majority of
the parties at such a conference that certain parts of the Treaty were
not working well. Indeed, there is no specific authorization for the
five-year review conferences to make any decisions at all. A specific
proposal that the review conference adopt "findings" by "a majority of
the signatory states present"' 4' was not accepted by the drafters. Such a
conference would, however, at least offer a forum for any party to
propose, discuss and perhaps obtain initial approval of amendments
to the Treaty.
Under paragraph 1 of Article VIII,142 any party is authorized to
propose amendments to the Treaty at any time. At the request of one-
constitutes an amendment to the Treaty which could not take effect under paragmph 2
of Article VIII, note 143 infra, as to any non-consenting party. However, this would dis-
tort paragraph 2 of Article X, which clearly seems intended to place the decision con-
cerning this particular phase of the Treaty in the hands of a majority of the parties and
to make that decision effective against all parties.
139. The nuclear era is barely twenty-five years old. The changes probable in the
next twenty-five years due to nuclear research, development and innovation seem at least
as great as those which have occurred in the first twenty-five year period. For a stimulating
glimpse into the future concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy, see Weinberg. The
Coming Age of Nuclear Energy, I.A.E.A. BuLu., Dec. 1967, at 11-21.
140. "Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the
Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this
Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of
the Treaty are being realized. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the
Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the De-
positary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the came objective of
reviewing the operation of the Treaty." Art. VIII, para. 3.
141. Statement by Representative of Nigeria to ENDC, ENDC/PV.371 (pro-), at 17.
142. "Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of
any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall
circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one third
or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a con-
ference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider sut an
amendment." Art. VIII, para. 1.
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third of the parties, a conference must be convened to consider the
proposed amendment. Any amendment would have to be approved by
a majority vote of all parties, including the affirmative votes of all
nuclear-weapon parties and all other parties which were members of the
IAEA Board of Governors on the date the amendment was circulated.
Each amendment would enter into force, assuming the requisite ma-
jorities were obtained, only as to those parties that specifically consented
by ratifying the amendment. Presumably, the unamended version of
the Treaty would remain in force among parties which did not consent
and between consenting and non-consenting parties.143 The require-
ment that the major nuclear powers, in both military and civil fields,
must approve each amendment provides stability to the Treaty and
probably eliminates the danger of its being reduced by amendment to
a set of conflicting and unworkable obligations.
The analysis of the Non-Proliferation Treaty so far has been primarily
directed at provisions intended to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons
in the horizontal plane to additional states. But proliferation also has
a vertical dimension-the build-up of nuclear armaments within the
nuclear-weapon states. These two dimensions are generally perceived as
dependent variables in any nuclear security equation14 4 Thus, the
143. Article VIII, paragraph 2, provides: "Any amendment to this Treaty must be
approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes
of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the
date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the
International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each
Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of
such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the Instru-
ments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties
which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors
of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any
other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment."
Article V, paragraph 2, of the draft treaty of August 24, 1967, had provided that upon
obtaining the requisite majorities amendments would enter into force as to all parties,
whether or not they had consented. Rumania and others criticized this provision, and It
was changed in the draft of January 18, 1968. Statement by Representative of Rummania to
ENDC, ENDC/PV.348, at 7-8. The Treaty's amendment process is sanctioned and described
in Article 36 of the Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties of the International Law Com-
mission. 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 9, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/6309JRev.1 (1966).
Rumania criticized this provision for giving the members of the IAEA Board of
Governors a privileged position. Statement by Representative of Rumania to ENDC,
ENDC/PV.348, at 7-8. Certainly, the Non-Proliferation Treaty amendment process will
add a major new factor to the designation and election of members of the IAEA Board
of Governors. It is interesting that no member of the IAEA Board has a veto over decisions
by the Board concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy, many affecting the Non.
Proliferation Treaty, while every member of the IAEA Board that is a party to tie
Treaty will have a veto over amendments to it circulated at that time.
144. Although the interaction between horizontal and vertical proliferation is recog-
nized, the conclusion is not inevitable that nuclear-weapon states must reduce their
nuclear armaments if they expect to prevent further proliferation. Rather than mini-
mizing the gap between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states--a "low posture"
-a nuclear-weapon state might choose to widen the gap to make it unbridgeable--a "high
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durability of the Treaty and the underlying policy of preventing fur-
ther horizontal proliferation will depend, perhaps decisively, on the
future success of efforts to control the nuclear arms race among the
nuclear-weapon states. Article VI of the Treaty obligates all parties,
including the twro superpowers, "to pursue negotiations in good faith
on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at
an early date and to nuclear disarmament .... 11
Present trends in nuclear weapons capabilities, however, fly in the
face of these words on paper. 40 Moreover, nuclear power politics is
posture." For good analysis pro and con of each alternative and a conclusion in favor of a
low posture, see Bull, The Role of Nuclear Powers in the Management of Nuclear Pro-
liferation, in Amrs CO-nTROL FOR THE LATE SixtEs 143 (Dougherty & Lehman ed. 1967).
145. "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith
on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to
nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict
and effective international control." Art. VI.
The undertaking regarding "general and complete disarmament" is propaganda. In
addition to these undertakings, the Preamble contains declarations of intention regarding
nuclear disarmament, general and complete disarmament, and achievement of "tie dis-
continuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time." "As has been pointed
out by many non-aligned delegations, a non-proliferation treat), must ...embody an
article of solemn obligation under which the state possessing nuclear weapons would
negotiate a meaningful programme of reduction of existing stockpiles of weapons and
their delivery systems. This provision cannot be merely a pious preambular platitude like
the unfulfilled 'determination' in the four-year-old partial test-ban treaty." Statement by
Representative of India to ENDC, May 23, 1967, ENDC/PV.298, at 4-17; DocutEsrs ox
DisAnRumENT, 1967, at 229, 238.
From time to time various states proposed the inclusion of references in Article VI to
various specific measures of control on vertical proliferation, including a comprehensive
nuclear test ban, cut-off of production of fissionable materials for use in veapons, and a
freeze on further production of nuclear weapon delivery systems. The United States has
stated: "We all know why it would not be feasible to incorporate specific obligations to
that end in the treaty itself. The differences that have prevented agreement on these
measures have not yet been resolved. Any attempt to incorporate specific nuclear arms
limitation obligations in the treaty would inevitably also inject them differences into the
consideration of the treaty itself and could only jeopardize its prospects." Statement by
United States Representative to ENDC, Aug. 24, 1967, ENDC/PV.325, at 4-11; DocuuEtrs
oN DL5s. FA&r, 1967, at 342, 346. The Soviet Union Representative to ENDC made a
statement to the same effect. ENDC/PV.361 (prov.), at 5-22. Moreover, it has been sug-
gested that the view held by some non-nuclear-weapon states-requiring nuclear disrma-
ment as a quid pro quo for accepting the Non-Proliferation Treaty-overlooks the fact
that the Treaty is intended to enhance the security of all states, and in particular the
non-nuclear-weapon states. See Statement by United States Representative to ENDC,
ENDC/PV.362 (prov.), at 21-23. In a recent speech, Secretary of State Rush listed the
following as possible next steps: "achieving an understanding with the Soviet Union o
halt the strategic missile arms race," incuding "control of both offensive vehicles and
antiballistic missiles;" a cut-off of production of fissionable materials for weapons; and a
comprehensive nuclear test ban. Address by Secretary of State Rush, May 2, 19653, 58 STAE
DEP'T Bum- 632, 633-34 (1968).
146. For example, in the United States during the eight years, FY 1962-FY 1969, ap-
proximately $78.7 billion will have been spent on strategic nuclear forces. In tie last
three years the trend is as follows: FY 1967, $6.9 billion; FY 1963, $7.9 billion; FY 1969,
$9.6 billion. Statement by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara on the Fiscal Year
1969-73 Defense Program and the 1969 Defense Budget, Table I, at 214 (196). In mid-1967
a $100.5 million project to provide additional nuclear weapons production facilities was
authorized for the AEC in support of the decision to deploy an anti-ballistic missile de-
fense system. U.S.A.E.C., Major Activities in the Atomic Energy Programs, January.
December 1967, at 60 (1968).
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not within the control of the United States and the Soviet Union,
individually or collectively. China, in particular, is moving into a
position of pivotal importance. On the one hand, China's nuclear
weapons program has already triggered a decision to deploy a ballistic
missile defense system in the United States and could in the future
catalyze a full-scale renewal of the nuclear arms race between the
United States and the Soviet Union. On the other hand, China's grow.
ing nuclear power will increase the problems for India and Japan in
maintaining their own nuclear security.147 Even if the United States
and the Soviet Union play down China's nuclear power and, under the
injunction of Article VI, freeze the nuclear arms build-up between
themselves, this would not resolve the difficulties of those non-nuclear-
weapon states which feel menaced by China.
148
The withdrawal provision of the Treaty and the security assurances
that the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom have
extended to non-nuclear-weapon parties are intended to deal with the
potential insecurity of those non-nuclear-weapon states which give up
their nuclear weapons options. Paragraph I of Article X14 1 provides that
a party may withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that "extraordinary
events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the
supreme interests of its country." This provision is identical with
Article IV of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.150 However, the
147. "India's peculiar position with regard to the nonproliferation treaty . .. is that
it is a nonaligned country, not in military alliance with any country nor under the
nuclear umbrella of any country. Secondly, India is far advanced in nuclear research, and
third, it is under the continuing threat and menace of China, which has already become
a nuclear power." News Conference Remarks by External Affairs Minister Chagla of
India, April 27, 1967, DOCUMENTS ON DISARAMENT, 1967, at 204.
148. For further analysis see WVillrich, ABM and Arms Control, 44 INT'L AFrAlis 228
(1968); Rothstein, The ABM, Proliferation and International Stability, 46 FokrioN
AFFAIRS 487 (1968).
149. "Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to with-
draw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter
of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice
of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security
Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extra.
ordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests." Art. X, para. 1.
150. The withdrawal clause in the Non-Proliferatoin Treaty was a United States
suggestion. Testimony of Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Director, United States Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, Hearings on Arms Control and Disarmament Act Amendments,
1968, Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1968).
The notion of an express provision for withdrawal when one's "supreme interests" are
jeopardized may well have had its origins in another agreement for quite another purpose.
The Nassau agreement provided that certain existing United Kingdom nuclear forces and
the United Kingdom Polaris submarine forces to be built with United States assistance
"would be assigned as part of a NATO nuclear force and targeted in accordance with
NATO plans." "The Prime Minister made it clear that except where Her Majesty's Coy.
eminent may decide that supreme national interests are at stake, these British forces
will be used for the purposes of international defense of the Western Alliance in all clr.
cumstances." (Emphasis added.) Statement on Nuclear Defense Systems, paras. 6, 8, Nassau
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provisions for notice accompanying withdrawal differ by requiring the
withdrawing state to give three months' notice to the Security Council,
in addition to all other parties, and to identify the events it regards as
having jeopardized its supreme interests.'r l
The "extraordinary events" justifying withdrawal must not only be
determined by the withdrawing party to have jeopardized its "supreme
interests," but must also be "related to the subject matter of this
Treaty." Thus, India might be justified in withdrawing from the
Treaty on the basis of a nuclear threat from China, while Israel might
not be justified in withdrawing on the basis of a growing conventional
threat from the Arab states.
The withdrawal clause provides a revolving door in the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, a feature that seems to be essential if the Treaty
is to be a viable political structure, since it touches vital security in-
terests. If a party believed its security was seriously threatened and it
could not withdraw, it would probably either secretly circumvent or
openly abrogate the Treaty. In these circumstances, the withdrawal
clause serves two important functions. First, by providing a legitimate
avenue of escape, it should make it easier for key states such as West
Germany, Japan, Sweden, and perhaps India to become parties to the
Treaty. Second, it should provide an important channel in which the
political process can operate in the event a party should feel its security
threatened. Although the withdrawal clause provides a means of escape,
in another sense it is legitimate, even desirable, for a non-nuclear-
weapon state to view it as a type of nuclear security gurarantee, particu-
larly since the Treaty itself provides no specific guarantee. 52
Communique by President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan, Dec. 21, 1962, 48
DEP'T STATE BuLL. 43-45 (1963); Docubir_ s ON Dis.wmANRENT, 1962, at 1274, 1276 (US.
Arms Control & Disarmament Agency Pub. No. 19, 1963). Article 90, paragraph 1, of the
Treaty of Tlatelolco contains a provision analogous to the Non-Proliteration Treat).
151. Rumania objected to the requirement of submitting a statement to the Security
Council concerning the basis for withdrawal, maintaining that the right of withdrawval
was within the exclusive competence of every state and no other state or international
organization was qualified to discuss it. Statements by Repr entat of Rumania to
ENDC, ENDC/PV. 362 (prov.), at 12; ENDC/PV.376 (prov.), at 22. As di~cuscd inrta,
the procedural requirement-that a statement of justification be submitted to the
Securtiy Council-can be made to work in favor of a party considering withdrawal for
legitimate security reasons. The Security Council would probably become invohed, in any
event, if a state sought to withdraw from the Treat)', if not to assist the party considering
withdrawal, then to consider sanctioning it for creating a situation endangering the
peace.
152. As the Treaty was being drafted and debated, a number of non-nudear-weapon
states proposed that a specific guarantee be included that would protect the non-nudear-
weapon states from nuclear attack or "blackmail" by the nuclear-weapon states. The
United States, in particular, resisted the incorporation of any security guarantee into the
Treaty, because the issues involved were "too difficult and complicated to be reduced to
a treaty provision" and should be dealt with in the context of the United Nations, which
had primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security. Statement by
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In order to obtain the benefits of the guarantee implicit in the with-
drawal clause, a non-nuclear-weapon state would first have to become
a party to the Treaty. Once a party, the non-nuclear-weapon state which
believed itself threatened by another state's nuclear capabilities or
intentions could begin the process of withdrawal, perhaps with a simple
statement of its concern rather than a formal notice. If the Treaty was
working well, the statement from the threatened non-nuclear-weapon
party should generate a prompt response from some or all of the parties
to which it was addressed, possibly including one or more of the
nuclear-weapon states. If, however, the initial response of the other
parties was insufficient to allay the concerns of the threatened non-
nuclear-weapon party, it could proceed to give formal notice of its
intention to withdraw. Notice as required in the withdrawal process
would dramatize the plight of the withdrawing state, and the Security
Council would be a suitable forum in which to generate an adequate
response. 53
Outside the Treaty framework but related to it, a resolution on
"security assurances," sponsored by the United States, the Soviet Union,
and the United Kingdom, has been adopted by the Security Council."'
This is intended to provide a new basis for responding to acts or
threats of "aggression with nuclear weapons" against non-nuclear-
United States Representative to ENDO, ENDC]PV.368 (prov.), at 17. In addition, In.
corporation of a specific security commitment into the Non-Proliferation Treaty could
cause substantial complications for the United States Government in obtaining Senate
consent to ratification.
The Soviet Union has declared its willingness "to include in the draft treaty a clause
on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states parties to the
Treaty which have no nuclear weapons in their territory." Message from Premier
Kosygin to ENDC, Feb. 1, 1966, ENDCJ167, Feb. 3, 1967; DocuMNiNTs ON DISARMAMENT,
1966, at 9, 11. In this proposal the Soviet Union combined two favorite foreign policy
themes. In the first place, the proposal is aimed at West Germany which is a non-nuclear-
weapon state that would clearly not qualify for preferred treatment. Second, the pro-
posal plays to "world public opinion" which will support "ban the bomb" resolutions lIn
the U.N. General Assembly and is unsympathetic to United States reluctance in this regard.
The concept of an affirmative guarantee of the security of a state against attack should be
carefully distinguished from the negative concept of a restraint in the use of a particular
weapon.
153. But the process could also lead in a different direction. It might be suggested
that one effect of the Treaty would be to make the act of withdrawal by a party it
order to acquire nuclear weapons a "situation which might lead to international friction"
justifying an investigation by the Security Council under Article 84 of the U.N. Charter.
The entire situation might be, thereafter, characterized as a "threat to the peace" under
Article 89, justifying the application of appropriate sanctions under Articles 40, 41, and
42. Of course, the target state would not necessarily be the state which had just with-
drawn and declared its intention to acquire nuclear weapons, but it could be.
154. The operative paragraphs are:
"[Each Council member] 1. Recognizes that aggression with nuclear weapons or the
threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon state would create a situation In
which the Security Council, and above all its nuclear-weapon state permanent members,
would have to act immediately in accordance with their obligations under the United
Nations Charter;
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weapon parties to the Treaty. Paragraph 2 of the resolution envisages
declarations of "intention" in support of the assurances. In conjunc-
tion with Security Council action on their proposed resolution, each
of the three sponsors has declared: "[A]ggression with nuclear weapons,
or the threat of such aggression, against a non-nudear-weapon state
would create a qualitatively new situation ... ;" and affirmed "its
intention, as a permanent member of the United Nations Security
Council, to seek immediate Security Council action to provide assis-
tance in accordance with the Charter to any non-nuclear-weapon state
party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that
is a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression
in which nuclear weapons are used."' 5lm Will it follow from such a resolu-
tion that, as declared by the three proponents, "any state which com-
mits ... or... threatens such aggression, must be aware that its actions
are to be countered effectively.. ." ?150 Would such Security Council
action constitute a reliable nuclear security "umbrella" over the non-
nuclear-weapon states which become parties to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty?15 7 Action "through" the Security Council under the assurances
resolution will require the support or acquiescence of the other two
permanent members of the Security Council, France and Nationalist
China. Since Nationalist China is both a non-nudear-weapon state
and a prime target for nuclear threats from Communist China, it will
probably support action under the security assurances resolution. It
is not so clear where France's interests will lie. But the resolution will
give France, which has refused to subscribe to the Non-Proliferation
"2. Welcomes the intention expressed by certain states that they will provide or support
immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nucear-weapon state
party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an
act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used;
"3. Reaffirms in particular the inherent right, recognized under Article 51 of the
Charter, of individual and collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a
member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures newciar
to maintain international peace and security. 58 DEmr STATE Bum. 401-03 (1963) (complete
text and U.S. statement).
155. Id. 402.
156. Id.
157. A United States official has stated that the security assurances resolution "does
not involve a new commitment but it is a statement of the ways we would act under the
charter of the U.N. and a statement which would be meaningful as far as the nonalined
are concerned, if a similar statement was made by the Soviet Union." Testimony of Adrian
S. Fisher, Deputy Director, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
Hearings on Arms Control and Disarmament Act Amendments, 196S, Before the House
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 78 (1968). On October 18, 196-, following
China's first nuclear explosion President Johnson stated: "The nations that do not reek
national nuclear weapons can be sure that, if they need our strong support against ome
threat of nuclear blackmail, then they will have it." 50 D.P'r STATE BuLt. 610-14 (196); see
Willrich, Guarantees to Non-Nuclear Nations, 44 FoapaN ArFAws 683 (1966).
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Treaty, a large influence over the effectiveness of the security assur-
ances which are viewed by many non-nuclear-weapon states as a vital, if
not integral, aspect of the Treaty.
A major substantive weakness of the Security Council resolution on
security assurances is that the events which will bring it into operation
are "aggression" or "the threat of aggression" with nuclear weapons
against a non-nuclear-weapon state. Thus, the resolution rests on all the
unresolved problems of defining aggression and identifying the ag-
gressor, and determination of the threshold question whether "aggres-
sion with nuclear weapons" has occurred in a particular case will be by
the usual Security Council procedures, including the veto of any one
of the five permanent members.
The thrust of the first two paragraphs of the security assurances reso-
lution is action through the Security Council. Paragraph 3, however,
reaffirms the right to individual or collective self-defense under
Article 51 of the Charter. This reaffirmation may be viewed as serving
two purposes. On the one hand, it seems to offset any suggestion, which
might be inferred from the pledges by the three nuclear-weapon parties
to the Treaty to seek action through the Council, that they had dele-
gated any veto-free power to the Security Council. On the other hand,
the reaffirmation of the rights of individual and collective self-defense
provides a "fall-back" assurance to the non-nuclear-weapon states if
assistance from or through the Security Council is not forthcoming.
168
Such an affirmation recognizes, but does not seem to add to or detract
from, the credibility of nuclear security guarantees which already exist
in collective security agreements.
The withdrawal clause of the Treaty and the Security Council
security assurances resolution are directed at different kinds of cir-
cumstances, but share a common purpose-preserving the Treaty. The
"extraordinary events" which a non-nuclear-weapon state might con-
sider to have "jeopardized the supreme interests of its country," thereby
justifying its withdrawal from the Treaty, might well fall short of what
the Security Council might determine "aggression with nuclear weapons
or the threat of such aggression." Thus, the Treaty's withdrawal clause
coupled with the Security Council resolution on assurances might seem
to provide a gradation of responses applicable to a broad range of
events which, if they occurred, would challenge the continued existence
158. Assuming United States-Soviet cooperation, the veto of another Security Council
permananent member or the absence of sufficient time for Security Council action would
not necessarily block coordinated superpower action outside the Security Council on the
basis of the right to collective self-defense.
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of the Treaty. The umbrella of the security assurances resolution,
however, extends only to non-nuclear-weapon states which are parties
to the Treaty. This limitation is intended to create incentives, first, to
adhere to the Treaty and, thereafter, to remain a party. But it will also
undercut any assurance effect of the withdrawal clause for non-nuclear-
weapon states, since the benefit of the resolution can not be claimed
after withdrawal from the Treaty.
What, in practice, might the resolution on security assurances ac-
complish? The veto which each permanent member possesses limits
the possible target of Security Council action to China, and no other
potential nuclear aggressor. In this respect, the Security Council may
become a principal organ for future collaboration between the United
States and the Soviet Union in the containment of China-as long as
China is not a member of the United Nations.109 Such open and insti-
tutionalized collaboration seems an important ingredient of any mean-
ingful security assurance to non-aligned non-nuclear-weapon states such
as India. It is too early to tell, however, whether the security assurances
resolution constitutes a real move by the United States and the Soviet
Union towards this kind of cooperation or merely a short-term ex-
pedient to obtain subscriptions to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
V. Assessment
The competitive forces inherent in the existing international system,
reinforced by conflicts over basic values among competing states in the
system, have greatly accelerated the exploitation of nuclear energy. A
series of upward and outward trends are established in both the
military and the peaceful nuclear fields. The Non-Proliferation Treaty
is an attempt to reverse the military trends, confirm the peaceful trends
and establish a barrier between the two. In short, the Treaty is a major
attempt to achieve political control on a global scale over the scientific
and technological processes by which nuclear energy is exploitedlcO
159. China sees the Non-Proliferation Treaty as just such collusion between the super-
powers. See note 132 supra. United States-Soviet collaboration in this respect will be a
mixed blessing, as far as future accommodation with China is concerned, and like so much
else in the non-proliferation field, it seems primarily intended to buy a few years time.
160. "This treaty confronts us in this form for the first time with the problem of
finding a political solution to the mass of information and knowledge brought to us by
science and technics, knowledge which we can no longer remove from our world. This
makes the help and the counsel of science indispensable in the political field. But it also
raises the problem to a new and somewhat unsure level, that of insuring the primacy of
the political. The political requires the helping partnership of the scientific, but the
responsibility of the final detennination--even in regard to important detailed decisions
-- cannot be taken away from the political leadership." Statement by Foreign Minister
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The attempt is justified mainly by the increasing probability of nuclear
war if nuclear energy continues to be exploited in a largely uncontrolled
manner within the present international system.
Each government faced with the issue of whether or not to become
a party to the Treaty will strike the balance among nuclear incentives
and disincentives for itself, and assess the consequences of the Treaty
from its own peculiar perspective. This will be a difficult political task,
in particular for such non-nuclear-weapon states as West Germany, Ja-
pan, India and Israel, which are faced with major security problems and
already possess technological capabilities to seek nuclear solutions. But
no decision by any government regarding the Non-Proliferation Treaty
can be taken in isolation. As with a decision to acquire nuclear weapons,
a decision to accept or reject the Treaty might well have a chain re-
action effect. Assessment of the consequences of the Treaty by any
particular state, therefore, should be made with the general implications
of the Treaty firmly in mind.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty implies that nuclear weapons will
remain under the exclusive control of the present five nuclear-weapon
states for the indefinite future. The Treaty is intended to prohibit any
sixth state from acquiring nuclear weapons and forecloses the possibility
of transfering nuclear weapons to multilateral structures, even though
no increase would occur in the number of powers in the global system
having control of nuclear weapons.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty leaves the freedom of action of nuclear-
weapon states relatively untouched. But along with this freedom come
serious responsibilities. The nuclear-weapon parties to the Treaty, in
particular the United States and the Soviet Union, will have to control
their development, procurement and deployment of nuclear armaments
if they expect the non-nuclear-weapon parties to continue to abide
by their pledge of nuclear weapons abstinence. At the same time, the
nuclear-weapon parties will have to make the system of security assur-
ances credible both to the non-nuclear-weapon beneficiaries and to all
potential nuclear-weapon aggressors. How the United States and the
Soviet Union can resolve the long-term contradiction between simul-
taneous calls for nuclear disarmament and for effective security assur-
ances against China's growing nuclear threat is by no means clear.
What is dear, however, is that the superpowers cannot avoid shared
responsibility for effecting such a resolution.
Brandt to the Bundestag, Apr. 27, 1967, News from the German Embassy, May 5, 1D67, at
1-8; Docu NElNs ON DISAR.AMENT, 1967, at 206-07.
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Nuclear weapons will remain contained within the existing inter-
national structure for only a limited period of time. A question of
fundamental importance is whether new solutions embracing necessary
structural change can be found or will emerge during the period in
which the rule of nuclear weapons containment established by the
Treaty lasts. Perhaps the greatest risk related to the Treaty is that the
search for new forms will be unsuccessful. Having maintained the
status quo against increasing pressures, if the Treaty structure then
breaks down, the ensuing instabilities could be more severe and danger-
ous than if the natural course of nuclear weapons proliferation had not
been interrupted. This does not mean that the risks inherent in the
Treaty outweigh the risks without the Treaty, but it highlights the
need for receptivity to structural innovation in the international
system in the critical interim period.
While the Treaty confirms the status quo regarding nuclear weapons,
it looks forward to change concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy. Under the Treaty, civil nuclear industries throughout the
world, except in the Soviet Union, will be open to international in-
spection. Non-nuclear-weapon states will come to rely mainly on an
international system of accountability for assurance against nuclear
weapons manufacture in other non-nuclear-weapon states. A new
multilateral decision-making framework for peaceful application of
nuclear explosives is established.
The provisions concerning the application of safeguards and the range
of international nuclear transactions permitted when a nuclear-weapon
state is the recipient are, however, more discriminatory than they need
be. Civil nuclear industries within states and nuclear commerce between
states should be placed on the same footing throughout the world as
soon as possible. The exclusions presently in the Treaty with respect
to these matters may be justified as expedients to obtain its initial
acceptance, but the question whether such exclusions ought to con-
tinue should be placed high on the agenda of the first review conference
under the Treaty.
We look forward to a world in which plutonium will be available in
very large quantities in all industrially advanced states and in many
developing states. 61 Safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities will at
most serve to flash a red warning light if this material is diverted from
161. For an excellent description and analysis, see Gilinsky, Fast Breeder Reactors and
the Spread of Plutonium, RAND Memorandum RIM-5148-PR (1957).
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peaceful uses. 62 There is nothing that safeguards alone can do to
prevent diversion from occurring once a non-nuclear-weapon state
decides to embark on a nuclear weapons program. Thus, safeguards
are but a part of, not a complete response to, the challenge to the
international system presented by continuing peaceful nuclear innova-
tion.1 3 Here again, an adequate response to nuclear energy will require
further structural innovation in the international political system.10'
162. There is not even a clear red light in the safeguards system. If a state was bent on
diverting nuclear material from a safeguarded nuclear facility, the only signal the inter-
national inspectorate could count on receiving would be a series of yellow warning lights
as a result of statements by the host state that inspection would be inconvenient.
Concerning sanctions, the IAEA Board of Governors has not ventured beyond references
to the relevant statutory provisions in its development of a system of Agency safeguards.
Article XII, paragraph C, sets forth procedures to be followed in the event of non-com-
pliance. These include: a report by the inspectors to the Director General; the transmittal
of the report by the Director General to the Board of Governors; a call upon the 6tate
concerned to remedy the situation if non-compliance is found by the Board; a report by
the Board to the members of IAEA and to the U.N. Security Council and General As-
sembly; and the Board's decision to curtail or suspend assistance in event of failure of
the state concerned to take "fully corrective action within a reasonable time," or to call
for the return of materials and equipment made available. Provision is also made for
suspension of the non-complying state from membership in the IAEA. For discussion, see
Szasz, The Law of International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards, 3 REV. Bu. o Dt
Daorr INT'L 196, 220-23 (1967).
163. One observer has concluded: "The proposed nonproliferation treaty must be
judged primarily for its effect on the growing threat of a worldwide diffusion of plutonium.
If it reinforces the false security of the safeguards system by persuading the legalists that
no country which has signed is ever capable of building nuclear weapons, it will (o a
grave disservice to the cause of nonproliferation.... [U]nder the placid rule of safeguards
as they are now understood, the plutonium will spread far and wide. When the collapse
comes, no one will remember how easy it might have been to hold a narrow ring." Blton,
Nuclear Fuel-For-All, 45 FOREIGN AiFFAIRS 662, 669 (1967). However, holding "a narrow
ring" based on international ownership and processing control in addition to safeguards
accountability control over plutonium, as Beaton suggests, does not seem to be a solution
easily achieved either.
It has also been suggested that detailed studies will reveal that: "There is some optimum
way for the elements of nuclear energy systems to be distributed throughout the world. If
facilities are collected together into too small a number of "closed fuel cycle" systems,
then unattainable surveillance accuracies are likely to be required to detect diversion
from a single facility at levels that correspond potentially to many nuclear explosives. At
the other extreme, however, nuclear facilities might be so widely dispersed that high sur-
veillance accuracies and effective physical security measures become too costly, and the
possibility of open, armed theft of enough material to produce a few nuclear explosives
for criminal purposes could become intolerably large." Taylor, The Rapid Growth of
Nuclear Technology-Implication for Nuclear Safeguards, INT'L RrSEARCH & TECIINOLOGY J.,
Jan. 1, 1968, at 16. The problem with such a suggestion is that economic and political
forces will probably cut in a different direction and the result will not approximate the
optimum from the safeguards standpoint.
164. As the availability of plutonium increases, the threat will become as much a
problem of internal as external security. Recently a United States contractor operating a
fuel fabrication plant reported losses in excess of 100 kilograms of uranium-235 over a
period of years. Address by John T. Conway, Executive Director, Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy, to 7th Annual Meeting, Institute of Nuclear Materials Management,
June 14, 1966. This triggered the convening of an outside review panel, the estabhshmentof a new Office of Safe uar s and Materials Management within th  AEC, A.E.G. Press
Release No. K-108, May 3, 1967, and the stationing of a resident AEC inspector at four
private facilities in the United States which process sigificant quantities of fissionable
material. A.E.C. Press Release No. K-121, May 12, 1967.
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Einstein once said: "The unleashed power of the atom has changed
everything save our modes of thinking, and thus we drift to un-
paralleled catastrophe." The Non-Proliferation Treaty could give
us some additional time to change our modes of thinking.
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